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Cyber Power and the International System 
 
Shawn William Lonergan 
 
 
This dissertation is comprised of three separate papers that address how cyber 
power contributes to national power and the implications for international security posed 
by cyber operations. The first paper, “Cyber Power and International Stability: Assessing 
Deterrence and Escalation in Cyberspace,” posits that there are unique attributes that 
define the cyber domain and that have direct implications on deterrence and escalation 
dynamics between state actors.  The second paper, “Arms Control and Confidence 
Building Measures for the Cyber Domain,” explores at various mechanisms that states 
have traditionally used to foster stability and prevent inadvertent conflict and assesses 
their applicability to controlling cyber operations. Finally, “The Logic of Coercion in 
Cyberspace” delves into the role of cyber operations as both inadvertent and deliberate 
signals and assesses their utility as a coercive instrument of statecraft.
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Cyber Power and International Stability:  
Assessing Deterrence and Escalation in Cyberspace 
Shawn W. Lonergan 
 
Introduction 
Although the cyber domain in general, and cyber conflict in particular, are not “new,” 
academia is only at a nascent stage in exploring and understanding how many of the core 
theories of international security apply to state behavior in cyberspace. Perhaps the most 
fundamental question posed by the emergence of a new domain of strategic and military 
competition between states is the extent to which it contributes to, or undermines, international 
stability. During the Cold War, the two interrelated theoretical concepts that were central to the 
notion of systemic stability or instability were deterrence and escalation. On the one hand, 
mutual deterrence through the reciprocal threat (and fear) of catastrophic strategic nuclear war 
was hypothesized to inject stability into relations between the two superpowers. On the other 
hand, escalation dynamics risked undermining the very stability achieved through mutual 
deterrence—deliberate escalation as encapsulated in Herman Kahn’s escalation ladder 
envisioned a world in which states could deliberately escalate to the use of nuclear weapons, and 
theories of inadvertent escalation hypothesized how states could unintentionally stumble into 
nuclear war. 
This paper explores the stability of the cyber domain using the lenses of deterrence and 
escalation theory. In particular, I assess the extent to which deterrence and escalation theories are 
applicable to cyberspace and, in doing so, identify the attributes of the cyber domain that differ 




scholars should think about deterrence and escalation. The prevailing assumption in the nascent 
literature on cyber conflict is that deterrence is incredibly difficult in the cyber domain and, 
therefore, it is likely to be defined by escalatory spirals. However, in my analysis, I find that 
traditional conceptions of both deterrence and escalation are problematic and that, while 
deterrence by punishment is hard, deterrence by denial is possible. Moreover, I find that the 
domain is also not as escalatory as the literature suggests. My divergent conclusions are in large 
part driven by the fact that, unlike the vast majority of scholars, I do not find the cyber domain to 
be offense dominant—particularly due to the target-specific nature of offensive cyber 
operations—and the destructive potential of cyber conflict is relatively minimal. Thus, while 
deterrence and escalation may be flip sides of the same coin in the context of the traditional 
security studies literature, I assert that the same is not the case in cyberspace.  
This paper proceeds as follows. First, I introduce the three distinct, theoretically 
important characteristics of cyberspace that carry implications for how we can understand the 
application of deterrence and escalation to the domain. Then, I assess three different deterrence 
logics: punishment, denial, and cross domain. The paper then transitions to explore both 
inadvertent and deliberate escalation dynamics in cyberspace.   
Three Unique Attributes of Cyberspace 
Three attributes distinguish the cyber domain from others in ways that have implications 
for the logic and feasibility of deterrence and escalation. In particular, I focus on a comparison 
between cyber and nuclear weapons due to the context in which deterrence and escalation 
theories were developed.
1
 The greatest similarities between nuclear and cyber weapons are that 
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 While I also consider the applicability of conventional deterrence to the cyber domain, my 
comparison of weaponry focuses on nuclear versus cyber arms due to the overwhelming 




both possess tactical as well as strategic utilities; and the logic of offense-defense theory appears 
to have relevance to the two fields, as will be explored in multiple parts of this paper.
2
 However, 
there are important differences between these weapons that stem from the nature of their 
employment, particularly offensive applications, and their respective capacities for destruction.
3
 
                                                                                                                                                                           
comparing an entire class of armaments (e.g., conventional) with a specific type of weapon. 
Several scholars have made the nuclear-cyber comparison before. For instance, see Stephen J. 
Lukasik, “A Framework for Thinking about Cyber Conflict and Cyber Deterrence with Possible 
Declaratory Policies for These Domains,” and Patrick M. Morgan, “Applicability of Traditional 
Deterrence Concepts and Theory to the Cyber Realm,” in Proceedings of a Workshop on 
Deterring Cyber Attacks: Informing Strategies and Developing Options for U.S. Policy, National 
Research Council (Washington, DC: The National Academies Press, 2010); and Joseph S. Nye 
Jr., “Nuclear Lessons for Cyber Security?,” Strategic Studies Quarterly 5, no. 4 (Winter 2011). 
2
 Offense-Defense Theory purports that the probability of interstate conflict increases when there 
is the perception by state actors that offensive capabilities have an advantage over defensive 
ones. Furthermore, the theory suggests that the probability of conflict decreases and the 
probability of cooperation between states increases when defense is dominant. For further 
reference see Robert Jervis, “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma,” World Politics 30, no. 2 
(1978): 167-214; and Stephen Van Evera, “Offense, Defense, and the Causes of 
War,” International Security 22, no. 4 (Spring 1998): 5-43. For a specific reference to the 
offense-defense balance and cyber see, Ilai Saltzman, “Cyber Posturing and the Offense-Defense 
Balance,” Contemporary Security Policy 34, no. 1 (2013): 40-63; and Keir Lieber, “The Offense-
Defense Balance and Cyber Warfare,” Cyber Analogies 96, no. 107 (2014). 
3
 There are other important differences between cyber and nuclear weapons. However, those not 
identified do not carry the same level of significance on the theoretical implications of the 
analysis presented in this paper as the ones stated. For instance, nuclear weapons have only been 
offensively employed twice in human history—the atomic bombings against Japan at the close of 
World War II—compared to a plethora of publicly-known significant cyber attacks, which likely 
represent only a subset of actual offensive cyber attacks. Offensive cyber operations are 
mainstream and not subjected to the non-use taboo surrounding nuclear weapons [For further 
discussion on the nuclear taboo see Nina Tannenwald, The Nuclear Taboo: The United States 
and The Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons Since 1945 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2007).]. Indeed, where Bernard Brodie noted that nuclear weapons changed the nature of war 
regardless if they are used, cyber weapons have changed the nature of war in the sense that it is 
an almost certainty they will be employed [Bernard Brodie, “Implications for Military Policy,” in 
The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order, ed. Bernard Brodie (New York: 
Harcourt, 1946), 83]. Be it on the battlefield or against the distant homeland of an invader, the 
employment of cyber weapons will only become more common in future conflict. Fourth, fears 
of the widespread proliferation of nuclear weapons, which has been a paramount concern since 
the dawn of the nuclear era, never materialized as opposed to the rapid development and 




First, in the cyberspace, secrecy is an inherent characteristic of the domain such that it creates 
two related complications for deterrence and escalation: the difficulties states encounter when 
attributing the physical origin and/or political responsibility for a cyber attack, and the decision 
to reveal information about attribution; and the fact that secretly operating in the domain is 
essential to mission success. Second, the defining feature of cyber weapons—the fact that they 
are non-physical weapons that are comprised of zeroes and ones—has implications for 
vulnerability and survivability, as well as the nature of their lethality. Third, at least at the current 
technological state, there are fundamental limitations, both material and psychological, to the 
costs that cyber weapons can generate against targeted states. Below, I outline these interrelated 
characteristics of the cyber domain, which serve as the bedrock for understanding how the logics 
of deterrence and escalation apply to cyberspace.   
Secrecy is Inherent to the Cyber Domain  
Successfully operating in cyberspace demands that states conceal their activities in the 
domain, both because espionage is a critical element of offensive cyber operations and this, by 
definition, is a secretive activity; and because revealing information about access and capabilities 
undermines efficacy. Espionage is the foundation of offensive operations in cyberspace because 
                                                                                                                                                                           
Reiss, eds. The Nuclear Tipping Point: Why States Reconsider Their Nuclear Choices 
(Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2004)]. Indeed, unlike nuclear weapons (thus far), 
offensive cyber capabilities have proliferated across most states and have not been restricted to 
governmental actors. Indeed, corporations, criminal elements, and even individuals can develop 
cyber arms. Additionally, unlike the traditional domains of warfare—land, air, sea, and space—
the cyber domain is the one domain where there is near offensive parity between many states; 
there may even be parity between some states and non-state actors. Much of this proliferation is 
due to low barriers of entry into the cyber field as offensive capabilities can be acquired via 
multiple online market places or through various cyber security firms [For example, see, “The 
Digital Arms Trade,” The Economist, March 30, 2013, 
http://www.economist.com/news/business/21574478-market-software-helps-hackers-penetrate-
computer-systems-digital-arms-trade]. However, this is not meant to imply that offensive cyber 
weapons are low cost capabilities. As is discussed in this paper, they may come with significant 




successfully delivering an effect against a target requires that a state first (covertly) gather 
intelligence about it, to include ascertaining how to gain access, particularities about the target’s 
capabilities and vulnerabilities, and mapping the target’s virtual network.
4
 While a nuclear 
weapon is a “fire and forget” capability that delivers the same effect regardless of the target with 
which it comes into contact, employing cyber weapons requires intelligence not only of the 
target system the state intends to affect, but also of the network vulnerabilities upon which access 
can be established in order to launch the tool. Specifically, a cyber attack requires three distinct 
operations. The first is collecting information on the targeted system or process (e.g., the 
manufacturer of the system, its operating system, its most recent firmware update, etc.). This 
could be conducted through various intelligence means or scanning the system in question via an 
assortment of cyber techniques. The second operation necessitates gaining access to the targeted 
system. This access functions as a foothold that enables further intelligence collection or could 
serve as a keyhole through which an offensive cyber weapon could be launched against the 
targeted system. The final step involves executing the malicious code against the targeted system 
via the access provided. 
Therefore, beyond espionage, secrecy is imperative to carrying out the requisite steps of a 
cyber operation described above. In particular, secrecy is necessary to preserve access, because if 
the target uncovers that a state has gained access to its networks, it can marshal defenses and take 
measures to patch its vulnerability and render the attacker’s access capability moot. Secrecy is 
also critical to preserving the capability of the weapon itself, because revealing that information 
                                                     
4
 Generally, cyber operations come in four varieties: cyber defense, cyber penetration (in some 
military circles “operational preparation of the environment (OPE)” depending on the intended 
end-state), cyber espionage, and cyber attack. Where the first is conducted entirely on one’s own 
networks, the later three are conducted on foreign nets.  Though the intent and the effect 
delivered for the last three types of operations vary greatly, they can also support cyber defense 




allows the target to develop defenses against it and it may also reveal the attacking state’s 
targeting strategy and broader set of capabilities.  
Because states have an enormous incentive to conceal their capabilities, accesses, and 
activities in the cyber domain, and due to the technical nature of cyber weapons, states that are 
the targets of offensive cyber attacks confront significant hurdles to attributing the origins of a 
cyber attack and ascertaining political responsibility.
5
 The technical design of the Internet itself 
complicates attribution because its virtual nature enables nearly-invisible operations and 
facilitates attackers obfuscating the point of departure of an attack by using multiple proxies and 
other anonymizing capabilities.
6
 Furthermore, attribution of a cyber attack may take weeks or 
months and only result in a degree of confidence in the true source of an attack. More 
importantly, attribution involves a strategic, political calculus to assign responsibility to an entity 
for a cyber attack, which is confounded by deliberated efforts by governments to obscure 
command and control for cyber attacks, such as employing cyber proxies.
7
 This is fundamentally 
distinct from nuclear weapons where, due to the limited numbers of states possessing bombs, the 
                                                     
5
 Thomas Rid and Ben Buchanan, “Attributing Cyber Attacks,” Journal of Strategic Studies 38, 
no. 1-2 (2015): 4-37. 
6
 For further reference see Clement Guitton and Elaine Korzak, “The Sophistication Criterion for 
Attribution: Identifying the Perpetrators of Cyber-Attacks,” The RUSI Journal 158, no. 4 (2013): 
62-68. 
7
 Rid and Buchanan argue that, at the strategic level, “attribution is a function of what is at stake 
politically,” 7. Also see Erica D. Borghard and Shawn W. Longeran, “Can States Calculate the 
Risks of Using Cyber Proxies?” Orbis 60, no. 3 (May 2016), 395-416, for a discussion of why 




ability to detect launches, and the unique signature of nuclear enrichment processes, attribution 
was not a significant concern for early nuclear scholars.
8
  
Cyber Weapons are Distinct 
 The virtual nature of cyber weapons makes them fundamentally distinct from nearly any 
other category of weapon in a way that has significant implications for the functions of 
deterrence and escalation. In particular, cyber weapons are simultaneously uniquely invulnerable 
and specific in their employment. Because cyber weapons are virtual—comprised of lines of 
code that could always be regenerated—the tools themselves are intrinsically invulnerable and 
survivable. This is a crucial distinction from nuclear weapons. Concerns about ensuring the 
invulnerability of nuclear arsenals were paramount because survivability undergirded the 
stability of nuclear deterrence by ensuring a state could credibly threaten to retaliate against a 
nuclear attack.
9
 Indeed, Wohlstetter argued that deterrence fails due to temporal constraints if 
one side can launch a surprise attack that destroys the opponent’s retaliatory capability.
10
 
However, Brodie noted that due to the destructive nature of nuclear weapons, retaliation did not 
have to be certain, just probable enough to serve a deterrent value.
11
 Initially Brodie believed that 
the ability to respond to a nuclear attack depended on the survivability of a nation’s armed forces 
and their ability to operate autonomously from major urban centers (assuming that cities would 
                                                     
8
 For instance, see Bernard Brodie, “War in the Atomic Age,” in The Absolute Weapon, 74. That 
said, depending on how they are conducted, underground nuclear explosions could hinder 
attribution efforts.  
9
 Indeed, secrecy was important to nuclear weapons because it guarded against proliferation and 
also contributed to survivability. 
10
 Albert Wohlstetter, “The Delicate Balance of Terror,” Foreign Affairs 37 (1958): 211-246, 
211.  
11




fall victim to counter value targeting).
12
 However, following the development of thermonuclear 
weapons in the early 1950s Brodie amended his statement and noted that survivability of nuclear 
deployment systems was essential to stabilizing deterrence. Concerns over survivability of 
weapons systems that marked much of the nuclear era has little bearing on cyber weaponry. 
Cyber weapons do not require airfields, missile silos, or submarine pens to protect them from 
attack. Cyber weapons could easily be concealed on a hard drive, a disk, or other type of 
removable media. Furthermore, the majority of cyber tools could be employed from virtually any 
area that has Internet connectivity regardless of geographic location.
13
 Unless an actor is 
foolhardy enough to store all of her cyber armaments on a centralized server that can be targeted, 
it is unlikely that an outside actor could destroy another actor’s ability to retaliate with offensive 
cyber capabilities. Even if the latter occurred, the virtual nature of cyber weapons means that an 
actor could always simply write new code. However, unlike nuclear weapons, which are nearly 
guaranteed to deliver an immensely destructive effect against any target, successfully deploying 
cyber weapons is contingent on maintaining access to a target’s networks and systems. While 
cyber weapons cannot be physically destroyed, access is highly precarious and can be vulnerable 
in unpredictable ways.  
Related to the access requirement, cyber weapons are unique in that they lack universal 
lethality. While nuclear weapons, or nearly any other munition, are target-agnostic, cyber 
weapons must be tailored to a specific target set, or type of target (which underlies the 
importance of espionage). Cyber weapons are nothing more than code that interacts with other 
code that directs a system to do something that the owner did not intend. Yet developing these 
                                                     
12
 Ibid., 87. 
13
 The caveat to this point is that there are some isolated targets that operate on closed networks 




capabilities is hard for two reasons. First, states typically secure the critical systems that might be 
targeted because of their importance to the functioning of a society and national security; and 
second, these critical targets often employ custom developed supervisory control and data 
acquisition (SCADA) software that is unique to that system and only intimately understood by 
the original developers. This means that developers of cyber weapons must not only gain 
intelligence on a target that most likely is well defended and probably not connected to the 
Internet, they must also possess intimate knowledge of the specific technology that the system 
was built on. Developing a capability that can interface with a custom-built system is difficult, 
but it is by orders of magnitude more difficult to develop the mastery necessary to manipulate the 
system to do something that it may have been designed to resist. Additionally, obfuscating one’s 
virtual presence from defenders throughout the entire process requires a level of tradecraft that 
few possess. Indeed, Herbert Lin notes that, “…the cost of a cyber weapon, which is almost 
entirely in R&D, cannot be amortized over as many targets as would be the case for a kinetic 
weapon. This fact necessarily increases the cost-per-target destroyed.”
14
 This is significant for 
both deterrence and escalation because there is no metric for measuring relative power between 
cyber actors, while there are both qualitative and quantitative metrics for assessing the relative 
power of nuclear states—one cannot simply count the number of cyber weapons an actor has in 
its arsenal in the same way that one can count the number of nuclear-equipped missiles a state 
has stockpiled. There are important implications stemming from the inability to measure relative 
power, particularly for escalation because states may be reticent to ratchet up against an 
adversary if there is endemic uncertainty about their relative power. Moreover, the lack of a 
                                                     
14
 Herbert Lin, “Oft-Neglect Cost Drivers of Cyber Weapons,” Council on Foreign Relations- 





measure of relative cyber strength between actors may inhibit economies of scale. This is further 
complicated by the fact that cyber weapons have a shelf life.  The access upon which they rely, 
and the effect they deliver, is only an update away from being patched.   
Cost Generation in Cyberspace  
Finally, cyber weapons cannot generate costs for a target at a magnitude comparable to 
that of conventional munitions, let alone nuclear weapons.
15
 The utility of military instruments of 
power inheres in their abilities to inflict significant damage and harm on a target state to achieve 
a political objective. Cyber weapons could be used to cause disruption of an adversary’s 
networks and systems—overwhelming them such that they lose the ability to function or the 
target loses confidence in their reliability—or causing destruction by destroying data resident on 
these systems or, in rarer circumstances, producing a physical effect.
16
 While conducting 
multiple cyber attacks against a targeted state’s critical national infrastructure, for example, 
could in theory cause significant destruction, replicating a cyber attack across numerous targets 
to produce a strategic effect may be beyond the realm of all but the most capable states. To draw 
an analogy, a war is comprised of tactical engagements that all contribute to the overall cost of 
the war. Tactical victories in cyberspace, taken individually, may appear to be relatively costless 
and net a high probability of success, but combining many of these victories together into a 
campaign that achieves a desired strategic end state is unlikely because the costs of producing 
such capabilities is extreme. Even if technology improves in a way that enables states to achieve 
strategic effects on the battlefield, or against civilian assets using cyber weapons, sustaining 
                                                     
15
 See Erik Gartzke, “The Myth of Cyberwar,” International Security 38, no. 2 (Fall 2013): 41-
73; and Thomas Rid, Cyber War Will Not Take Place (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013). 
16
 For a more detailed discussion of this point see Erica D. Borghard and Shawn W. Lonergan, 




costly campaigns over time is confounded by the fact that it takes time to develop capabilities 
and accesses (especially due to the absence of universal lethality of cyber weapons); and that the 
adversary is a strategic actor who can take action to mitigate existing vulnerabilities once the 
attacking state’s tools and accesses are revealed as they are employed. Therefore, as states 
employ cyber weapons over the course of a campaign, they are likely to use their most decisive 
capabilities at the outset and will be less effective and/or precise over time, generating effects 
against most vulnerable rather than more deliberate targets.  
Relatedly, while it is possible to employ cyber weapons to produce a destructive effect in 
the physical realm, no one to date has died as the direct result of a cyber attack. Thus, while it 
may be possible to generate comparable costs to a target using cyber and conventional military 
means—in terms of the financial cost of a particular attack—decision-makers (and domestic 
publics) are likely to perceive the “cost” of physical and virtual destruction differently. This may 
be similar to the psychological perceptions surrounding certain classes of weapons that societies 
have deemed heinous, even though their destructive capabilities may be similar to, or even less 
potent than, weapons deemed acceptable.
17
 The perception of the likely cost of an attack is 
important because it factors into a decision-maker’s calculus regarding the relative payoffs of 
various courses of action in the context of deterrent threats, and it also helps define the 
thresholds according to which a government assesses decisions to escalate.  
Together, these three attributes of the cyber domain—the integral role played by secrecy, 
the distinct nature of cyber weapons, and the differences in cost generation—affect the logics of 
deterrence and escalation as applied to the cyber domain. In the context of escalation, the nature 
of strategic interaction in the cyber domain creates self-dampening effects and injects breathing 
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room into crisis situations that, together, mitigate the risks of escalatory spirals. However, these 
same attributes also problematize efforts at achieving successful deterrence because they 
undermine effective signaling and create significant difficulties in discerning and generating the 
requisite capabilities for a deterrent threat. In the following section, I turn to the problem of 
deterrence in cyberspace and explore how these factors complicate state efforts at deterrence.  
Deterrence in Cyberspace 
Deterrence, at its core, is prevention by fear. Robert Art defines deterrence as, “the 
deployment of military power so as to be able to prevent an adversary from doing something that 
one does not want him to do and that he otherwise might be tempted to do by threatening him 
with unacceptable punishment if he does it.”
18
 For much of the Cold War the United States and 
the Soviet Union pursed a strategy of mutual deterrence to reciprocally prevent the onset of 
nuclear war. To many scholars, it was the successful application of deterrence by both sides that 
kept the Cold War from becoming hot.
19
 Theoretical canons were developed during the twentieth 
century that sought to explain the origins and continuation of stable relations between the Cold 
War superpowers based on a strategy of deterrence, and sought to identify how perceived 
momentary military advantages could undermine the preservation of the status quo.  
                                                     
18
 Robert J. Art, “To What Ends Military Power?” International Security 4, no. 4 (Spring 1980): 
3-35, 6. However, it is difficult to ascertain whether a given deterrent threat was successful 
because deterrence has a negative object. 
19
 But see the following for debates about the efficacy of deterrence strategy during the Cold 
War: Robert Jervis, The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1984); Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy (London: Macmillan, 1989); 
Austin G. Long, Deterrence: From Cold War to Long War: Lessons from Six Decades of RAND 
Deterrence Research (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, Vol. 636, 2008); and Francis 
J. Gavin, Nuclear Statecraft: History and Strategy in America's Atomic Age (Ithaca: Cornell 




More recently, scholars and policymakers alike have attempted to apply deterrence 
models to the cyber domain, given the widely-accepted notion that there is a need to establish 
norms of acceptable behavior in cyberspace and limit offensive cyber operations and actors. 
However, while there is some scholarly consensus that achieving deterrence in the cyber domain 
is far more difficult, if not impossible, than it was for practitioners during the Cold War, the 
existing cyber literature has not systematically assessed the various logics of deterrence and the 
mechanisms through which deterrence may or may not work in cyberspace. Therefore, in this 
section, given the three distinct attributes of cyberspace introduced above, I explore how the 
traditional logics of deterrence by punishment, denial, and cross-domain deterrence apply to the 
cyber domain. I will demonstrate that, across all three types of deterrence, the opaqueness of the 
cyber domain, the unique nature of cyber weapons, and the problem of cost generation in 
cyberspace make deterrence nearly impossible by undermining the ability of states to credibly 
signal capability and resolve; and to generate and convey proportionate deterrent threats. 
However, I also demonstrate that the application of these three types of deterrence—punishment, 
denial, and cross-domain—to cyberspace is complicated by logics and variables that are unique 
to each form of deterrence.  
The General Argument 
 Achieving successful deterrence during the Cold War came with incredibly high stakes 
due to the devastating costs of nuclear war. The primary factor that made nuclear deterrence 
difficult, therefore, was the credibility of deterrent threats. Under conditions of mutual assured 
destruction, a credible nuclear deterrent rested on threatening to take actions that would result in 
the destruction of the threatener’s society. Moreover, defining a political objective that would be 




Indeed, this is why Thomas Schelling’s seminal work on the topic, Arms and Influence, devotes 
so much time to the problem of credibility and all of the ways in which states could enhance the 
credibility of their threats (e.g., hands-tying, brinksmanship, the art of commitment, to name only 
a few).
20
 The credibility of a threat is a function of capability—possessing the means to carry out 
the terms of a threat—and resolve—the willingness to do so. For nuclear deterrence, capability is 
an unproblematic aspect of credibility because all states are aware of the immensely destructive 
nature of nuclear weapons, and states can easily demonstrate their capabilities through shows of 
force. Resolve, on the other hand, is incredibly difficult to convey because there is an inherent 
incredibility in threatening nuclear war for the reasons stated above. Therefore, scholars and 
policymakers during the Cold War focused on means of conveying a willingness to use an 
unthinkable weapon. 
 Deterrence in cyberspace is problematic for precisely the inverse reason. The offensive 
employment of cyber weaponry is hardly unthinkable. Indeed, states have developed and 
employed these capabilities since the 1980s, and their use is only becoming more prevalent. 
Thus, cyber warfare is more immune from the so-called “credibility problem” faced by nuclear 
strategists. There is little reason to doubt the general credibility associated with the use of 
offensive cyber weapons because states have demonstrated a willingness to do so, and even use 
cyber capabilities to target an adversary’s critical infrastructure. However, cyber weapons 
possess a distinct credibility issue in the context of cross-domain deterrence, which stems from 
the difference in the perception of virtual versus physical destruction. More specifically, a state 
may doubt the credibility of a deterrent threat that promises to respond to a cyber attack 
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 Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence: With a New Preface and Afterword (New Haven, 
CT: Yale University Press, 2008). As Schelling notes, the problem of credibility is even more 
severe for extended deterrence, where the United States during the Cold War had to convince the 




(resulting in virtual damage that may produce an effect in the physical world, but does not 
directly cause death) with a kinetic one (resulting in physical damage). Additionally, conveying 
credibility in a specific situation is problematic in the cyber domain due to the requirements for 
operating secretly. While recent scholarship has demonstrated that it is possible to credibly signal 
in secret, specifically through the use of covert actions, this logic rests on the fact that local 
actors can observe covertly-operating states taking costly and risky actions on the ground in an 
area of conflict.
21
 However, the manner in which secrecy affects cyber operations falls outside of 
the scope of this kind of reasoning. Setting aside the fact that there are serious problems 
associated with assessing the relative cost of cyber attacks (and, therefore, their value as a 
signaling tool), actions that reveal a state’s cyber weapons and accesses can provide decisive 
information to the target of a threat that enables her to take protective measures that render the 
threat moot. Thus, cyber attacks are poor tools of costly signaling, even when conducted in secret 
because a signal, once sent, may likely not be repeated.
22
 Additionally, even covert signaling 
through conventional means relies on a reasonable assessment about the identity of the 
perpetrator of an attack. In cyberspace, targets are not only confronted with an attribution 
problem, discussed above, but there may also be a significant time lag between when an 
operation is carried out and when it is perceived by the target, unless the attacker self-identifies 
(invoking all the risks associated with operating overtly in the cyber domain). Therefore, this 
suggests that while there is no general credibility problem associated with the use of offensive 
cyber weapons, conveying credibility in specific instances may be deeply problematic for 
reasons that are inherent to the cyber domain.  
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 See Austin Carson and Keren Yarhi-Milo, “Covert Communication: The Intelligibility and 
Credibility of Signaling in Secret,” Security Studies 26, no. 1 (2017): 124-156. 
22




 Beyond these distinct credibility problems, the fundamental conundrum of deterrence in 
cyberspace is capability. Nuclear capability is easy to demonstrate and the staggering costs of 
employing nuclear weapons are clear to policymakers.
23
 Capability in cyberspace, however, is 
incredibly difficult to measure; to understand in relative or proportionate terms; and to signal. As 
will be described below, measuring cyber capabilities is challenging due to the importance states 
assign to secrecy and the absence of universal lethality of cyber weapons—the fact that specific 
accesses and tools must be developed for specific targets; that gaining and maintaining accesses 
is contingent; and that attacks may be unpredictable in terms of cost, scope, and effect. This 
confounds deterrence for numerous reasons. As described above, a deterring state may be loath 
to reveal capabilities (which enhances the credibility of deterrence) because the act of revealing 
them renders them impotent. The deterring state and/or the target of deterrence may not be able 
to assign a value to the cost associated with the threatened punishment if the latter defects 
relative to the value the latter ascribes to defection. Relatedly, the threatened punishment may 
simply not be sufficiently costly to affect the target’s calculus, or the target may be willing to 
gamble that a threatened action may not produce the effect intended by the deterring state due the 
often-unpredictable nature of cyber operations. Finally, signals regarding capability may go 
unrealized, or be misinterpreted or misperceived. 
 Policymakers and scholars, recognizing the inherently problems of credibility of nuclear 
deterrence, attempted to devise means of overcoming the credibility gap and grappled with 
whether it could be possible to plan for limited nuclear options. The question for the cyber 
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domain is whether the capability conundrum and other problems associated with cyber 
deterrence could ever be overcome.
24
  
Deterrence by Punishment 
Deterrence is a “coercive strategy” that seeks to prevent an actor from taking an 
unacceptable action.
25
 As Robert Art describes, deterrence involves “…the threat of retaliation… 
(whose) purpose is to prevent something from happening.”
26
 Deterrence succeeds, therefore, 
when “the risks and cost of military action are very high.”
27
 The literature distinguishes between 
two different types of deterrent threats: deterrence by denial, and deterrence by punishment. 
Deterrence by denial, according to Glenn Snyder, involves threatening to physically impede the 
adversary’s ability to successfully carry out a military operation or making it too costly to do so. 
This form of deterrence, therefore, works by targeting the adversary’s military capabilities 
(counterforce targeting in the context of nuclear weapons) and/or shoring up one’s own defenses 
such that offensive operations are inordinately costly for an attacking state. Deterrence by 
punishment, on the other hand, rests on the credible threat to wreak devastating pain and 
suffering on a target’s civilian population such that the perceived costs of an action are deemed 
unacceptably high.
28
 The notion that threatening punishment to affect a target state’s behavior 
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gained prominence during the strategic bombing campaigns of the Second World War, where 
Allied strategists calculated that unleashing terror from the skies against German and Japanese 
populations would prompt the citizenry to rise up against their governments and force them to 
concede.
29
 In the context of nuclear weapons, deterrence by punishment involved counter value 
targeting against the adversary’s population centers. Lawrence Freedman assert that, “[f]or a 
sanction of tough punishment to be an effective deterrent it is necessary for a would-be offender 
to know that there is a high chance of (a) being apprehended and (b) being punished severely.”
30
 
During the nuclear age, the ability of the Soviet Union and the United States to mutually deter 
the outbreak of strategic nuclear war rested on the reciprocal threat of unimaginable punishment 
which, paradoxically, created stability in the international system. The stability of mutual 
deterrence through punishment hinged on the survivability of second strike nuclear forces such 
that “neither [side], in striking first, can destroy the other’s ability to strike back.”
31
  
 In the cyber domain, broadly speaking, offensive operations are typically thought of as 
being synonymous with “cyber attacks,” which are commonly defined as operations that disrupt, 
deny, destroy, or degrade access to some networked asset. However, offensive cyber operations 
may also include information operations that are designed to influence an individual or group’s 
decision-making process. Indeed, in recent times, hacked accounts and leaked emails—even 
those that are altered—have influenced election outcomes and created reputational costs for the 
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targets. Table 1 identifies the different types of offensive operations that may be employed to 
create costs against an adversary. However, there is only one type of offensive method that, in 
theory, could be employed for the purposes of punishment. As will be discussed in greater detail 
below, the limited utility of most offensive cyber operations to support a punishment strategy 
contributes to the conclusion that deterrence by punishment is unlikely to succeed in cyberspace.  
Deterrence by punishment relies on the logic that a state could credibly respond to a 
deviation from the status quo by administering a punishment capable of bringing a society to its 
knees. As Table 1 demonstrates, the type of offensive cyber operation that is even conceptually 
able to generate these costs would be a cyber attack on critical infrastructure. In theory, 
undermining critical infrastructure that is essential to the functioning of a society could force 
panic-stricken citizens to press their leaders to capitulate. However, Borghard and Lonergan 
argue that the offensive employment of cyber power is not capable of generating the costs 
necessary for an effective coercive punishment strategy because offensive cyber operations 
targeting critical infrastructure (e.g. power grids, pipelines, and transportation nodes, etc.) 
require highly tailored accesses and exploits which are difficult to scale given the material 
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Hacked Account and 
Data Leak 
Stealing private or classified information 




Website Defacement Changing the appearance of a website 
often to spread a political message. 
Typically involves that loss of the 







Cyber Extortion Requiring an actor to do something that 
they would otherwise not do (e.g. pay a 
ransom) or else their website will be 
overwhelmed with a packet flood, their 
private information released or destroyed, 
or their network crashed. Often this 








Distributed Denial of 
Service 
(aka packet floods) 
Overwhelming a system through 
excessive requests for information, thus 
forcing a system shut down or severe 





Destruction of Critical 
Infrastructure 
Installing an exploit on a critical system 
necessary for the functioning of society 
that when activated causes some change 







Installing an exploit on a non-critical 
system that when activated causes some 







Altering data in transit or at rest so that 
the originator and/or receiver cannot rely 





For deterrence by punishment to succeed, three requirements must be met. First, the 
deterring state must possess a capability powerful enough to affect the target’s calculus regarding 
the costs and benefits of a course of action; specifically, she must be able to hold the target 
accountable and impose a significant level of damage on the target’s civilian population and 




Second, the state should be able to credibly signal to the target state the former’s intent to carry 
out the threatened action. Third, the target of deterrence must accurately perceive the deterrent 
threat and make a risk calculation about its own ability to get away with the undesired action. 
The effective implementation of these requisites of deterrence by punishment are complicated by 
the three attributes of the cyber domain identified above, as well be demonstrated in the below 
discussion. Most importantly, deterrence by punishment that relies solely on offensive cyber 
operations is likely to be ineffective because cyber warfare is an inadequate means to instill an 
unbearable level of fear in an adversary. 
Possessing the Capability 
 Measuring capabilities in cyberspace and, therefore, issuing effective deterrent threats are 
complex and difficult. This difficulty is compounded by the limits in cost generation associated 
with cyber warfare and the difference in how decision-makers are likely to perceive physical 
versus virtual destruction. In the nuclear arena, there are methods to estimate a state’s arms 
stockpiles and there are treaties, accords, and international oversight institutions that monitor and 
limit these weapons.
33
 However, as already noted, in the cyber domain there is no measure of 
relative strength because cyber weapons lack universal lethality; one cannot simply count the 
number of cyber tools the same way one can count the numbers of missiles or pounds of poison 
gas a state possesses. Certain types of cyber attacks require minimal, target-specific tailoring and 
are not access dependent; therefore, these capabilities are more “universal.” For example, 
distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks can overwhelm a target’s systems using botnets-for-
hire that are easily customizable and that can adapt to surmount a target’s defenses (such as 
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blacklisting source nodes). However, deterrence by punishment requires possessing the 
capability to deliver devastating strategic effects against an adversary’s population centers. In 
cyberspace, these kinds of capabilities are almost always dependent on gaining and maintaining 
unique accesses and are highly tailored because the targets—critical national infrastructure such 
as SCADA systems—are typically extremely customized.  
Assessing the capability to carry out the threat of punishment is further complicated by 
the secrecy that pervades the cyber domain. In the context of nuclear deterrence, states were 
incentivized to conduct shows of force to demonstrate capability. However, the nature of cyber 
warfare produces the opposite incentive: to shroud a tool set in secrecy so that a would-be 
defender does not erect counter measures that may thwart a desired course of action. Indeed, 
Austin Long notes that, for this reason, brandishing cyber weapons may attenuate a deterrence 
strategy.
34
 Moreover, a show of cyber force is a poor indicator of latent cyber capability due to 
the tailored nature of offensive cyber operations against strategically decisive targets. In other 
words, within the scope of cyber operations carried out for the purposes of punishment, any one 




There is also a human capital element of assessing capabilities that is uniquely important 
for cyber warfare due to the highly-skilled nature of operations developed for the purposes of 
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 Some tacticians may be driven to count the number of cyber forces that 
a government openly reports or note estimates from military journals to assess capability, but 
these sources do not consider critically important differences in skillsets. For this reason, 
comparing operators across states is problematic. For example, China is reported to possess 
legions of cyber operators but these units, such as its Information Warfare Militia, lack 
widespread standardized training pipelines and, therefore, there is substantial variation in skill 
within and across these units. The Israel Defense Force’s Unit 8200, in contrast, is a highly 
skilled, creative, and motivated cyber force but, as it is a military unit, it suffers the 
disadvantages of short enlistment times, high turnover, and requirements to train new personnel 
with limited technological experience.
37
 When carrying out a punishment strategy in the cyber 
domain, possessing the most “trigger pullers” is not as important as possessing the right trigger 
puller, armed with the right capability, with access to a vulnerable target.  
Beyond simply possessing a capability, a state seeking to deter through the threat of 
punishment must also possess a means the deliver the punishment; otherwise, the capability itself 
is irrelevant. The nuclear triad—the B-52 bomber, the nuclear-armed submarine, and the 
intercontinental ballistic missile—were the paradigmatic images of the Cold War because they 
were the delivery systems that made the threat of nuclear war real. The comparable analogy in 
cyberspace is access to an adversary’s networks and critical infrastructure, which must be 
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ensured prior to delivering a cyber payload.
38
 Access is particularly important for punishment 
strategies because governments take measures to protect critical national infrastructure from 
attack by taking measures such as building the system on a closed network that is isolated from 
the Internet. However, as already noted, access is necessary to collect intelligence on a target so 
that an attacker can develop a capability to alter the functionality of the intended target as part of 
cyber attack.  
There are three methods for gaining access to an adversary’s network: remotely (through 
the Internet); physical access; and supply chain interdiction. Hacking, or remote access, involves 
connecting to the target system through the Internet or a network that an operator can already 
access. However, finding a target can be a daunting task, requiring extensive network mapping to 
ensure that the operator has found the right network in which to burrow. The operator must also 
have adequate exploits to surpass any firewalls and advanced defensive efforts that the adversary 
has in place. Once inside the network, the operator must then locate the intended target within 
the new cloud of information it is navigating. While the process of gaining access may be 
complex, once an operator has established a foothold for access it is easy to return to the target 
through this backdoor for further operations as long as the operator remains undetected. 
However, maintaining persistent access is often unpredictable because the target may take 
measures, such as installing patches and updates to a system, that inadvertently result in the 
operator being expelled.  
Since the majority of cyber incursions come via remote access, firewalls are typically 
placed at the gateway between the network and the Internet. To protect the most sensitive targets 
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(i.e., those that would be targeted as part of a punishment strategy), many actors have 
constructed closed networks that are not connected to the Internet, with the aim of preventing 
hackers from gaining access. Typically, this is referred to as an “air-gapped” network since there 
literally is air between the networks’ computers, devices, and other machines that may connect to 
the Internet. However, there are some types of malware that are designed to “jump” the air gap 
by transmitting data to and from machines that may connect to the Internet. This malware 
functions by translating code into high frequency sounds that can then be detected by the 
microphones that are now common on most computers.
39
 Therefore, most malware programs that 
are designed to target closed networks possess a means to overcome the air gap.
40
 
Closed networks are not immune from adversary penetration, as supply chain interdiction 
as well as human operators can be used to physically gain access. In the latter method, a human 
being is used to physically engage with the target. This approach allegedly enabled the actors 
behind Stuxnet to gain access to Iran’s critical infrastructure through physically introducing the 
virus into the Natanz nuclear facility via a thumb drive or other personal computing device.
41
 
However, gaining physical access is difficult and risky because it requires a human operator on 
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the ground often behind an adversary’s lines. A less risky option, therefore, is through supply 
chain interdiction. Under this method, a surreptitious actor would interdict some physical piece 
of the network (i.e. a printer, a modem, a hard drive, etc.) and install an implant prior to it 
reaching its intended destination. This implant is designed to “call back” through the Internet to 
its originator to await further directions or provide whatever information it was programmed to 
garner. This method is perhaps the most effective way to gain access, assuming that the 
perpetrator is aware of the shipment, has a capability and the time to interdict, and that it is 
ultimately delivered to where it is intended without trigging the recipient’s suspicion.  
In short, while there is no system that is theoretically beyond the reach of a state seeking 
to deter a target through punishment, the ability to gain access to sensitive systems does not 
guarantee that punishment is possible in the cyber domain. This is because there is a fundamental 
problem associated with cost generation in cyberspace; there is no guarantee that a state 
possesses a cyber weapon that could inflict an unbearable level of punishment upon an actor it is 
seeking to dissuade. In fact, given the extant technological state of the field, it may simply not be 
feasible to impose the kinds of costs on a target that would be required for deterrence by 
punishment to succeed.
42
 While it is theoretically possible that cyber operations could lead 
directly to a loss of life, no one has reportedly died to date as a result a cyber attack, despite over 
30 years of recorded cyber conflict. The typical scenario associated with a punishment strategy 
in cyberspace conjectures that loss of power stemming from a cyber attack on a power grid could 
lead to a loss of life. However, even in this instance, the conceivable deaths from the loss of 
power over an extended period of time are far from those that are required for an effective 
punishment strategy. To draw a comparison, when Hurricane Sandy hit the United States’ 
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eastern seaboard in late October 2012 over 8.5 million people were left without power, with 
many going weeks and even months before it was brought back on line.
43
 Yet, a U.S. National 
Hurricane Center postmortem of Hurricane Sandy reported that of the 159 people in the United 
States killed either directly or indirectly from Hurricane Sandy only, “[a]bout 50 of these deaths 
were the result of extended power outages during cold weather, which led to deaths from 
hypothermia, falls in the dark by senior citizens, or carbon monoxide poisoning from improperly 
placed generators or cooking devices.”
44
 If a cyber attack took out power of a similar magnitude 
and duration of Hurricane Sandy, it is conceivable that a comparable number of casualties would 





 Even under conditions in which a state possesses the capability to inflict cyber 
punishment on a target and a reliable means of delivering it, for deterrence to succeed the target 
must believe that the deterring state intends to carry out the terms of threat.
46
 Indeed, making a 
credible threat requires the target to believe that the issuer possesses both the capability to 
impose the threatened cost and the will to employ it if the target does not comply with the 
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issuer’s demands. Yet as previously noted, secrecy surrounds a nation-state’s cyber capabilities 
and creates a situation of acutely imperfect information from which a policymaker must judge 
the threat’s credibility. This is because the typical route to enhancing credibility—taking public 
measures to reveal capabilities or tie one’s hands—undermines the likelihood of a cyber 
operation’s success because secrecy is necessary to preserve access and capabilities. Therefore, 
there is an inherent tension between the incentive to conceal and the requirements of deterrence 
that are irreconcilable. Moreover, past cyber operations are unreliable measures of current 
credibility because cyber capabilities are not universal and replicable over time across different 
target sets. The result of this informational imbalance is that a state must look for signals and 
indices that are exogenous to cyberspace—such as diplomatic communications and increases in 
cyber resource allocations—to assess the other actor’s intentions. The criteria that drive these 
assessments may be unique to the perceiving policymaker but will typically include an 
assessment of the strategic culture that has evolved in the state for an environment with a dearth 
of international laws, norms, or the possibility of iterative reciprocity as well as the use of 
whatever indices the receiver has developed.
47
 While differences in strategic culture may 
complicate signaling across all of the domains of warfare, the problem is particularly acute in 
cyberspace due to the absence of norms and indices. Furthermore, the employment of cyber 
power offers no credible assurances that the confluence of offensive and defensive elements can 
be brought to bear at the appointed time and place to provide an unbearable punishment 
sufficient to dissuade the target from undertaking an undesirable action due to the 
unpredictability of access necessary to deliver an effect. 
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The Target’s Perception 
 Finally, for deterrence to succeed, it is imperative that the actor that is to be deterred 
understands what she is expected to do and believe that she cannot get away with taking the 
unwanted action. As already noted, the deterrence literature notes the dangers of misperceptions 
and the need to make intentions clear to avoid inadvertent conflict.
48
 In cyberspace, 
understanding the intent of any cyber operation is exceptionally difficult given the mission’s 
invisible nature. Ex ante, it is difficult to surmise the intent of any given cyber operation alone 
because discovering that an actor has penetrated a target’s networks does not provide the target 
with any information regarding intent—penetration could support legitimate espionage 
operations, or it could reflect preparations for an offensive attack. Thus, intent can only be 
discerned after the execution of the mission, which by definition means that deterrence has 
failed—the threat of punishment alone should be sufficient to prevent the target from taking 
undesirable actions. Given the inability to understand intent from a cyber operation alone, a 
deterring state must couple cyber operations with established means of signaling in the physical 
domains, such as issuing a formal threat via a diplomatic channel so that the party to be deterred 
accurately understands the mandate.
49
 However, as already described, there are incentives to 
keep the terms of the threat (the punishment to be meted out) secret because revealing 
capabilities and accesses undermines mission success.  
A critical element to the successful functioning of deterrence in cyberspace is the target’s 
calculations regarding whether she can get away with the action meant to be deterred by taking 
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advantage of the attribution problem. This presents a conundrum for deterring states because, if 
they cannot know with some measure of acceptable reliability the identity of the perpetrator, they 
may be hesitant to respond due to the desire to avoid an escalatory response against the wrong 
target.
50
 Ascertaining the source and, more importantly, the political responsibility of a cyber 
incursion can be exceedingly difficult due to offensive techniques that use multiple proxy actors, 
servers, and distributed command and control networks to obfuscate an operation’s true source. 
Though it is no guarantee, there are methods of cyber attribution. The most reliable attribution 
method requires the party carrying out the operation to acknowledge responsibility and the 
targeted state to believe that the self-identified aggressor possessed both the capability and 
motivation to perform the operation. Of course, a state being deterred through the threat of 
punishment would be unwise to publicly acknowledge its responsibility for an attack. Another 
means of attribution requires the targeted state to have prior access to the would-be coercer’s 
network from which the attack originated and witness the operation’s execution. This is believed 
to be how the United States was able to attribute the cyber attack against Sony Pictures 
Entertainment to the North Korean Government.
51
  This method is not as desirable because, once 
attributed, the access to the targeted system will most likely be lost as the target wipes or 
replaces infected devices. Therefore, the long-term intelligence loss must be evaluated against 
                                                     
50
 This logic informs Adam Segal’s proposition that, potentially, Edward Snowden’s leaks 
containing information about the National Security Agency’s sprawling capabilities could deter 
American adversaries through “omniscience.” In other words, if U.S. adversaries believe that 
“the NSA sees all,” they may be more susceptible to being deterred. See Adam Segal, The 
Hacked World Order: How Nations Fight, Trade, Maneuver, and Manipulate in the Digital Age 
(New York: PublicAffairs, 2016), 57.  
51
 David E. Sanger and Martin Fackler, “N.S.A. Breached North Korean Networks Before Sony 






the need to publically attribute. The final method of assigning attribution is attained when the 
attack’s signature is so unique that it can be traced to a specific actor. This is the least reliable 
method, yet recently there have been advances in signature recognition software that are 
designed to scour millions of lines of code in order to obtain unique profiles for developers.
52
 
Additionally, there have been situations where attribution has been attempted through code 
analysis, such as the use of a Hebrew reference in Stuxnet.
53
 In Stuxnet’s case, inserting this 
code suggested that the operation could be attributed to Israel—although strategic actors may 
intentionally plant false clues to obfuscate true responsibility. On the other hand, Stuxnet may 
have contained these references to signal to Iran that the United States and Israel have the means 
and determination to destroy its nuclear enrichment infrastructure and were therefore using an 
offensive cyber mission for the purposes of sending a deterrent signal, although it is important to 
note that this would have been an example of deterrence by the threat of denial, rather than 
punishment. 
Therefore, despite improved techniques to alleviate the attribution problem,
54
 the use of 
cyber power to meet the needs of deterrence by punishment is confounded for two reasons. First, 
the deterring party may find it a pointless exercise to issue deterrent threats in cyberspace if it 
cannot reliably identify the perpetrator of the action meant to be deterred. This suggests that, as 
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will be discussed in greater detail below, other elements of national power may prove more 
viable for the purposes of deterrence. Second, though an operation such as Stuxnet may have 
contained insights into its origin as part of a deterrent threat, there is no guarantee that the target 
will trace a threat back to the deterring party unless it is coupled with a clear message 
communicated via an established platform. Thus, the attribution problem fundamentally 
undermines the efficacy of deterrence because it adds uncertainty both to the target’s assessment 
of the coercing party cyber capabilities and to the target’s calculations about its own ability to get 
away with unsanctioned behavior. 
Deterrence by Denial 
 While the threat of punishment through civilization-ending nuclear war shaped the bulk 
of academic writing on deterrence during the nuclear era, efforts were made to explore whether 
tactical or theater nuclear weapons employed on the battlefield could serve the purposes of 
deterrence by denial, thus extending the literature on conventional deterrence to the nuclear age. 
Theater nuclear weapons were considered a “deterrent backstop to conventional defense” and 
could “deter by promising territorial denial.”
55
 Similarly, Glenn Snyder distinguishes between 
investing in deterrent forces that can threaten another state versus investing in defensive forces 
that mitigate the consequences of enemy aggression.
56
 Schelling has a slightly different take on 
the distinction between deterrence and defense. To Schelling, the distinction was centered on 
force structure, but was related to the intent of force employment. If the intent were to ensure an 
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attacking enemy could not succeed, it would constitute defense. However, “[i]f the object is to 
induce… [the enemy] to proceed, by making his encroachment painful or costly, we can…call 
it…‘deterrent’ defense.”
57
 Snyder’s view of deterrent forces and Schelling’s ‘deterrent defense’ 
both were designed to impose costs on an adversary with the goal of rendering an offensive 
military action too costly for an adversary to pursue, whereas defense was about survival. Over 
time, the literature evolved to regard the threat of an attacker meeting Schelling’s “deterrent 
defense” as deterrence by denial. Indeed, conveying to an enemy that they will not be able to 
achieve success on the battlefield at an acceptable cost is a form of deterrence.
58
  
John Mearsheimer asserts that deterrence by denial tends to be most associated with the 
employment of conventional forces to prevent an enemy from achieving battlefield success.
59
 In 
the conventional realm, the efficacy of deterrence is conditional on two variables: first, the costs 
the attacker would have to pay in terms of material resources, military and civilian casualties, 
and other related costs associated with the mobilization, deployment, fighting, and maintenance 
of the force; and second, the probability of success, which is a function of time.
60
 To wit, if an 
attacker believes she has a high probability of achieving victory in a short time span, then she is 
less likely to be deterred. However, if victory is only going to be achieved after a protracted 
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conflict then it is less likely to succeed because of the perceived costs that would accumulate 
over time.
61
 In sum, when costs of war are low and the probability of success is high, deterrence 
is unlikely to work. 
 Unlike deterrence by punishment, which is hampered by fundamental problems that make 
the likelihood of success minimal, deterrence by denial is attainable in cyberspace. Indeed, there 
is already emerging literature making claims to this effect. For instance, in recent scholarship, 
both Patrick Morgan and Martin Libicki have suggested that the logic of deterrence by denial 
applies to cyber conflict, but is problematic to implement. Indeed, Morgan notes that achieving 
deterrence by denial would be less costly and also bring no damage to the state compared to 
deterrence by punishment, but he notes that it may be difficult to demonstrate to an attacker the 
cost they might incur by attacking.
62
 Libicki also notes that psychological factors may confound 
effective deterrence by denial. Specifically, he argues that “the dynamic nature of cyberspace can 
convince one that targets that seem impregnatable today may be vulnerable tomorrow simply 
because things change all the time, so keep trying.”
63
 Yet, neither has explored the concept in 
depth or exposed it to much academic scrutiny. Therefore, by building on the nuances in the 
deterrence literature on the distinctions between deterrence and defense, it is imperative to 
consider the separate logics of deterring an adversary in cyberspace through building up one’s 
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own defenses versus doing so through targeting the adversary’s offensive capabilities, both of 
which fall under the rubric of deterrence by denial.
64
  
 Deterrence by denial is possible in the cyber domain if a state builds up its defensive 
capabilities such that the would-be attacker calculates that the costs of an offensive cyber 
operation would be unreasonably high and/or the probability of success small. There is a 
widespread assumption in the academic and policy literature that offensive cyber operations are 
relatively easy and that defense is difficult, if not impossible. For instance, while serving as U.S. 
Deputy Secretary of Defense William J. Lynn III wrote that,  
In cyberspace, the offense has the upper hand. The Internet was designed to be 
collaborative and rapidly expandable and to have low barriers to technological 
innovation; security and identity management were lower priorities. For these structural 
reasons, the U.S. government's ability to defend its networks always lags behind its 




However, the manner in which cyber weapons are developed and employed belies this 
assumption regarding the ease of offense. The target-specific nature of most cyber weapons that 
can produce strategic effects (e.g., those that target critical national infrastructure or military 
systems) means that adequate defenses render a highly specific capability in which a state 
invested research and development time and costs essentially useless. In other words, once a 
cyber weapon is discovered, it becomes a sunk cost because protections can be built relatively 
quickly to make future deployments ineffective, which means that an attacking state would have 
to invest time and resources to develop new capabilities and exploits and find a means of gaining 
access to deliver them to continue to pursue its objective, while also holding some degree of 
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uncertainty about whether the new capability will actually produce the intended effect. This 
challenges the widely held assumption that offense has the advantage in cyberspace because the 
target-specific nature of cyber weapons means that calculating the relative cost of an offensive 
operation does not involve the simple additive cost of deploying more of the same assets against 
a given target. Moreover, the specificity of offensive cyber operations suggests that the relative 
ease of offense or defense cannot be logically calculated as a systemic variable. Effective 
defenses, therefore, affect a target’s cost calculus because they would require her to invest in 
building a potentially entirely new set of capabilities that could again be neutered by further 
defensive measures. Depending on the political objectives of the would-be attacker, she may find 
it more appealing to simply use cyber capabilities to target a less well-defended state. In other 
words, in the cyber domain, defense is relative; a target’s networks and systems simply have to 
be slightly less difficult to penetrate than another.
66
 Even in response to a persistent and 
dedicated attacker, there are a plethora of defensive measures that a state can take to make an 
attack against it unpalatable and, therefore, serve a deterrent function.
 67
 Defense of networks and 
systems in cyberspace is layered, as illustrated in Table 2. 
Defense-in-depth in cyberspace, as Table 2 illustrates, encompasses physical, human, 
network, and host security. This may appear to imply, therefore, that an attacking state has many 
avenues through which it can penetrate a target and, thus, deterrence by defense is a fruitless 
exercise. However, the dynamics of defense in cyberspace in fact suggest that, even when an 
                                                     
66
 However, this is more likely to be applicable to criminal entities using cyber tools for the 
purposes of financial gain, rather than nation-states with specific political objectives that are not 
easily transferable to other more vulnerable targets. 
67
 These defensive measures are distinct from active defenses, to be discussed in the subsequent 
section, which are directed at attriting the adversary’s offensive capabilities rather than 




adversary has penetrated a defending state’s network, the latter can still force the attacking state 
to pay high costs for attempting to surmount its defenses, and the attacker will quickly come to 
surmise this fact as it employs a trial and error approach. In the logic of deterrence, a well-
defended state can force an adversary to waste time and money trying to surmount its defenses 
such that it may calculate that the costs of persisting are too high and/or that the likelihood of 





















Table 2: Defensive Measures in Cyberspace 
Type of Defensive 
Measure 
Description 
Means of Access it 
Counters 
Physical Security of 
the System 
  
Wireless access points 
Ensure there are no “rogue” wireless access 
points. 
Physical and on-net 
Safeguarding supply 
chain 
Prevent adversaries from interdicting supply 




Physically isolate networks and systems at 
facility from Internet. 
Physical and on-net 
Facility security 
Physically security facilities on which 
networks and systems reside. 




Ensure all personnel are screen and practicing 
proper computer hygiene. 










End-to-end securing of remote user’s access to 
network. 
On-net 
Third party access 
Screen and limit vendors and contractors’ 
access to network. 
Physical or on-net 
Firewalls 
Filters network traffic to scan for known attack 
signatures and preclude access to blocked 
content; typically emplaced at a gateway 





Programs that are designed to block network 





Programs that scan network traffic looking for 
signs of an attack and alert network 
administrators if they detect indications. 
On-net 
Compartmentalization 





Ensuring firmware is updated on networked 
infrastructure (e.g., routers, switches). 
On-net 
Quarantining traffic 
Create a “DMZ” for suspect traffic to facilitate 













Prevent attackers from mapping entire network 
through constructing false network typologies 
On-net 
Host Security   
Passwords and 
advanced forms of 
identification 
Security protocol that limits unauthorized 
access to the network and the end user's 
computer. 
Physical or on-net 
Host-based encryption Encrypting work stations and data storage. Physical or on-net 
Host-based intrusion 
detection systems 
Similar to network detection systems, but 
based on host machines. 
On-net 
Personal firewalls 
Programs that block malware access to/from 
the individual computer and the network. 
On-net 
Anti-malware tools 
Programs that run on a host that hunt for 
known malware 
On-net 
Application Security   
Routine software 
updating 




Deterrence by denial through degrading a target’s offensive cyber capabilities is more 
complex, but still possible. One of the defining features of cyber weapons, which has 
implications for both deterrence and escalation, is that they are nearly invulnerable—because 
they are comprised of zeroes and ones they can, in theory, always be regenerated and cannot be 
physically destroyed. However, this does not mean that a deterring state is entirely barred from 
efforts at undermining a target’s offensive capabilities. First, a deterring state could target the 
other state’s attack infrastructure, which refers to the infrastructure that enables the attack to be 
delivered through the Internet. These include but are not limited to servers and routers that are 
strategically emplaced even outside of the attacking state’s sovereign borders. While these are 
replaceable, destroying them could serve as a delaying function. Second, a deterring state could 
engage in a range of “active defense” efforts that cut off the attack vector at its source. These 
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defensive measures occur outside of one’s network and include activities such as engaging with a 
third party (e.g., telecommunications providers) to cut off the origin of an attack; or emplacing a 
“logic bomb,” which is malicious code that resides on the defending state’s network that an 
attacker takes back to her own network and triggers a negative impact such as wiping files. 
Third, defending states could engage in so-called “hacking back,” which entails penetrating an 
attacker’s networks during the course of or following an attack for the purposes of destroying 
information with which the attacker absconded, stealing adversary information, wiping their 
networks, or other retaliatory measures. Finally, a state could employ Counter-Computer 
Network Exploitation (CNE) that involves going after the adversary’s toolkit and developing 
custom defenses against it; or revealing information about the threat such that others can develop 
patches against the vulnerability that the cyber weapon exploits and in effect degrading the 
attacking state’s offensive capabilities by rendering them useless. 
Cross-Domain Deterrence 
The above discussion was limited to deterrence by punishment and denial within the 
cyber domain. However, there is an emerging discussion among policymakers and scholars about 
the potential utility of cross-domain deterrence of cyber operations.
69
 Indeed, in response to 
allegations of foreign interference in the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election, President Obama stated 
“I think there is no doubt that when any foreign government tries to impact the integrity of our 
elections ... we need to take action. And we will — at a time and place of our own choosing. 
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Some of it may be explicit and publicized; some of it may not be.”
70
 The concept of cross-
domain deterrence is far from new. As Robert Jervis points out, during the Cold War deterrence 
was not framed solely in terms of nuclear politics but, rather, was multidimensional. Deterring 
different domains and technologies “…were not segregated from one another but rather mixed in 
the cauldron of international politics.”
71
  This section defines cross-domain deterrence and 
discusses some of the issues with this approach to deterring offensive cyber operations.  
 While deterrence rests on the promise of inflicting a more costly (but within a similar 
category of) response, cross-domain deterrence relies on using unrelated elements of national 
power to deter an action. In other words, where deterrence relies on the notion of employing like 
to deter like, cross-domain deterrence relies on an unlike capability to threaten costs.
72
 Given the 
ineffectiveness of deterrence by punishment and the potentially unpredictable efficacy of 
deterrence by denial in the cyber domain, the incentive for decision makers to employ cross-
domain deterrence is high. This incentive may be even higher for states that possess an 
asymmetric advantage over others in a different element of national power. However, cross-
domain cyber deterrence is plagued by several issues. First, cross-domain responses are typically 
sent in the open where both domestic and international audiences are privy to the response, 
whereas a cyber response can be sent clandestinely, and avoid public scrutiny. Second, some 
non-cyber mechanisms, such the imposition of economic sanctions, may require a multilateral 
response to be effective. Both issues reflect the fact that cross-domain responses require shining 
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a light on activities that would otherwise be kept in the dark and, to justify them to the public, the 
deterring state may feel compelled to share attribution information or other intelligence it may 
otherwise prefer to keep secret. Third, developing a proportionate cross-domain response to 
virtual damage is difficult because no norms exist that equate virtual damage with either 
economic or material costs (this will be explored in greater detail below in the discussion of 
escalation).  
The enumerated issues above suggest that cross-domain cyber deterrence is beset by 
serious complications. In particular, any multilateral cross domain response would require 
common agreement on what actions are to be deterred. This is problematic because great 
uncertainty exists regarding the “rules of the road” in the cyber domain. For instance, when 
Estonia came under crippling cyber attacks in 2007 the question arose if Estonia President Jaak 
Aaviksoo could invoke Article 5’s mutual defense clause of NATO’s Charter.
73
 In the wake of 
the attack, NATO responded by developing the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of 
Excellence located in Tallinn, Estonia to address issues of this nature. In mid-2016, NATO 
Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg went on the record and stated that cyber attacks would meet 
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Yet Secretary General Stoltenberg’s rhetoric did not stop Russian interference in the 2016 
U.S. presidential election or that of other NATO members.
75
 Following reports of Russian 
interference during the 2016 election, President Obama became concerned that Russia would use 
cyber attacks to interfere with US election systems and effectively undermine the integrity of the 
vote on election day.  As mentioned above, Obama chose a cross-domain response. First, during 
the G20 summit in China, President Obama threatened Russia’s President Putin that there would 
be “consequences” if interference did not stop. As the continued release of hacked emails from 
the Democratic National Committee continued, a month later Obama used the hotline connection 
between the Nuclear Threat Reduction Centers, which only three years prior had been bilaterally 
designated as being used for cyber related events, to convey to President Putin that the laws of 
armed conflict applied to cyberspace.
76
 According to reporting, Russian hacking stopped and the 
electoral system was not directly attacked.
77
 However, it is not clear whether this represents an 
example of successful cross-domain deterrence. Though US electoral systems were not attacked 
and the integrity of the vote has not been questioned, Putin may have assessed that his influence 
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operation had already achieved its major objectives. It remains unknown how credible Putin 
perceived Obama’s threat to be. 
Assessing Deterrence in Cyberspace 
The above analysis explored some of the key problems associated with effective 
deterrence in cyberspace. Unlike nuclear weapons, where demonstrating resolve was the crux of 
success and confounded scholars and policymakers due to the immensely destructive potential of 
nuclear war, the fundamental conundrum of deterrence is cyberspace is capability. Few doubt a 
state’s desire to employ cyber weapons, and indeed, offensive cyber operations have become 
common state practice. However, the inability to credibly signal cyber capabilities and resolve 
confounds both deterrence by punishment and, to a lesser degree, deterrence by denial. In the 
context of deterrence by punishment, cyber actors cannot conduct shows of force to demonstrate 
their capability because doing so runs the risk that the target can customize its defenses to thwart 
a future action and potentially render the cyber weapon inert. The incentive to conceal 
capabilities to protect operational viability trumps public measures to enhance credibility. 
Furthermore, since cyber weapons lack universal lethality, states are limited by the cyber 
weapons they have on hand and may not have a proportionate response available in their arsenal. 
Most important for deterrence by punishment, the destructive potential of even a large-scale 
cyber onslaught against critical national infrastructure is simply insufficiently painful to affect a 
target’s calculus. Indeed, the limit on destruction is the most significant impediment to 
successful deterrence by punishment. On the other hand, deterrence by denial presents more 
feasibility for states because there are a range of actions states can take to defend themselves in 
cyberspace and, therefore, raise the costs to an attacker, as well as to degrade the latter’s 




offensive advantage in cyberspace is misguided. Due to the limits of deterrence within the cyber 
domain coupled with the persistent desire to prevent aggressive cyber actions, states have relied 
on cross-domain solutions, particularly if the deterring state maintains an asymmetric advantage 
in another element of national power. However, some of the same hurdles associated with 
secrecy and proportionately that confound deterrence within the cyber domain also apply to 
deterring cyber attacks through non-cyber means. 
The difficulties of deterrence have led some to suggest that interstate relations in the 
cyber domain are likely to be plagued by dangerous escalatory spirals. The follow section 
explores why this logic is fallacious.   
Escalation Dynamics in Cyberspace 
 As the above discussion demonstrated, there are substantial barriers to achieving stable 
deterrence in cyberspace. Prima facie, therefore, one might infer that the cyber domain is 
fundamentally escalatory. Indeed, the emerging consensus among cyber scholars and 
practitioners is that the domain is fundamentally escalatory and the risks of escalatory spirals in 
this domain are significant. However, this presents an empirical puzzle: if there are attributes of 
the cyber domain that create the conditions for escalatory spirals between states, why have we 
not yet observed any significant escalation in the domain? For example, in response to Russia’s 
hack of the Democratic National Committee’s email server in an effort to influence the 2016 
presidential election, President Obama imposed sanctions on Russian intelligence agencies, four 
operatives, and three Russian companies (the Special Technology Center, Zorsecurity, and the 
Autonomous Professional Association of Designers of Data Processing Systems); expelled 35 






 While these sanctions were more costly than the ones the United States 
imposed on North Korea in the wake of the 2014 Sony hack, they were “not as biting as previous 
ones in which the United States and its Western allies took aim at broad sectors of the Russian 
economy and blacklisted dozens of people, some of them close friends of Mr. Putin’s.”
79
 If the 
cyber domain were characterized by greater risks of escalation, one might have expected that an 
attack on a democratic state’s election system would have prompted a more significant response. 
The mismatch between the predominant hypotheses in the emerging literature on escalation 
dynamics in cyberspace and the empirical reality could be attributed to two categories of factors. 
First, those who assert that the cyber domain is inherently escalatory may be utilizing a 
conception of escalation that differs from that of this paper. Specifically, following the 
traditional academic literature on nuclear escalation, this paper defines escalation as an action 
that increases the intensity of military action, either in quantitative or qualitative terms (see the 
discussion below for a more thorough definition). Others, however, may include in their concept 
of escalation actions that simply respond to another state’s behavior at a level consistent with the 
latter. While it is possible that, given the absence of norms and indices in the cyber domain, 
responsive actions that do not represent an increase in intensity could risk inadvertent escalation 
due to misperception, this paper does not count these as examples of deliberate escalation. 
Similarly, proponents of the escalatory nature of cyberspace may identify escalatory behavior 
where this paper does not due to divergent conceptions of the role of espionage. In particular, 
this paper excludes from a conception of escalatory behavior espionage conducted through cyber 
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means because it considers espionage to be a necessary state practice that is mutually recognized 
by governments as legitimate. This account for the U.S. (non)response to Chinese cyber 
espionage that resulted in the theft of tens of millions of records from the Office of Personnel 
Management. This led the US Director of National Intelligence at the time, James Clapper, to 
note that “You have to kind of salute the Chinese for what they did.”
80
 Conversely, if espionage 
is considered deliberately escalatory, than the empirical record is littered with examples of cyber 
escalation. However, while cyber espionage in particular (as distinguished from other forms of 
espionage) could potentially trigger inadvertent escalation due to the fact that governments may 
be unable to distinguish between access gained for the purposes of espionage versus attack, 
categorizing espionage as escalatory flouts most conceptions of customary international law.  
 Therefore, while some scholars and practitioners have broached the topic of cyber 
escalation dynamics, none have approached it with academic rigor and, therefore, the literature 
has largely ignored critical aspects of escalation that have been central to the traditional canon on 
escalation. This section will consider the applicability of the academic literature on escalation 
dynamics that emerged during the early days of the Cold War to the cyber domain. It presents a 
theoretical framework assessing the nature, likelihood, and causes of both inadvertent and 
deliberate escalation in cyberspace. For the purposes of this paper, I limit my theoretical analysis 
to escalation within the cyber domain, rather than cross-domain escalation, unless otherwise 
specifically noted.
81
 Furthermore, I will argue that the prevailing view among cyber conflict 
experts that the domain is fundamentally escalatory is not necessarily true under most conditions. 
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This is due to two interrelated factors: first, the self-dampening nature of carrying out operations 
in the cyber domain; and second, the distinct role played by time in cyberspace, which creates 
breathing room for decision-makers to assess options and responses to adversary actions.
82
 
The section proceeds as follows. First, I develop a theoretical framework to account for 
why escalation has not been observed in the cyber domain, despite the issues associated with 
deterrence. Second, following the existing literature on escalation dynamics in cyberspace, I 
explore causes of inadvertent escalation in cyberspace. The current literature posits that the cyber 
domain is escalatory because it implicitly assumes that actors, for a variety of reasons that are 
unique or particularly acute in the cyber domain, will inadvertently cause escalatory spirals. 
However, this literature is not well-grounded in the traditional theoretical canon on escalation. 
Therefore, I review the traditional literature on inadvertent escalation and identify causes of 
inadvertent escalation. Then, I assess the extent to which these causes are applicable to the cyber 
domain and the implications for causes of inadvertent escalation in cyberspace. My analysis 
demonstrates that inadvertent escalation in cyberspace is not necessarily predetermined. Indeed, 
the decision to escalate may be extremely context-dependent on the risk aversion or acceptance 
of decision-makers and how they respond to conditions of the pervasive uncertainty that is 
acutely present in cyberspace. 
 Next, I assesses the extent to which deliberate escalation as part of a bargaining strategy 
is possible in the cyber domain. This has largely been ignored by the emerging literature on 
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escalation dynamics in cyberspace, even though the original escalation literature in the nuclear 
era wrestled with the question of deliberate (rather than inadvertent) escalation. Specifically, I 
develop a theoretical framework for understanding deliberate escalation dynamics modeled after 
Herman Kahn’s escalation ladder. I consider the extent to which deliberate escalation in 
cyberspace differs from, and is similar to, deliberate escalation as it is traditionally understood in 
the literature. My analysis suggests several important distinctions: first, as described below, there 
are multiple “worlds” in which deliberate escalation in cyberspace could occur, which are a 
function of the observability and attribution of attacks; second, there are no clear firebreaks as 
there are with the employment of nuclear weapons and other conventional weaponry; third, there 
is no universal metric for assessing virtual damage; and fourth, potential thresholds may be 
inadvertently crossed due to unintended second order effects. Then, based on the cyber 
escalation ladder, I derive implications for escalation dominance, brinksmanship, strategies for 
victory, and de-escalation in cyberspace.  
 Finally, I conclude by synthesizing the insights from the analysis of both inadvertent and 
deliberate escalation to explore why escalation has not yet occurred in this domain. In particular, 
I argue that the cyber domain is inherently self-dampening. Indeed, there is a lack of universal 
lethality of cyber weaponry which means that following a cyber attack states must elect to do 
nothing, decide to respond with whatever cyber capabilities they already have (which may be far 
from the ideal response), or escalate through a cross-domain reaction. However, the latter may be 
difficult to conceive as there are no targeting norms for assessing proportionate physical 
responses to virtual damage. Finally, any response, cyber or otherwise, requires attribution, 
which takes time. Both elements work together to create breathing space and stymie escalatory 




puzzle by describing several recent cases where one might have expected to observe escalation, 
but did not. Indeed, by studying these “dogs that did not bark” one can identify the conditions 
that may have prevented escalation such as the United States’ tempered response to the 2014 
hack of Sony Picture’s Entertainment by North Korea.  
Defining Escalation 
 Escalation, put simply, is the increase in the intensity of military action—quantitatively 
through doing more of the same (e.g., increasing bombardment of a particular area), or 
qualitatively through introducing a new type of capability (e.g., moving from conventional to 
tactical nuclear weapons in a theater of operations)—or the scope (e.g., expanding the scope of 
military action to go beyond the current geographic theater to target the adversary’s allies or 
homeland).
83
 Academic debates regarding escalation dynamics flourished in earnest in the wake 
of the Cuban Missile Crisis, which crystalized the risks of nuclear annihilation due to crisis 
escalation.
84
 Herman Kahn’s seminal work, On Escalation, set the theoretical foundation for 




 As described by Kahn, escalation is akin to Schelling’s “competition in risk-taking” in 
which, in the context of a crisis, one side attempts to increase its effort to match the other’s, 
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potentially producing an escalating spiral that could lead to nuclear war.
86
 Parties to a crisis 
might choose to deliberately escalate to signal to an adversary and force the latter to back down, 
or escalation could occur inadvertently through security-dilemma dynamics, where an actor does 
not anticipate the consequences of what the other side interprets as escalatory actions.
87
 Victory 
is achieved through maintaining what Kahn refers to as “escalation dominance,” in which one 
side has a clear superiority at every level of escalation and can, therefore, prevent a crisis from 
spiraling out of control and achieve a desired political objective.
88
  
Whether it is indeed possible to achieve escalation dominance became a pressing 
question for academics in the context of nuclear deterrence, because it implied that the United 
States (or the Soviet Union) could escalate in a rational, linear, and controlled manner to get its 
way in superpower crises without risking spiraling into nuclear Armageddon. Indeed, according 
to Kahn and other theorists, the structural condition of the nuclear balance of terror—the 
disproportionate devastation that would occur with the strategic use of nuclear weapons—was 
likely to “induce some degree of restraint and prudent behavior on each side.”
89
 In other words, 
the nuclear balance of terror during the Cold War was deterrence dominant. However, as the 
Cold War progressed and the idea of using nuclear weapons as part of a deliberate bargaining 
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strategy came to be perceived by academics as illogical or anti-Clausewitzian (in that the costs of 
a nuclear confrontation would far outweigh whatever political objective was sought by their 
use).
90
 Therefore, the academic literature shifted to focus on the conditions under which 
escalation might occur through inadvertent or accidental means.
91
     
Inadvertent Escalation in Cyberspace 
Taken together, the above examples suggest a non-escalatory dynamic exists in the cyber 
domain. However, the prevailing sentiment in the emerging literature on escalation dynamics in 
cyberspace is that inadvertent escalation is overdetermined due to unique properties inherent in 
the domain. Indeed, while there is some discussion of the employment of cyber arms as part of a 
deliberate bargaining strategy, most of the contemporary discussion focuses on how parties to a 
crisis may inadvertently be drawn into strategic cyber war, or how cyber war might inadvertently 
escalate into kinetic conflict.
92
 For example, Lawrence J. Cavaiola et al. claim that avoiding 
inadvertent escalation in cyberspace is difficult due to unpredictable collateral damage and risks 
of unintended contagion, and problems of command and control.
93
 Patrick Allen and Chris 
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Demchak posit that the existence of patriotic hackers—citizens who, motivated for nationalistic 
reasons, engage in cyber attacks against perceived enemies of the state
94
—creates conditions for 
the cyber domain to be particularly escalatory due to divergent motivations of patriotic hackers 
and the government.
95
 Libicki argues that crisis management is likely to be more difficult in 
cyberspace than in conventional domains when the interests at stake are comparable. He also 
posits that that inadvertent escalation is more likely in cyberspace due to the fact that parties to a 
crisis may define thresholds differently and/or if thresholds are private; the involvement of third 
parties and the ensuing attribution difficulties; and heightened problems of command and 
control.
96
 In an earlier piece, Libicki argues that the factors that distinguish the cyber domain 
from conventional ones makes the former more escalatory, such as the uncertainty surrounding 
the effects of cyberattacks; the asymmetric nature of the vulnerability in the domain, which could 
prompt escalation to conventional kinetic attacks; and the greater credibility of retaliatory 
threats.
97
 Jason Healey has claimed that conflict in cyberspace is “the most escalatory kind of 
conflict we have ever come across.”
98
 Roger Hurwitz warns of the risk of conflict and escalation 
in cyberspace due to “ongoing quantitative and qualitative cyber arms races among state actors, 
the proliferation of cyber weapons among state and non-state actors, a widely shared 
                                                     
94
 Borghard and Lonergan, “Can States Calculate the Risks of Using Cyber Proxies?” 
95
 Patrick D. Allen and Chris C. Demchak, “The Palestinian-Israeli: CYBERWAR,” Military 
Review 83, no. 2 (March/April 2003). Also see Lin, “Escalation Dynamics and Conflict 
Termination in Cyberspace,” 59-61. 
96
 Martin C. Libicki, Crisis and Escalation in Cyberspace (Santa Monica, CA: RAND 
Corporation, 2012), 10, 93-97, 106-108, 114-119. 
97
 Martin C. Libicki, Cyberdeterrence and Cyberwar (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 
2009), 69-74.  
98




conventional wisdom that these weapons favor offense over defense, and no broadly accepted 
definition of the cyber attacks that amount to the use of force.”
99
 David C. Gompert and Martin 
Libicki postulate that escalation is particularly likely in the event of a crisis between the United 
States and China due to mutual expectations regarding each state’s likely cyber strategy in the 
event of armed conflict.
100
  
While it may be the case that some aspects of the cyber domain point to greater risks of 
inadvertent escalation, the above literature does not systematically review the causes of 
inadvertent escalation as they have been identified in the existing theoretical canon and assess 
their relevance or application to the cyber domain. The analysis below, therefore, identifies five 
causes of inadvertent escalation and assesses the extent to which the mechanisms and logics 
could play out in cyberspace. My analysis suggests that the current conventional wisdom that the 
cyber domain is fundamentally escalatory—that escalatory spirals can be easily triggered and, 
therefore, that relations between cyber rivals is inherently unstable—misses the nuances 
surrounding the nature of escalation in cyberspace. In fact, there are many factors that point in 
the direction of caution and deliberation and, therefore, mitigate the risks of inadvertent 
escalation. The literature on escalation dynamics in the context of nuclear weapons, as well as 
the traditional security studies literature, provides a wellspring of hypothesizing on the factors 
that may prompt inadvertent escalation. I explore the extent to which the factors that have been 
hypothesized to cause inadvertent escalation are applicable to the cyber domain.  
                                                     
99
 Roger Hurwitz, “Keeping Cool: Steps for Avoiding Conflict and Escalation in Cyberspace,” 
Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, International Engagement on Cyber III: State 
Building on a New Frontier (2013-14), 17. 
100
 David C. Gompert and Martin Libicki, “Cyber Warfare and Sino-American Crisis 
Instability,” Survival 56, no. 4 (August-September 2014): 7-22. Also see Avery Goldstein, “First 
Things First: The Pressing Danger of Crisis Instability in U.S.-China Relations,” International 




The Security Dilemma and the Spiral Model 
The security dilemma was originally conceived of as applying to relations between states 
during peacetime. However, scholars have used the underlying logic of the security dilemma to 
gain insight into how security dilemma dynamics could provoke unintended escalation during 
times of conflict.
101
 Several factors lie at the crux of the security dilemma and the spiral model: 
the adverse effects of incomplete information under anarchy;
102
 the cognitive biases of decision-
makers; and the uncertainty associated with the inability to predict into the future.
103
 The 
fundamental logic of the security dilemma is that the anarchic nature of the international system 
creates the conditions for arms races and dangerous spirals between status-quo orientated states. 
A security dilemma occurs when “an increase in one state’s security decreases the security of 
others.”
104
 Actions that one state takes to make itself more secure could ultimately undermine its 
security if another state perceives those actions as threatening and takes measures to arm itself, 
provoking a reciprocal, potentially escalatory spiral.  
Robert Jervis identifies two factors that contribute to the security dilemma: offensive 
versus defensive advantage; and the distinguishability between offense and defense.
105
 Security 
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dilemmas occur when defense is dominant (“when it is easier to destroy the other’s army and 
take its territory than it is to defend one’s own”
106
), but states cannot easily distinguish between 
offense and defense. Technology and geography are the primary factors that determine whether 
offense or defense has the advantage. In terms of geography, things that increase distance, cost, 
and vulnerability as an attacker advances to the defender contribute to a defensive advantage, 
while factors that decrease these contribute to an offensive advantage. In terms of technology, 
the vulnerability of weapons contributes to an offensive advantage because states will feel the 
need to use them prior to being attacked, while the invulnerability of weapons contributes to a 
defensive advantage.
107
 In the context of nuclear weapons, perceived vulnerability of second 
strike capabilities plays a critical role in igniting escalation from conventional to nuclear conflict, 
according to Barry Posen, because it creates an incentive for a state to strike first with its nuclear 
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arsenal (or, to organize its nuclear forces so that they launch on warning, triggering the potential 
for escalation) to avoid an attack on its retaliatory capabilities.
108
    
The distinguishability of offense and defense enables states to signal their “types” to 
others, because status-quo states will arm themselves with defensive capabilities, and it creates 
the conditions for advance warning of attack because states can observe others maneuvering 
offensive capabilities into position.
109
 Distinguishability also enables status-quo states to devise 
arms control agreements to limit offensive weapons.
110
 Jervis posits that, at most times in 
history, the international system is characterized by the conditions that enable security 
dilemmas.
111
 Indeed, there are very few inherently defensive weapons and, therefore, a state’s 
intent regarding the employment of weapons may be more significant than the characteristics of 
the weapons themselves.
112
 And, of course, anarchy complicates states’ efforts to signal intent 
because it creates incentives for obfuscation and signals can get lost in translation.
113
  
The logic of the security dilemma serves as the foundation for the spiral model, which 
depicts how status quo states may nevertheless end up spiraling into unintended retaliatory 
cycles of conflict because each proffers up threats and punishment in an attempt to positively 
affect the other’s behavior, when appeasement and conciliation would have been a more 
                                                     
108
 Posen, Inadvertent Escalation, 4. 
109
 Jervis, “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma,” 199-200. 
110
 Ibid., 201. 
111
 Ibid., 213. 
112
 Stephen Biddle, Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2001). 
113
 Robert Jervis, “Signaling and Perception: Drawing Inferences and Projecting Images,” in 
Political Psychology, ed. Kristen Renwick Monroe (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum 






 In other words, states miscalculate the nature of the world in which they 
are operating. 
Applying the Security Dilemma to Cyberspace: Offensive vs. Defensive Advantage 
One axis of the security dilemma is the extent to which offense or defense has the 
advantage. As has been extensively noted in discussions of the offense-defense balance in the 
literature, this variable is meant to operate at the systemic, rather than dyadic level.
115
 Because 
there is no universal lethality of cyber weapons, it is conceptually difficult to conceive of offense 
or defense being dominant in the cyber domain. Therefore, the only way (from a technical 
perspective) to begin to quantify an offense-defense balance in cyberspace is dyadically.
116
 With 
this caveat in mind, the analysis below explores the nature of geography and technology in 
cyberspace and the implications for an offensive or defensive advantage.  
The prevailing wisdom in the emerging literature on escalation in cyberspace is that the 
“geography” of the cyber domain contributes to an offensive advantage, thus making escalatory 
spirals more likely.
117
 From a superficial perspective, it may seem as though there are no 
geographic boundaries, buffers, and borders between states (or other actors operating in the 
domain) because anyone can theoretically reach out and touch anyone else in cyberspace. In 
other words, in cyberspace all states essentially share a common virtual border. The ostensible 
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absence of cyber geography could, therefore, dramatically compress the time necessary to launch 
an attack and create heightened incentives to strike first, increasing the risk of inadvertent 
escalation through advantaging offense over defense.
118
    
However, in reality, there are both physical and virtual barriers that impede access in 
cyberspace. For example, critical infrastructure is typically not connected to the Internet. Self-
contained systems that are not connected to the Internet are said to be separated from the latter 
by an “air gap,” which makes it physically isolated and, therefore, more difficult to penetrate. As 
already noted, gaining accesses to these systems requires close access through either physically 
penetrating a facility using a human operator or getting in sufficiently close proximity to connect 
via wireless or other means; interdicting supply chains; or securing a witting or unwitting insider 
to deploy the tool.  
Furthermore, the nature of geography in cyberspace is unique in terms of its fluidity in a 
way that is not comparable to physical geography. For the most part, physical terrain cannot be 
altered. However, in cyberspace, accesses and barriers can change rapidly, unpredictably, and 
even unintentionally. This could occur through multiple means. At the tactical level, entities 
could employ basic defensive measures such as instituting user training and implementing new 
hardware and software updates that deny the specific vulnerabilities that attackers were 
exploiting. Operationally, depending on how data flows into and out of a country or region, 
states may force the active monitoring of content at gateways, thus creating choke points to 
detect nefarious activity. Finally, at the strategic level, states may wage a preemptive or 
preventive attack against the cyber capabilities of another state or come to agreements that limit 
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actions in the domain. Indeed, this occurred in 2015 when China’s President Xi Jinping agreed to 
suspend cyber economic and industrial espionage against the United States.
119
  
The full implications of this for offensive versus defensive advantage and the likelihood 
of escalation remain uncertain. Decision-makers may not be able to reliably calculate whether 
offense or defense has the advantage at any given moment given the dynamic and evolving 
nature of offensive and defensive capabilities. Even if they can do so, they are unlikely to have 
confidence that these calculations are stable over the short- to medium-term, let alone the long-
term. In summary, this depicts a domain that may not necessarily be offense dominant. On the 
one hand, if an actor currently maintains access and fears that it may lose it in the future, this 
may create an incentive to strike first and, therefore, provoke an escalatory spiral; in other words, 
there is a “use-it-or-lose it” dynamic at play. On the other hand, the fact that states cannot 
reliably assess whether offense or defense has the advantage may prompt restraint because cyber 
weapons have a “use-it-and-lose-it” property and, therefore, deploying them under adverse 
conditions could result in the loss of an expensive access and/or capability. 
The second factor that impacts the relative advantage of offense and defense is the nature 
of technology and, by extension, its vulnerability. The predominant viewpoint in the cyber 
literature is that the technology of cyber weapons contributes to an offensive advantage. William 
Lynn, for instance, posits that the environment is “offense dominant” in cyberspace: “Adept 
programmers will find vulnerabilities and overcome security measures put in place to prevent 
intrusions….Cyber warfare is like maneuver warfare, in that speed and agility matter most.”
120
 
The argument that offense is dominant due to the technology of cyberwar largely rests on the 
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notion that there are numerous vulnerabilities that could be exploited and, therefore, defenders 
are always one step behind attackers. Indeed, as computing power and memory storage have 
improved, operating systems and applications have been able to provide users with increased 
functionality, but with increased performance come larger and more elaborate computer 
programs. For instance, Windows 95 had roughly 15 million lines of code when it debuted in 
1995, compared to the 2001 release of Windows XP that contained over 35 million lines of 
code.
121
 It is inevitable that, as more code is released, there will always be bugs that enable a 
malicious actor to manipulate the software. Microsoft, for example, typically finds 10-20 defects 
per 1000 lines of code during in-house testing, but releases software with 0.5 per 1000 lines.
122
 
That may seem like a low defect ratio, but it implies that Windows XP, with 35 million lines of 
code, contained over 17,500 vulnerabilities.
123
 Though not every one of these bugs necessarily 
provides a means for a hacker to take over a machine, some do and, due to the sheer magnitude 
and complexity of these programs, it is impossible to write completely bug-free code. However, 
the skill set necessary to discover these vulnerabilities and develop custom software to exploit 
them is difficult and very costly, particularly if the targeted system is highly customized.
124
 
Governments have recognized this fact and, therefore, have adapted over time to protect their 
own supply chains, purchase locally, and develop highly tailored and customized programs. For 
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example, China is working with Microsoft through its “Government Security Program” to gain 
access to the source code, conduct security reviews, and have Microsoft customize programs to 
meet their security requirements.
125
  
Furthermore, it is the case that certain types of cyber attacks favor the attacker—for 
instance, “cheap, fast, and easy” operations such as DDoS attacks, which are designed to disrupt 
rather than destroy. However, these types of attacks are unlikely to cause significant harm and, 
therefore, it is doubtful that they could produce strategic effects.
126
 Attacks that are truly costly 
for the target, such as those of a magnitude comparable to Stuxnet, are also costly to develop and 
implement. This suggests that, when it matters, the technology of cyber weapons gives an 
advantage to the defense, rather than the offense. 
Another aspect of the argument that technology contributes to the likelihood of escalation 
is the extent to which a given technology is vulnerable and, therefore, whether there is a “use-it-
or-lose-it” incentive. As mentioned above, this vulnerability informs Barry Posen’s argument 
regarding the causes of escalation to nuclear conflict during the course of conventional war. This 
occurs when conventional military operations come in contact with a state’s nuclear forces (or 
early warning and command and control systems) and threaten to undermine the latter’s 
confidence in their ability to use them. In other words, when a conventional operation imperils 
the integrity of the adversary’s nuclear retaliatory forces, the adversary is likely to escalate, 
particularly if it relies on a counterforce doctrine.
127
 Secure nuclear retaliatory forces are the 
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bedrock of nuclear deterrence and negate a perceived first strike advantage by either side. When 
those forces are threatened, the perceived incentive to strike first reemerges, creating the 
conditions for a state to escalate to use nuclear weapons or position its nuclear forces to launch 
on warning to signal to the adversary its willingness to escalate.
128
 During the 1980s, military 
planners devised plans to target the weak link in the command and control of the adversary’s 
nuclear forces. Attacks on command and control are “one of the few sources of leverage in a 
nuclear war.”
129
 Inadvertent nuclear escalation can be more or less acute, according to Posen, 
depending on the state’s nuclear strategy. In particular, Posen posits that a counterforce strategy 
increases the likelihood of inadvertent escalation because the perceived harm of conventional 
operations that target counterforce capabilities is greater and leads to perceptions of first strike 
advantage. Conversely, countervalue strategies are more immune to these risks.
130
 
This model of inadvertent escalation is not a perfect fit for the cyber domain due to the 
nature of the vulnerability of cyber weapons. In the context of nuclear weapons, deterrence is 
stable when cities are vulnerable and weapons are invulnerable. Operations that threaten the 
invulnerability of weapons, therefore, undermine stability and increase the risk of escalation. 
However, cyber weapons are a unique class of weapons in that they are not in themselves 
inherently vulnerable. Therefore, the pressure to “use it or lose it” does not apply in the same 
way in this domain. Cyber weapons, as already described in a previous section, cannot be 
physically destroyed and, in theory, there is an unlimited capacity to regenerate them. Martin 
Libicki, for instance, asserts that, 
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The prerequisites of a cyberattack are clever hackers, cheap hardware, some 
network connection, intelligence on the workings and role of the target system, 
specific knowledge of the target’s vulnerabilities, and tools to build exploits 
against such vulnerabilities. Cheap hardware possibly aside, none of these can be 





However, there is an important nuance to this point that Libicki misses. While cyber weapons are 
themselves inherently invulnerable, states can target the attack infrastructure of their adversaries; 
yet this is a complex endeavor. For instance, while it is possible to conduct counter-force 
targeting and to destroy the networks that hold the cyber weaponry of another state, it is unlikely 
that this would be the only copy a state maintains of these weapons. Furthermore, a state could 
steal another state’s toolkit and incorporate the signatures into its defenses to render a potential 
attack ineffective. However, capabilities do exist that enable attackers to repurpose a tool to 
overcome the target’s defenses.
132
 Another type of counterattack would be to disconnect the 
target state from the Internet or to destroy the networked infrastructure that it uses to employ the 
cyber weapon. Yet, while it would delay an attacking state, as discussed in the context of 
deterrence by denial, the impact of this would be temporary. Therefore, in the long run, cyber 
weapons have near-complete survivability.
133
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The implications of the survivability of cyber weapons on escalation are nuanced. On the 
one hand, the fact that capabilities could, in theory, always be regenerated removes the pressure 
to strike first in a crisis and therefore, contributes to stability rather than escalation. However, 
while tools are nearly invulnerable, accesses are not. Without proper access to deliver a cyber 
weapon at the appropriate time, the invulnerability of a tool is meaningless. What this means for 
escalation, therefore, is that the anticipation or the fear of losing an access—rather than the 
anticipation of losing a tool—could create escalatory pressure. The “use it or lose it” incentive 
applies in the cyber domain to the access, rather than the weapon. However, as noted above, the 
fluid and unpredictable nature of accesses in the domain means that states may not know with 
any reliability when they are likely to lose an access. Therefore, this does not uniformly suggest 
that this facet of the domain contributes to escalation.  
Furthermore, the counterforce targeting described above may be particularly important 
during times of crisis or conflict when the temporary disruption of another state’s offensive cyber 
capabilities may create a momentary military or bargaining advantage. Though the implications 
of this type of escalation are entirely theoretical, a state may find an advantage in this kind of 
escalatory move because it changes (albeit for a limited period of time) the relative vulnerability 
posture. Another temporary advantage that can change the vulnerability calculus is if one targets 
the command and control nodes of cyber weapons. For instance, in the United States only the 
President, and under some conditions, the Secretary of Defense, may order an offensive cyber 
operation.
134
 If this command and control node can be decapitated at a strategic time, then an 
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Applying the Security Dilemma to Cyberspace: Distinguishability of Offense and Defense  
The indistinguishability of offense and defense also contributes to the likelihood of 
escalation. An inability to distinguish between offense and defense could stem from the 
structural conditions of an anarchic international system, where actors have imperfect 
information, as well as from the nature of the weapons themselves, which could have offensive 




There are several factors suggesting that the security dilemma and, therefore, the risk of 
escalation, may be heightened in cyberspace due to the difficulty of distinguishing between 
offensive and defensive cyberattacks. Most notably, states face considerable difficulty 
distinguishing between cyber intrusions that are conducted for the purposes of espionage versus 
those that are laying the groundwork for an offensive cyberattack. This is because gaining access 
and absconding with data could just as easily support intelligence objectives as it could offensive 
information requirements to needed to target the network or specific systems connected to it. 
Compounding the issue of distinguishability is the predominant role secrecy plays in the cyber 
domain. Secrecy complicates efforts to distinguish between offensive and defensive capabilities 
because it is difficult to observe how states are arming themselves, and states rarely get advance 
warning of an impending attack. Moreover, problems of attribution mean that a targeted state 
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may face significant barriers to identifying the adversary who committed an attack; and, even if 
attribution is possible, the intentions of the attacking states may be difficult to discern due to 
difficulties of signaling in the cyber domain.
137
  
Taken together, these suggest that there is an increased chance of escalation due to the 
ambiguities associated with discerning between offense and defense and, more broadly, inferring 
intent. However, the factors that contribute to the risk of escalation are mitigated by the role of 
time. There are unique properties to cyber conflict that inject breathing space into crisis 
situations. The time lag that it takes between perceiving an attack and having confidence in 
attribution provides breathing room and political cover to decision-makers to deliberate on the 
appropriate response (and assess whether the government has the necessary capabilities and 
accesses at the time to deliver a proportionate response).
138
 Problems associated with 
distinguishing between espionage and offensive cyberattacks, attribution, and intent create the 
risk that a state may respond disproportionately to a perceived cyberattack, and/or that they may 
respond against the wrong actor. These risks are as likely to induce caution as they are to 
incentivize escalation. Risk-adverse states may be more likely to use uncertainty as an excuse to 
pause before retaliating against a perceived cyberattack; risk-acceptant states may be more likely 
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The Stability-Instability Paradox and Military Organization and Culture 
There are additional concepts in the canon on inadvertent nuclear escalation that could be 
applicable to inadvertent escalation in the cyber domain, but remain beyond the scope of this 
paper and are, therefore, fruitful avenues for future research. First, an extension of nuclear 
deterrence is the concept of the stability-instability paradox, in which stable deterrence at the 
strategic level nevertheless creates the conditions for conventional conflict because nuclear war 
is so unthinkable that states are willing to risk conventional conflict; paradoxically, this could 
unintentionally spiral into a nuclear exchange, despite the stability of mutual assured 
destruction.
140
 As the deterrence analysis above demonstrates, there is no stable deterrence in the 
cyber domain and cyber war is not “unthinkable.” Therefore, the structural conditions of the 
stability-instability paradox may appear ill-suited to the cyber realm. However, there is emerging 
literature that attempts to apply this concept to cyberspace and, therefore, its utility warrants 
further exploration in light of the findings of this paper.
141
 For instance, in future research one 
might explore the conditions under which low-level provocations and crises in the cyber domain 
risk spiraling into strategic conflict, given the unique attributes of the cyber domain that produce 
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self-dampening dynamics. The logic of the stability-instability paradox could also be explored in 
a cross-domain context (which, indeed, was how it was originally conceived in the realm of 
nuclear deterrence) to identify the likelihood of minimally costly but potentially disruptive cyber 
provocation spilling over into kinetic conflict between adversaries. 
There is also an extensive body of literature on the topic of military organization and 
culture and its effects on escalation through various mechanisms, such as the cult of the 
offensive, strategic culture, risk-aversion or acceptance, and loose vs. tight coupling, to name a 
few.
142
 For instance, Posen argues that certain types of civil-military arrangements could 
heighten the risk of inadvertent nuclear escalation. Specifically, inadvertent escalation could 
occur if there is a divide between civilian leaders and military planners, with the latter having 
significantly greater knowledge than and closely holding war plans from the former. 
Furthermore, if civilian leaders perceive nuclear weapons to be “exotic,” they may have 
difficulty foreseeing the consequences of their use and, therefore, take actions that risk 
escalation.
143
 In the cyber domain, lack of expertise among civilian leaders about the nature of 
cyber warfare and an aversion to understanding what is perceived of as a highly technical field 
may make it difficult for civilian policymakers to understand and appreciate the escalatory risks 
of war plans, potentially empowering the military and playing into cult of the offensive logic. 
There may also be significant variation within military leadership concerning cyber competence, 
which could result in a small, elite cadre of cyber warriors to whom both civilian and military 
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leadership grant significant autonomy and decision-making authority, further enhancing the risk 
of inadvertent escalation. Finally, the critical role played by the private sector and non-state 
actors more broadly in the cyber domain, and their relationships with the government, introduce 
another potential source of inadvertent escalation that is distinct from other domains of warfare. 
For example, the extent to which the private sector is granted discretion to take active measures 
to defend its networks and systems and the level of oversight exerted by the government could 
risk that actions taken by non-government entities against foreign targets could draw a 
government into an unwanted crisis or cyber war. Variation in civil-military and public-private 
relationships and the implications for escalation is a topic for further research. 
Finally, the literature on strategic culture offers rich and extensive opportunities for 
further research and many axes of variation for scholars to explore. Variation in strategic cyber 
culture across states could explain differences in states’ cyber strategies, and decisions about 
cyber force structure and employment. Using the emergence of a militarized cyber domain as an 
exogenous event, researchers could assess the conditions under which states’ approaches to the 
cyber domain are consistent with versus diverge from its existing strategic culture. Within states, 
variation across cyber actors with different strategic or organizational cultures (public versus 
private; civilian versus military; military versus intelligence; different military services) could 
explain divergent approaches to the domain. 
A Unique Facet of Inadvertent Escalation in Cyberspace: Cyber Proxies 
Perhaps the most likely cause of inadvertent escalation in cyberspace is a factor that the 
existing literature on inadvertent escalation does not consider, namely, the role played by cyber 
proxies. As articulated in past research, the desire for plausible deniability in the cyber domain 




Indeed, cyber proxies provide political cover for states even as the technical ability to assign 
attribution is improving. When proxy actors are inserted into a crisis, regardless of domain, there 
is an increased risk that these actors may intentionally or inadvertently exceed their mandate and 
escalate a crisis beyond what is intended.
144 
Nevertheless, in addition to the technical factors that 
dampen the risk of inadvertent escalation in cyberspace regardless of the existence of proxies, 
uncertainty regarding command and control of cyber operations may also prompt the target of a 
cyber attack to pause before issuing an escalatory response rather than respond erroneously 
against the wrong actor. In this way, employing cyber proxies may actually enable states to get 
away with cyber attacks and avoid retribution.   
Deliberate Escalation in Cyberspace  
 The above analysis has demonstrated that there are several properties inherent in the 
nature of the cyber domain that mitigate the risk of inadvertent escalation. A separate 
consideration is whether deliberate escalation—where states intentionally ratchet up the scale or 
scope of operations against an adversary in cyberspace—is possible and, if so, what the nature of 
that escalation could theoretically look like. The elements of cyber operations that alleviate 
inadvertent escalation risks through generating self-dampening dynamics—for instance, the 
absence of universal lethality of cyber weapons; the difficulty of generating proportionate 
responses; attribution difficulties and the role played by time—also complicate efforts to develop 
and implemented a deliberate escalation strategy. Nevertheless, this section uses the deliberate 
escalation literature, particularly Herman Kahn’s work on escalation, as a framework for 
theoretically assessing the dynamics of deliberate escalation in cyberspace. I argue below that 
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there is a critical conceptual difference between deliberate escalation in the nuclear and cyber 
realms due to the role played by secrecy in the cyber domain. In the latter environment, 
deliberate escalation could occur in three possible worlds—obfuscation, covert coupling, and 
overt coupling—each of which contains its own logic and is distinguished by the manner in 
which secrecy permeates cyber operations. Furthermore, deliberate escalation in cyberspace is 
also distinct in that there is no clear firebreak comparable to that between the deliberate non-use 
versus use of nuclear weapons. 
 This section proceeds as follows. First, I define deliberate escalation and describe the 
logic of the three worlds of deliberate escalation in cyberspace. Next, I construct an escalation 
ladder for the cyber domain. I subsequently explore the implications for how we can 
conceptualize escalation dominance in cyberspace; brinksmanship; and strategies of victory. I 
conclude by assessing the prospects of de-escalation in cyberspace. 
Deliberate Escalation  
In the context of nuclear warfare and nuclear options, the idea of escalation as part of a 
deliberate bargaining strategy became appealing for American policymakers in the context of the 
doctrine of Flexible Response, where the U.S. sought “seemingly numerous possibilities for 
controlled escalation, in deliberate gradations through an extended range of violence.”
145
 It was 
assumed, in this approach to controlled escalation, that policymakers would actually be able to 
deliberately manipulate levels of violence, ratcheting it up or down in a controlled manner.
146
 
The seminal framework for conceptualizing deliberate escalation in the nuclear realm was 
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conceived by Herman Kahn, who used the metaphor of a ladder to epitomize escalation 
dynamics. The basic framework of the escalation ladder involved “a linear arrangement of 
roughly increasing levels of intensity of crisis.”
147
 In Kahn’s conception of deliberate escalation, 
states could intentionally move up or down the escalation ladder to win in a crisis. For Schelling, 
state could deliberately escalate for the purposes of signaling in the context of coercion.  
Three Worlds of Deliberate Escalation in Cyberspace 
There are several factors that make deliberate escalation in cyberspace unique. First, a 
fundamental aspect of nuclear escalation dynamics is that they occur in the context of a two-
sided crisis.
148
 However, with cyber operations it may be more likely that there are third parties 
that are participants. Indeed, states that lack appropriate capabilities to carry out offensive cyber 
operations or seek additional (political) plausible deniability beyond what the cyber domain 
already provides at a technical level may employ cyber proxies to conduct the operation.
149
 That 
said, for the purposes of this analysis I employ a two-party escalation model for cyberspace, 
although exploring the implications of multi-party escalation models is a fruitful avenue for 
future research. Furthermore, a two-party escalation model is theoretically possible even if one 
or both sides employ proxy actors as long as either side chooses to hold the other state 
responsible for the actions of a proxy actor. 
The most theoretically significant difference between deliberate escalation in the nuclear 
and cyber realms is the implication of the roles of secrecy and attribution in cyberspace. 
Deliberate escalation in cyberspace could occurs in three different worlds (see Figure 1 
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 Each world is based on the extent to which the escalating states prefer to reveal its role 
in a cyber attack.
151
 The more information that is revealed regarding attribution, the less 
applicable are the self-dampening aspects of escalation in cyberspace (which in the case of this 
situation are primarily driven by the time required to ascertain attribution). In the first world, 
which I term “Obfuscation,” the escalating state does not make any deliberate efforts to self-
attribute; rather, attribution is the responsibility of the target. This world is by far the most 
common world in which interaction in cyberspace currently occurs. A notable exception to this is 
when former Secretary of Defense Ash Carter took public responsibility for a U.S. cyber 
operation against ISIS in Mosul, Iraq.
152
 The first world is characterized by the anonymizing 
features the cyber domain provides to actors and thus, offensive actors have plausible deniability 
and the targets are forced to pursue attribution. As already discussed above, attribution takes 
time, resources, and rarely can be leveraged with complete confidence.
153
 This process creates 
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breathing space between potential escalating volleys of cyber attacks and responses, even when 
states are pursuing a deliberate escalation strategy.  
Figure 1: Three Worlds of Deliberate Escalation in Cyberspace 
 
In the second world, which I term “Covert Coupling,” an escalating state privately takes 
responsibility for a cyber attack through covert coupling. This private attribution could occur 
through a secretive diplomatic missive or perhaps even technical messages embedded in attack 
signatures or lines of code.
154
 Indeed, secrecy has been used by actors outside of the cyber 
domain to convey resolve without signaling to domestic or international audiences.
155
 By 
privately revealing information about the identity of an attacker, the target is provided with a 
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experts to include, intelligence professionals, technical forensic specialists, and national security 
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decision-making environment in which the reputational costs of not responding are not nearly as 
acute, because the only actor who would perceive the non-response is the attacking state. Thus, 
while the latter may make calculation about the target’s capabilities or resolve based on a non-
response (or a non-escalatory response), the target is shielded from domestic or international 
reputational costs.  
The third world, “Overt Coupling,” most closely resembles escalation dynamics in the 
nuclear realm because it lacks the self-dampening features that typically exist in the cyber 
domain. In this world, the attacker uses overt signaling to claim responsibility for an attack. This 
world envisions attribution being coupled with a formal diplomatic and/or a technical message, 
such as a defacement, that is widely and publicly observed and the authenticity of which is 
accepted. Therefore, in this world, one may be more likely to observe cross-domain responses to 
cyber attacks because offensive cyber counter responses may be difficult to rapidly leverage and 
the public nature of the attack is likely to put pressure on leaders to carry out an expedient 
response once an attack reaches a certain threshold. Importantly, this threshold is likely to be 
lower than it would be for a World 1 or 2 type of attack because of the increased reputational 
costs that are generated.
156
 
In this framework, when governments use cyber operations as part of a deliberate 
bargaining strategy, the initiator has the first choice to decide the world in which it prefers to 
operate. The choice of a particular world sends a signal to the target (and, if the initiator chooses 
World 3, international and domestic audiences) about its resolve and perceived ability to weather 
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a cyber or cross domain response. The initiator must also make a risk calculus regarding the 
likelihood that the target chooses to respond in a different world, which potentially changes the 
dynamics of the game. In other world, a target may elect to respond to an attack in World 1 by 
maneuvering into the second or third worlds, which forces the initiating state to decide if it wants 
to deny its culpability. In doing so, the initiating state may deescalate the situation by fostering 
domestic and international dissention and, therefore, delegitimizing a potential response. 
However, it also runs the risk that the target may be willing to publicly provide evidence to 
support the latter’s attribution. The initiating state may also choose to deny culpability through 
secret channels, but in doing so it could be signaling that its resolve and capabilities are perhaps 
not as strong as may have seemed at first and may suggest a desire to avoid continued escalation. 
In another scenario, a target may elect to respond to a cyber attack in Worlds 2 or 3 by a 
maneuver in World 1, which is a de-escalatory move because its response is not observable, but 
it also runs the risk that the initiating state (and, potentially, international and domestic audiences 
who cannot observe the response) may interpret the target’s behavior as a signal of its 
diminished resolve and capabilities and invite further attacks in the future. In sum, this implies 
that deliberate escalation in the cyber domain is more complex than other arenas because 
escalatory and de-escalatory maneuvers could occur vertically up and down an escalation ladder, 
and also through jumping between different worlds. 
The Cyber Escalation Ladder 
In this section, I use Kahn’s 44-rung escalation ladder as a starting point for developing 
an escalation ladder in cyberspace and explore the extent to which the latter and former overlap 
and diverge. Kahn’s escalation ladder is divided into seven distinct units in which the movement 






 The most significant firebreak, of course, is the “deliberate nonuse of nuclear 
weapons.”
158
 While the ladder is organized in a linear, hierarchical fashion, one does not have to 
continue to climb up the escalation ladder rung-by-rung—one can also go down and de-escalate, 
or one can skip rungs.
159
 A state has the escalatory advantage and can achieve desired political 
objectives if it enjoys escalation dominance at a given rung of the ladder (ideally, at every rung). 
Escalation dominance goes beyond simply having military superiority at any given rung of the 
escalation ladder. It also includes “the assurance, morale, commitment, resolve, internal 
discipline, and so on, of both the principals and their allies.”
160
 
Organizationally, the cyber escalation ladder is similar to Kahn’s in that, within each 
world described above, cyber escalation may also work along a fixed structure and is 
hierarchically organized according to different rungs and thresholds. However, while Kahn’s 
ladder integrated the use of nuclear weapons into the spectrum of instruments of power available 
to a state (including diplomacy and conventional military activity), this ladder is solely for the 
cyber domain—hence, there are fewer rungs. This is because, to gain theoretical and conceptual 
clarity regarding the nature of escalation dynamics in cyberspace, it is important to first 
understand how cyber operations could be arrayed in relations to one another. An avenue for 
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further research is to integrate the cyber escalation ladder with the range of instruments available 
to states. 
Therefore, in the cyber domain, there are theoretically three parallel escalation ladders, 
which are mirror images of one another but differ in the extent to which any given action is 
attributable. It is important to note that the relative ordering of rungs on the ladder may vary 
slightly depending on the world in which the interaction occurs. Like Kahn’s ladder, one can 
skip rungs and the ladder is organized hierarchically according to the degree of harm inflicted. 
Therefore, attacks that are destructive are placed higher than those that are disruptive. However, 
there are some exceptions to the hierarchical ordering of the below ladder, which reflects the 
wide range of targets that cyber operations could theoretically attack. For instance, while in most 
cases publicly defacing websites (rung 7) creates more harm for the target because it creates 
reputational costs and could theoretically tie leaders’ hands, in some instances beaconing inside a 
network (rung 6) could be perceived by the target as more harmful if the network is essential for 
military operations (for instance, nuclear command and control networks). Thus, unlike Kahn’s 
escalation ladder, the specific ordering of these rungs is potentially more fluid in the cyber 
domain. This is due, in part, to the fact that there is no universal metric for assessing virtual 
damage. Thus, the degree to which a given action is perceived as escalatory may depend on what 
a state values, which is a more subjective measure than simply material cost. This is a point that 
will be further elaborated in the context of the rungs below. However, the key implication is that 
there is likely to be variation across states and also over time in terms of how harm is defined on 
variables such as regime type and the systemic norms that govern interstate interactions in 




Soviet Union escalation ladders and thresholds may differ, but does not explore the implications 
of this for crisis stability.
161
  
Figure 2: Cyber Escalation Ladder 
 
Rungs 1 through 3 on the cyber escalation ladder mirror Kahn’s “subcrisis maneuvering” 
unit, which he describes as maneuverings that “manipulate, either deliberately or otherwise, the 
fear of escalation or eruption.”
162
 The first three rungs essentially begin with verbal, diplomatic 
instruments: states indicate that a crisis is looming; they make diplomatic/political/economic 
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gestures; or they issue formal declarations.
163
 Though they are the beginning rungs of the cyber 
escalation, at least as demonstrated by the recent history of cyber conflict, crises do not 
necessarily have to begin at this level due to the secrecy that surrounds state behavior in the 
domain. Perhaps a normative implication is that crisis in cyberspace should start like this, 
because it would be more stabilizing, so that another state can fully understand that a crisis is 
looming, but currently this is not common practice. However, since it could occur in the future it 
remains an integral part of the presented cyber escalation ladder. Absent these rungs, it is 
difficult for a state to see that a crisis is looming. Furthermore, it is difficult to interpret behavior 
at higher rungs if the operation is not coupled with some other type of political signaling. Absent 
this coupling, the line between ill-conceived coercion and brute force may be blurred or, more 
generally, the intent behind a particular cyber operation may be misinterpreted. Cyber escalation 
in World 1 would not begin at these rungs because they enable attribution; cyber escalation in 
World 2 may involve the private issuing of formal diplomatic statements.   
Cyber operations begin at Rung 4. Rungs 4 through 6 start to enter the dangerous space 
of threatening behavior that can be destabilizing, and depending on the level of attribution can 
function either as shows of force for the attacker or shows of vulnerability for the targeted entity. 
Though a traditional show of force would reveal capability, because these attacks do not cause 
destruction the attacker is not showing any capability other than that it has mapped key networks 
and, in some cases, gained access. The ability of the attacker to escalate beyond is something 
which a target would have to make an assessment.
164
 However, unique to the cyber domain, 
cyber operations of this nature also reveal how vulnerable the target is and may encourage the 
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target to deescalate simply because its security was shaken by the inadequacies of its own 
defenses. 
Rung 4 envisions the aggressive port scanning of key infrastructure of another actor. In 
other words, it is the technical equivalent of a pointing a finger and saying, “I see you and I 
know what you value.” Additionally, by scanning all ports on a target, an attacker can identify 
ingress points that are vulnerable to the toolset they possess.
165
 However, port scanning sends a 
signal to the recipient because it can be easily detected in real-time.  It is important to note that 
port scanning does not indicate that the sender has the ability to gain access to or the capability to 
disrupt or destroy the scanned target. The scanning simply signals that the critical infrastructure 
can be identified across cyberspace. Rung 5 turns up the invasiveness and envisions attempts to 
gain access that are “noisy.” In other words, the attacker is conducting penetration attempts 
against the target and is making little to no effort to obfuscate that fact it is doing so. Often this 
would look like an uptick in attacks against a target using commonly tools and techniques that 
can easily be detected and defended against. Rung 6 is where the attacker demonstrates that it 
has access to the target. Causing easily detectable beacons to be activated in the target’s key 
networks and systems invokes a threat of persistent access and also makes the target feel 
vulnerable because its defenses were undermined. The target may also wonder what else the 
attacker might have gained and retained access to. 
Between Rungs 6 and 7 rests what I coin the “Public in the know” threshold. Beyond this 
threshold the effect of the operation is generally detectable to the public or the plausible 
deniability of the effect of the operation is difficult to hide (even though the identity of the 
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attacking state could still be hidden).
166
 This creates political costs for the target state, even if the 
initiating state can avoid attribution. Rung 7 features activity such as website defacement and 
hacked social media accounts. The damage delivered is temporary and recoverable, but paints 
the website or account owner in an unfavorable light and thus inflicts a reputational cost. Rung 8 
envisions DDoS attacks against the Internet facing website of a public or private entity. These 
attacks can vary greatly in scale and scope. They have been highly coordinated, as was the case 
in Operation Ababil (discussed below), but many have been largely unsuccessful and resulted in 
little degradation of service. Rung 9 depicts the release of confidential information from a firm or 
government entity. Data breaches of this nature can vary greatly in scale and scope. They can be 
extreme, such as the hack against the US Office of Personnel Management that led to the loss of 
over 20 million records and has to potential to confound U.S. intelligence operations for a 
generation; or the DNC hack, which exposed, among other things, the personal emails of Hillary 
Clinton’s campaign manager and were used as fodder by her opposition during the 2016 U.S. 
presidential race. They also can cause reputational damage for a firm, for instance the 2014 Sony 
hack led to the release of sensitive corporate communiques as well as a decision to not release 
the film (although Sony Pictures ended up making more than expected revenue in the wake of 
the North Korean hack due to greater publicity about an otherwise B-rated movie).
167
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Between rungs 9 and 10 is a threshold that describes the transition from disruptive to 
destructive attacks. Attacks of this nature move beyond nuisance and depict physical damage to 
the network or operating infrastructure of their target. The 2014 attack by Iran against the Sand’s 
Casino corporation which destroyed part of the firms networked infrastructure is an example of 
an attack at the tenth rung. However, the significance of Rung 9 may be greater in a world in 
which there is public attribution for the attack. Rung 11 envisions a destructive attack against 
non-critical military or government networks and systems. 
Beyond rung 11 lies another threshold which describes the transition into targeting 
critical infrastructure.
168
 Critical infrastructure is defined as systems so vital to a society that 
their incapacitation will put pose direct risks to public safety and national security. However, 
how individual states define what systems fall under the rubric of critical infrastructure may vary 
significantly or may only be realized after the fact. For instance, in democracies, electoral 
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systems may count as critical infrastructure, while in autocracies systems that enable the regime 
to monitor, surveil, and control access to information domestically (such as China’s “Great 
Firewall”) may be perceived as critical infrastructure. In the United States, President Obama 
declared Sony Pictures to be part of under US protection in that it was part of “first amendment” 
values after the revelation of the North Korean hack.
169
 Furthermore, the degree to which an 
attack is escalatory may vary from one sector of critical infrastructure to another for reasons that 
are beyond the scope of this paper. For instance, attacking a key military system in the middle of 
a military crisis that leaves the targeted state vulnerable is arguably more escalatory than 
crashing an election system, especially if the outage does not occur during an election cycle. 
Likewise, attacking a gas line that provides heating to much of a state during the winter may be 
more escalatory than if the same attack occurred in the spring. In other words, the degree of harm 
inflicted on these key systems is what determines how escalatory the attack is, not simply that 
critical infrastructure was targeted.
170
  
When attacks on critical infrastructure cause a loss of life, then a different threshold has 
been breached as the damage done is no longer limited to a virtual world—it now has generated 
costs in physical space beyond the costs of reputation and the replacing affected systems. 
Furthermore, the first time this threshold is breeched would be significant because, as already 
noted, to date, no one has ever died as a direct result of a cyber attack.
171
 Another unique aspect 
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of this threshold is that the attacker may not have intended to cross it. Indeed, critical 
infrastructure is often critical because its loss can directly impact public safety, therefore an 
attack against it may have unanticipated consequences, including the loss of life. Therefore, these 
types of attacks at the thirteenth rung are extraordinarily risky and any rational attacker should be 
conscientious that controlling escalation once critical infrastructure is targeted may be 
exceedingly difficult.  
Rung 14, which lies beyond the final threshold, envisions widespread destructive attacks. 
These attacks would cross multiple critical sectors and not be geographically localized. Attacks 
of this nature cause catastrophic devastation and fear among a populace as a coordinated 
offensive cyber campaign is carried out. Once this rung is hit, it could very easily look like the 
cyber equivalent of Herman Kahn’s famous “war-gasm,” initially. However, once this “cyber-
gasm” is hit, the complexity of the cyber attacks are likely to gradually subside as the tailored 
accesses and tools that were necessary to conduct the initial offensive campaign become inert 
due to responding defenses and simply because the absence of universal lethality means that 
cyber weapons they often lose their utility once they have achieved their desired objectives. 
Therefore, for the attack to continue over time, attackers are likely to pursue fast, cheap, and easy 
means to hit remaining vulnerable targets (although, the remaining targets are likely to be the 
less vulnerable than those targeted in the initial wave). This type of targeting is unlikely to be 
effective against critical infrastructure, which often requires custom tools and accesses. 
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Therefore, causing widespread attacks against vulnerable targets across all sectors could quickly 
become a war of attrition.  
It is important to note that rungs 9 through 13 require access in order to carry out the 
desired effect. At least conceptually, each rung requires a greater level of capability and access 
than afforded at the rung below. That said, there exists an incentive for a state that does not have 
preexisting accesses and capabilities to skip directly to targeting the weak underbelly of the state. 
This “cherry picking approach” to targeting, if effective, amounts to a war of attrition. Indeed, if 
the scope and scale of the onslaught is wide enough, the effect could lead to the faltering of most 
of the state’s IT infrastructure as users lose confidence in the reliability and integrity of their 
systems and data. 
Implications: Strategies of Victory; Escalation Dominance; and Brinksmanship  
 If deliberate cyber escalation can ever be useful for states, they must be able to achieve 
political objectives and extract concessions from adversaries. This section discusses the 
implications of the escalation ladder for how states could construct strategies of victory; the 
possibility of achieving escalation dominance in cyberspace; and the dynamics and potential 
risks of brinksmanship. According to Kahn, there are two strategies one can employ to achieve 
victory in the context of deliberate escalation. The first type of strategy involves “mak[ing] use 
of features of the particular ‘agreed battle’ that is being waged in order to gain an advantage.”
172
 
In other words, one side in a crisis may have a threshold or limit beyond which it will not 
escalate, and will instead focus on achieving victory within a predetermined sphere. These 
thresholds could be clearly and credibly communicated to the adversary, or they could be kept 
secret. The second type of strategy eschews limits to escalation, instead engaging in 
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 Essentially, this is the notion that one party to a crisis can 
escalate and risk “eruption” to force the other side to concede (Schelling also discusses this).
174
  
Kahn’s “agreed battle” presents issues for the cyber domain when thresholds are not 
clearly communicated and it may be possible to inadvertently escalate further than intended due 
to opaque communication and the possibility of cascading effects. Furthermore, the lack of 
overtly and clearly defined thresholds fundamentally undermines the creation of an agreed battle 
space. If there are explicit thresholds, states have certainly kept them secret, which Kahn 
suggests “may run the risk of a full-scale pre-emptive eruption.”
175
 Furthermore, in a crisis where 
trust may also be an issue between adversaries, the only way to currently limit the conflict space 
would be through some sort of diplomatic agreement. However, the likelihood that one side 
would use the ambiguity of the domain to gain an advantage is high, thus undermining incentives 
for agreement. 
Intrinsically linked to escalation is the concept of brinkmanship. Schelling conceptualizes 
brinkmanship as a game of nuclear chicken; it involves deliberately manipulating the mutual risk 
of nuclear-armed states in a crisis such that things may get beyond an actor’s control and both 
parties could fall over the brink.
176
 Employing a strategy of brinkmanship is possible in the 
context of cyber operations. Parties to a cyber crisis could manipulate the risk of escalation 
through tying their hands using two mechanisms. First, states may choose to employ cyber 
proxies and essentially arm them with capabilities and thus turn over command and control. This 
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ties a state’s hands because, if the attack against another state lacks centralized command, it 
could generate escalatory effects that may be hard to control. For example, when Estonia came 
under a far-sweeping cyber attack following the removal of a Soviet-era war monument, over 
128 botnet control nodes were registered.
177
 This meant that the actor (most likely Russia) 
behind the attacks had delegated authority to proxy actors that they may not have had influence 
over. Secondly, states could tie their hands in the cyber domain through automaticity, which 
could take several forms. First, states could create the capabilities for automatic counter cyber 
attacks. In other words, an autonomous offensive response to an incursion that is made without 
human decision-making. This would involve significant technical complexities, such as the 
ability to ensure the hacking back capability functions the way in which it is intended against an 
unknown target, and the need to develop artificial intelligence to ensure that it does not get 
manipulated by the attacker. However, DARPA’s 2015 Cyber Grand Challenge demonstrated 
that super computers can indeed be used to find vulnerabilities and attack another computer 
while themselves under attack.
178
 Another way to create automaticity in cyberspace would be to 
employ honey pots, which are a type of cyber security mechanism designed to attract attackers to 
certain types of data resident on a network. If these are deployed in such a way that the data that 
the attacker exfiltrates contains a logic bomb that is activated when it is back on the host’s own 
network, then an automatic counter response is possible. In this sense, the widespread 
employment of honey pots is analogous to a minefield that, if properly arrayed, only hurts the 
attacker.  
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Beyond successfully employing a brinksmanship strategy, states could theoretically win 
an escalation contest if they enjoy escalation dominance, ideally at every rung of the escalation 
ladder. If one state can defeat another at every rung of the escalation ladder, it can control the 
dynamics of a crisis either through deterring the other side from escalating or (paradoxically) 
escalating to a rung in which it has escalation dominance in order to de-escalate. While the 
concept of escalation dominance is difficult to operationalize in traditional circumstances, it is 
even more complex in the cyber domain. There have been some claims in the cyber literature 
that escalation dominance is possible, but these arguments ignore the implications of the lack of 
universal lethality of cyber weapons and fluid nature of access in the domain, upon which 
delivering an effect is predicated.
179
 Together, these complicate states’ efforts to hit the right, 
rather than the most available or most vulnerable, target. Thus making achieving escalation 
dominance nearly impossible. Moreover, this effort would have to be replicated for every 
potential adversarial state as accesses and required capabilities are unique for each target. 
Furthermore, even if escalation dominance were physically possible in cyberspace, there 
are other aspects of the domain that complicate it in practice. For instance, one shortcoming of 
Kahn’s work is that he does not discuss the implications of different conceptions of the 
escalation ladder, as well as poor understandings of the other side’s ladder. A theoretical 
implication of this for achieving victory through escalation dominance is that, if thresholds are 
not codified in doctrine, a state may inadvertently escalate more than intended—perhaps to a 
rung in which it lacks an advantage over its adversary. Furthermore, the fact that these thresholds 
are relatively new and have mostly remain untested suggests that, even if they are made known, 
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it is likely that they will gradually tested. Indeed, Schelling’s famous analogy of wading into the 
water to discover the true threshold applies in this space.
180
 Furthermore, beyond ambiguity 
regarding thresholds, the secrecy surrounding cyber operations and the potential involvement of 
third party proxies impedes states’ calculations regarding its adversary’s capabilities at any given 
rung of the escalation ladder, making it difficult to assess which side may have escalation 
dominance. 
A final key facet of deliberate escalation is the ability of the escalation state to control the 
magnitude of the escalation. Kahn, for example, describes three ways an actor could escalate in 
the context of a crisis: increase the intensity of its effort (by doing more of the same, or by 
violating targeting and weapons norms and, in extreme cases, using nuclear weapons); widen the 
area of operations (by increasing the geographic scope of the conflict to include local sanctuaries 
or neighboring countries); or engage in compound escalation (by targeting beyond the local area 
of operations to hit the principal adversary or her allies).
181
 While it is possible to contain a cyber 
attack to a select target or group of targets that are all located within a certain region or state, a 
state needs to anticipate that unforeseen outcomes that extend beyond the area of hostilities. 
Cyber operations can have cascading effects due to unanticipated behavior as well as command 
and control issues that may result in targeting a principal or an ally unintentionally. Additionally, 
limiting cyber operations to certain types of targets may be complicated due to the nature of 
targeting over time. As already discussed above, over the course of a cyber campaign, a state’s 
access, exploits, and their utility expire. Therefore, states may find that increasing intensity 
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means that they are targeting the most vulnerable targets because they present the easiest means 
of access, which could mean targeting civilian assets.  
The previous discussion is not to insinuate that escalation can never be controlled and 
deliberate in cyberspace. Cyber escalation may be controlled through the implementation of 
several restrictive measures. First, care would need to be made during development and testing 
of cyber weapons to prevent undesired cascading effects.
182
 Second, the operators conducting the 
attack would need to be closely monitored by the state to ensure they do not exceed their orders. 
Third, states can develop confidence building measures to mitigate the risks of misinterpretation 
of signals and intent in the cyber domain.
183
  
De-escalation and Ending Wars   
The flip side of escalation dynamics is, of course, de-escalation. There are several aspects 
of cyber operations that facilitate de-escalation more so than in traditional domains of conflict, 
but also attributes of cyber conflict that make de-escalation difficult. One way that Kahn posits 
states can de-escalate from a crisis is through developing capabilities for “de-escalation 
dominance,” in which it can unilaterally de-escalate from a situation regardless of what the 
adversary is doing.
184
 Kahn lists some examples of de-escalation: reversing the previous 
escalation move; resolving a peripheral dispute; free prisoners; make conciliatory statements; 
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replacing individuals; let time pass for the situation to dampen down.
185
 The primary mechanism 
through which cyber operations facilitate de-escalation is the aforementioned dampening effects 
of operating in the domain. Because there is no universal lethality of cyber weapons, states will 
eventually exhaust their cyber capabilities or find them rendered inert over time as effective 
defenses are discovered. States may try to fight this tendency through mobilizing new resources 
but, even then, there is likely to be a significant time lag that injects breathing space into any 
crisis between cyber adversaries. This implies that tit-for-tat volleys in cyberspace are likely to 
be separated by longer stretches of time than in other domains, providing breathing space for 
governments to decide to ramp down.
186
 Furthermore, employing disruptive, rather than 
destructive, cyber attacks may also facilitate de-escalation because they can be walked back in a 
pre-coordinated timeline without having irrevocably destroyed an adversary’s capabilities or 
assets.  
However, there are also unique aspects of interstate relations in the cyber domain that 
make some aspects of de-escalation more difficult. Kahn states that parties can de-escalate 
through “concessions and conciliation,” but that de-escalation may be more difficult to achieve 
because it “is even more sensitive to accurate communication and shared understandings than 
escalation is.”
187
 This is because, to de-escalate, adversaries must be able to coordinate on de-
escalation moves, and this requires that they have a shared understanding of the situation. In 
cyberspace, this shared understanding of a situation may be hard to credibly communicate 
because states have incentives to keep information secret, as revealing it may expose accesses 
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they use for intelligence collection. Furthermore, even if states could agree on a shared 
understanding of the situation, the ability to credibly commit to a course of action and cease 
hostilities is problematic. Indeed, depending on the means of attack, it may be nearly impossible 
to reassure one’s adversary that the attacks will subside. For instance, if a state has employed 
proxies to conduct the attack, the state would have to find a way to credible exercise control over 
them to crease the onslaught. This can be difficult if the proxies are decentralized and the state 
does not have any means to influence them once they have equipped them with tools or targeting 
information. Furthermore, certain methods of attack can have effects that are difficult to stop 
either because of the way they are designed to propagate through a network, or once exposed to 
the target environment they act in unforeseen ways. For example, Stuxnet, which targeted Iranian 
nuclear centrifuges, it is believed was never supposed to propagate beyond a few targeted 
systems. However, due to its unique design, the worm quickly spread to other SCADA systems 
throughout the world.
188
 One potential method to de-escalate in such a situation is to share the 
original source code of the weapon with the party with whom you want to de-escalate. This 
would promote a shared understanding of the situation and for the targeted state to more rapidly 
engineer a means to thwart the attack and patch vulnerabilities as opposed to having to wait for 
an in-depth forensic analysis. 
Finally, in the context of ending wars, Kahn briefly explores the implications of the 
mobilizations of society for war. The First and Second World Wars required the total 
mobilization of the belligerents’ populations to wage modern industrial warfare. Kahn suggests 
that thermonuclear war, despite being far more destructive, would not be total in terms of 
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mobilizing society; rather, it could be waged by government authorities and technicians.
189
 The 
implication is, therefore, that thermonuclear war would be easier to end because governments do 
not have to walk back their entire population from supporting the war effort. Would strategic 
cyber warfare require the mobilization of civilian society and, if so, what would it look like? 
Due to the multi-stakeholder nature of the Internet, cyber power does not solely exist in 
government. Government networks ride on the backbone of civilian ones; non-governmental 
actors are powerful players in the domain and may have capabilities that rival even those of 
states; cyber talent is diffuse and exists across many sectors of society, not just in the military 
industrial complex; and in many ways the private sector is ahead of government agencies in 
understanding and operating in the domain. Therefore, in this sense, strategic cyber war may 
necessitate the mobilization of certain sectors of society in a way that thermonuclear war would 
not. Mobilization could come through two means: either the mobilization of the technology base 
to engineer cyber weaponry and supporting infrastructure, or the equivalent of an “electronic 
levee en masse.” Though mobilizing the tech sector in the same way the industrial sector did 
during WWI and WWII is possible, it would fundamentally be different given the no universality 
lethality of cyber weapons principle. To be effective, states would need to entrust corporations 
with targeting information, intelligence, and battle plans well in advance of their implementation 
for the base to develop requisite capabilities. Though there are means to clear these civilians for 
access to information that states typically classify, the potential to lose the element of surprise 
behind future military operations would be high. Furthermore, it would be difficult to scale such 
a program across all of industry. A more likely scenario would be that states would engage with 
elements of their defense industrial base that have been pre-vetted to handle sensitive 
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information. States may also consider conscripting these personnel to conduct operations, 
however their legal status and the oversight of their operations are considerations that would a 
prudent state would want to address. However, if a state decides to engage in indiscriminate 
targeting such as that described at rung 14, the cyber-gasm, then this type of mobilization might 
be exceedingly effective. 
A second option envisions combining the computing power of computers resident in a 
state. This “electronic levee in masse” would require the placement of software on some 
percentage, if not all, of the computers in a state that enables it to direct unused computing cycles 
to assist in conducting attacks or breaking advanced encryption standards.
190
 The computational 
power that distributed computing on this level would vary from state to state depending on the 
scale and scope of the program it implements and the preexisting computing base within the 
state. In a future where this method is employed, electronic coalition warfare that brings together 
the combined computing power of multiple states may be a reality. Taken together, this suggests 
that, in the event of strategic cyber warfare, the relationship between the civilian sector and 
government may more closely resemble that of the total industrial wars of the twentieth century 
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The Dogs That Didn’t Bark 
Below, I explore four examples of U.S. interactions with competitors in cyberspace: 
China, North Korea, Iran, and Russia. These examples demonstrate this section’s empirical 
puzzle and provided the thrust for the presented theoretical analysis, with the caveat discussed 
earlier that scholars and practitioners who take the position that the cyber domain is inherently 
escalatory may interpret these cases differently due to divergent conceptions of what counts as 
escalatory (i.e., defining an equivalent response espionage as escalatory behaviors). These cases 
only address the response action from the United States to a specific cyber attack or type of 
activity.
191
 One shortcoming of this approach is that the individual responses may be part of a 
larger tit-for-tat strategic response. However, given the secretive nature of cyber operations and 
the closed nature of the authoritarian governments evaluated, data on their perspective is 
speculative unless otherwise noted. 
The first case considered, China, stands apart from the other three. With China, the 
United States was responding to a systematic cyber espionage campaign, whereas with the other 
three examples the United States responded to distinct events that generated effects beyond the 
theft of trade secrets. In all three of these cases the public was aware of the specific occurrences, 
as opposed to the case with China where the general US public was aware of systemic Chinese 
espionage, but perhaps not individual thefts against public and private entities.  
 China 
Speaking before Congress in 2016, former director of the National Security Agency and 
Commander of the United States Cyber Command, General-retired Keith Alexander described 
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how cyber space has enabled the greatest transfer of wealth in history.
192
 Though Alexander was 
speaking about the cost of the loss of trade secrets from cyber espionage, it is well documented 
that that the Chinese government has engaged in a systemic campaign of cyber economic 
espionage against the United States. Many of the attacks against corporate and governmental 
targets remain unreported to the public, but several incidents have recently come to light. The 
United States, however, has historically been reticent to publically address Chinese espionage. 
Indeed, despite China being linked to cyber espionage from the early 1990s the first time the US 
publically named the Chinese government as being behind the cyber-enabled theft of intellectual 
property was in a 2011 National Counter Intelligence Executive report that noted that “Chinese 
actors are the world’s most active and persistent perpetrators of economic espionage.”
193
 This 
was a significant step because, prior to this report, the United States had been reticent to 
publically chastise state actors for economic cyber espionage.
194
 Other than this report however, 
there was no other significant public discussion of Chinese cyber espionage by the US 
government for over 2 years, despite China’s continuation of the practice. One senior US 
military officer with knowledge of US-Chinese exchanges explained that the Chinese would 
simply deny taking part in cyber espionage and would ask the US to prove their claims. In his 
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estimation, the Chinese knew full well that the United States did not want to do this because it 
would expose the intelligence accesses the United States relied upon to spy on China.
195
  
This public ambivalence ceased in February 2013 when The New York Times published a 
widely read article that directly named the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) as one of 
the sources of a series of attacks targeting private corporations in the United States.
196
  The 
article was based off of a seminal investigatory report issued by the US cyber security firm 
Manidant.
197
 Though the Chinese government denied their involvement the day following the 
release of the report, given the technical nature of the Chinese Internet infrastructure, which is 
known for widespread government monitoring and filtering, and the detail of the evidence that 
Mandiant had collected and made publically, it is implausible that the Chinese Government was 
not aware of, if not sponsoring, these activities.
198
 Following the release of this report in March 
2013, Tom Donilon, then U.S. National Security Advisor, addressed the Asia Society in New 
York City. During his remarks, Mr. Donilon issued the first public admonishment by a senior 
U.S. official of Chinese cyber activities against U.S. corporations and national interests.
199
 It was 
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subsequently revealed to the press that, three months prior to Donilon’s speech, the U.S. had 
issued a secret demarche order to the Chinese government in protest of cyber espionage on the 
heels of over 6 months of unproductive closed door dialogues between the two governments.
200
 
Though it is unclear what pressed the Obama administration to finally admonish China, it 
probably occurred, in part, as a result of outcry from elements of the US private sector that had 
fallen victim to Chinese hacking. This, coupled with the public release of the Mandiant report, 
enabled the US to highlight evidence of Chinese hacking without endangering any intelligence 
accesses. Indeed, the Mandiant report appears to be the tipping point for the administration to 
act. From the U.S. perspective, economic and industrial espionage are considered illegitimate 
(unlike intelligence collection to fulfill national security requirements). Through this public 
admonishment, the United States was attempting to employ a “naming and shaming” strategy to 
create a norm against economic espionage between the United States and China.  
Xi Jinping becoming president of the People’s Republic of China in March 2013 created 
an opportunity for the US to advance this foreign policy initiative through diplomacy. Indeed, the 
issue of collaborating on the protection of intellectual property and cyber security threats was 
discussed during President Obama’s first call to President Xi.
201
 This point was reiterated during 
the president’s first meeting in June where cyber security and the protection of intellectual 
property was a significant point of discussion. During a press conference at the summit, 
President Xi was asked directly about Chinese cyber attacks against the United States, Xi noted 
that “The application of new technology is a double-edged sword.  On the one hand, it will 
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drive progress in ensuring better material and cultural life for the people.  On the other hand, it 
might create some problems for regulators and it might infringe upon the rights of states, 
enterprises, societies and individuals.”
202
 Xi’s remarks reflect the fundamental way that China 
conceived cyber espionage—as a means to further the power of the state by enabling 
innovation and growth across all economic sectors.
203
 However, both leaders realized that there 
was a need to cooperate on cyber security related threats and agreed to open a dialogue moving 
forward. The next month, in July 2013, a bilateral working group for cyber security held its 
first meeting where the issue of cyber espionage was discussed and the need to collaborate via 
future meetings to address these concerns.
204
 
 Despite the public admonishments and top-level meetings, public reporting from the 
Office of the National Counter Intelligence Executive indicated that China continued to 
aggressively target U.S. interests and demonstrated an increasing level of sophistication.
205
 The 
next public rebuke from the United States of Chinese cyber espionage came in May 2014 with 
the indictment of 5 PLA officers for many of the activities identified in the 2013 Mandiant 
                                                     
202
 “Remarks by President Obama and President Xi Jinping of the People's Republic of China 




 China’s use of cyber espionage as a deliberate means to secure economic growth and 
industrialization is well documented. For instance, see Segal, The Hacked World Order, 125-
129. 
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 The Chinese responded to the indictments by again denying their involvement and by 
pulling out of the bilateral cybersecurity working group in protest.
207
  
 In mid-2015, Chinese hacking took a new twist when they breached the personnel records 
of over 21 million U.S. government employees including the finger prints of nearly 6 million.
208
 
While this breach was significant due to its scale and the impact it could have on ongoing and 
future intelligence operations, reporting indicates that the Obama administration was perplexed 
with how to respond for they had been pressing a norm that intelligence for national security was 
acceptable. Indeed, James Clapper, the Director of National Intelligence at the time, noted that 
“…you have to kind of salute the Chinese for what they did.”
209
 Several months following the 
U.S. realization of the OPM breach, Presidents Obama and Xi struck a deal to stop economic 
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cyber espionage in September of 2015 and discussed means to create a cyber code of conduct.
210
 
The further creation of cyber norms between the two states has continued through the reinstated 
bilateral cyber security working group which meets bi-annually. Both the private sector as well 
as public statements from Obama’s US Assistant Attorney for National Security indicated that 
Chinese cyber espionage decreased in the wake of the accord.
211
 Through concerted diplomatic 
engagement and strategically timed public admonishments, the United States was able to create a 
norm against economic espionage with China. However, only time will tell the long-term 
durability of the norm. 
North Korea 
 Sony Pictures Entertainment’s development of movie The Interview, depicting two 
American journalists that are conscripted by the Central Intelligence Agency to assassinate North 
Korea’s Kim Jong Un triggered one of the biggest cyber security breaches of 2014. The 
infamous “Sony hack” was part of a failed coercive ploy to prevent the release of the film that 
played out over November and December of that year. The first indication that something was 
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awry came on Friday, November 21
st
, when several top executives received a cryptic email from 
a group calling themselves “God’sApstls” demanding monetary compensation or else “Sony 
would be bombarded as a whole.”
212
 However, these emails were either filtered by spam filters 
or ignored entirely by the recipients.
213
 Additionally, one of the company’s Twitter feeds was 
taken over and a message stating that the two co-chairs of Sony were “going to hell” was sent out 
on the same day. The following Monday many of the 3,500 Sony employees came into their 
Culver City, California corporate headquarters to find that they were locked out of their systems 
and some were left with a virtual banner depicting a skull with a message stating they had been 
hacked by the “Guardians of Peace” and specifically that,  
We’ve obtained all your Internal data including your secrets and top secrets. If you don’t 







The message also contained links to sites where the hackers had already posted some of Sony’s 
files.  
On Tuesday, November 25
th
 the first significant data dump came with the posting of four 
yet-to-be released films online. Shortly after their posting, a senior editor working at fusion.net 
received an email from the “boss of the G.O.P” instructing him to search online for the leaked 
films and that there was nearly 100 terabytes of Sony’s data that was yet to be leaked.
215
 Over 
the next several weeks, the world saw at least eight separate dumps of Sony’s corporate data. 
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Among these data dumps were salary schedules, human resource files, network information, and 
credentials that could be used by others to gain further access to Sony’s IT assets. Indeed, 
hackers even included directions on how these data could be used to further exploit Sony.
216
 
Additionally, thousands of internal emails were also leaked. In the wake of the breach, these 
leaked emails proved later to contribute to the dismissal of at least one executive.
217
 Forensics of 
the malware employed found that the malware was coded to search for specific servers and either 
send the information to a server designated by its originator or to simply erase all data on the 
infected system.  
After the third data dump the attack got personal when several Sony employees received 
emails to the either their private or corporate emails accounts asking them to sign a petition 
condemning Sony or else they and their families would be in danger.
218
 However, it was only 
after the 7
th
 data dump, on December 16
th
 that the hacker’s demands were made clear. In an 
email to Sony’s chief financial officer, the hackers insinuated that “9/11” violence was coming 
and that employees should seek shelter when the world sees “…what an awful movie Sony 
Pictures Entertainment has made.”
219
 To Sony, the message was clear—they were asked to 
cancel the release of The Interview. The coercive tactics worked, causing the studio to cancel 
their planned Christmas Day 2014 release following the backing out of several major theater 
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 This triggered a public outcry in the United States as it appeared the hackers had been 
successful in stymieing the release of the movie. Indeed, President Obama stated that he 
respected Sony’s decision, but felt that they “…made a mistake” and “we cannot have a society 
in which some dictator someplace can start imposing censorship here in the United States.”
221
 
This response from President Obama encouraged Sony executives to allow independent movie 
theaters the option of airing the movie as well as to work with several online distributers—the 
film had its Christmas day release after all.
222
 
The same day that President Obama expressed his concerns about the Sony hack, the FBI 
released its report attributing the attack to the North Korean government.
223
 The report reflected 
an unusually high degree of confidence in the attribution, which led some experts to suggest that 
US must have had preexisting access to the networks from which the attack emanated.
224
 This 
attribution made it possible for the United States to publically respond. On January 2, the Obama 
administration responded with an executive order imposing economic sanctions against ten 
senior North Korea officials and the intelligence organization linked to North Korean cyber 
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 From September 2012 to March 2013 a group calling themselves the Izz ad-Din Al-
Qassam Cyber Fighters, conducted a multi-phase cyber attack.
227
 Operation Ababil, as the 
hackers called it in an online blog post, directed sophisticated distributed denial of service 
attacks against dozens of the public-facing websites of U.S. financial institutions.
228
 According 
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to the initial Department of Justice (DoJ) indictment, the attacks began in December 2011 and 
occurred on an occasional basis until September 2012. It was during that time that their 
frequency came almost weekly and increased in their intensity. DoJ estimates that at least 46 
major US financial institutions and other financial-sector corporations were targets of DDoS 
attacks over a period of at least 176 days. They note that, “[o]n certain days during these attacks, 
hundreds of thousands of customers were unable to access their banks accounts online” and that 
“[a]s a result of these attacks, those victim institutions incurred tens of millions of dollars in 
remediation costs as they worked to mitigate and neutralize the attacks on their computer 
servers.”
229
 Given the technical complexity of the attack and other intelligence, the U.S. assessed 
Iran was the culprit and that it was the probable response to U.S. led sanctions and cyber attacks 
against Iran’s nuclear enrichment processes.
230
  
There is no open-source reporting discussing if the U.S. conducted a retaliatory military 
response against Iran for Operation Ababil, however the United States did respond three years 
later by indicting seven individuals linked to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps for their 
involvement in the attacks.
231
 It is possible that the United States also responded with a covert 
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attack as reporting suggests that the United States maintains extensive network accesses within 
Iran and is prepositioned to conduct an offensive cyber campaign against their key 
infrastructure.
232
 However, it seems unlikely because of the effect such an attack would have 
caused on the already minimal relations between the United States and Iran. It should be noted 
that during the same time period as Operation Ababil, the United States was pursuing 
negotiations for the Iranian nuclear deal (also known as the “Joint Comprehensive Plan of 
Action”). The United States may have found that delaying the indictments, and not responding 
with a punishing cyber attack, was more prudent until after the deal was signed. Furthermore, by 
solely issuing indictments, the United States was able to reinforce the rule of law over the 





In the weeks leading up to and following the 2016 U.S. presidential election, reports 
spread via the media suggesting Russian interference in the election.
234
 In a joint assessment on 
the election, the U.S. Intelligence Community described a widespread and multifaceted 
campaign conducted by the Russian government that attempted to undermine the U.S. election 
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 Note that at the time of writing there are at least three separate federal investigations into this 
matter. The results of which unfortunately may significantly rewrite the details of this case and 
expose Russian cooperation with Americans and the undermining of President Obama’s 
bargaining position.  
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through hacking of sensitive information and the spread of propaganda. Indeed, the Democratic 
National Committee and the networks of several state and local level elections were hacked. 
Their confidential information was posted to WikiLeaks and false reports were disseminated via 
several media outlets that are widely seen as propaganda organs of the Russian state.
235
  
In the wake of the election, President Obama was pressed by the media why he had not 
responded to the outcome sooner, he noted during a December 16
th
 press briefing the following: 
What we’ve simply said is the facts, which are that, based on uniform intelligence 
assessments, the Russians were responsible for hacking the DNC, and that, as a 
consequence, it is important for us to review all elements of that and make sure that we 
are preventing that kind of interference through cyberattacks in the future…. Now, with 
respect to how this thing unfolded last year, let’s just go through the facts pretty 
quickly.  At the beginning of the summer, we’re alerted to the possibility that the DNC 
has been hacked, and I immediately order law enforcement as well as our intelligence 
teams to find out everything about it, investigate it thoroughly, to brief the potential 
victims of this hacking, to brief on a bipartisan basis the leaders of both the House and 
the Senate and the relevant intelligence committees.  And once we had clarity and 
certainty around what, in fact, had happened, we publicly announced that, in fact, Russia 
had hacked into the DNC. And at that time, we did not attribute motives or any 
interpretations of why they had done so.  We didn’t discuss what the effects of it might 
be.  We simply let people know -- the public know, just as we had let members of 
Congress know -- that this had happened. ….And, finally, I think it's worth pointing out 
that the information was already out.  It was in the hands of WikiLeaks, so that was going 
to come out no matter what.  What I was concerned about, in particular, was making sure 
that that wasn’t compounded by potential hacking that could hamper vote counting, affect 
the actual election process itself.  And so in early September, when I saw President Putin 
in China, I felt that the most effective way to ensure that that didn’t happen was to talk to 
him directly and tell him to cut it out, and there were going to be some serious 
consequences if he didn’t.  And, in fact, we did not see further tampering of the election 
process.  But the leaks through WikiLeaks had already occurred. So when I look back in 
terms of how we handled it, I think we handled it the way it should have been 
handled.  We allowed law enforcement and the intelligence community to do its job 
without political influence.  We briefed all relevant parties involved in terms of what was 
taking place.  When we had a consensus around what had happened, we announced it -- 
not through the White House, not through me, but rather through the intelligence 
communities that had actually carried out these investigations.  And then we allowed you 
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This extraordinarily candid statement by President Obama describes several aspects of 
the decision-making behind the U.S. government’s response. First, Obama was worried about the 
escalatory risk of further hacking into the election system that a military response may have 
provoked. Second, he notes that investigations take time and the importance of attribution. Third, 
President Obama believed that his direct discussions with Putin played a role in deterring the 
Russia from conducting further attacks.
237
 What is striking about this statement is that Obama’s 
initial response clearly reflects a cautious hand that felt vulnerable to further attacks and sought 
to avoid a cyber war. However, he acknowledges there is a temporal aspect to consider when 
responding to cyber attacks. He notes the difficulty of attribution, but stresses that it is possible 
with time. In other words, attributing injects breathing space into what otherwise might have 
been a time sensitive crisis. 
In the weeks following President Obama’s remarks, the United States formally responded 
by expelling thirty-five Russian diplomats that the United States said were linked to espionage 
and closing two waterfront estates located in Maryland and New York that had historic ties to 
being used for spying. Furthermore, through the Department of Treasury, the U.S. placed 
sanctions on four top Russian officials, a Russian intelligence unit, Glavnoye Razvedyvatel'noye 
Upravleniye (GRU), and three Russian cyber security companies that had been involved in the 
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operation according to U.S. intelligence.
238
 Despite initial threats from the Russian foreign 
minister, Putin responded that he would avoid retaliation and indicated that he looked forward to 




 Despite the fact that the cyber domain is not deterrence dominant, it remains puzzling 
that we have not observed significant escalation—either inadvertent or deliberate. The balance of 
terror logic that governed nuclear deterrence has little bearing when applied to the cyber realm 
because states simply cannot leverage enough devastation to threaten the annihilation of another 
civilization using cyber power alone. Moreover, this is compounded by the attribution problem, 
because states may calculate that they can get away with a cyber attack as long as they can avoid 
attribution.  
One may infer that in light of the attribution problem that there is little incentive for 
prudent behavior in the cyber domain and, therefore, that the domain is inherently escalatory. 
However, as a whole we have not seen the widespread devastation that some pundits have 
suggested, or even escalatory responses to cyber attacks, indicating that actors are indeed 
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moderating their actions in cyberspace.
240
 This moderating behavior is indicative of the self-
dampening nature of cyber operations.   
An important implication, therefore, is that if a state is determined to escalate in response 
to a cyber attack, it may find a cross-domain response more appealing than a cyber one, just as 
cross-domain deterrence strategies have been appealing for policymakers. This is because the 
cyber weapon required to send the ideal proportionate response that a policymaker may want to 
send may not be waiting in her cyber arsenal. Indeed, most cyber operations require custom 
accesses and capabilities that are unrealistic to produce in an appropriate timeframe. Developing 
precision cyber weapons takes time and resources. As already noted, cyber weapon development, 
particularly against critical infrastructure requires extensive intelligence support and high 
research and development costs. This cost cannot be amortized over numerous targets because 
cyber weapons, particularly those against the most critical targets, lack universal lethality.  
Additionally, there is nothing that guarantees that a cyber-pure response will be perceived 
or accurately attributed unless coupled within the context of a larger military operation where 
attribution can be assumed or declared through some sort of diplomatic message. Indeed, the 
traditional factors that hinder communication between state actors (e.g. different languages, lack 
of direct communication, etc.) are compounded in a domain that is prone to obfuscation.   
Further, in a domain that is devoid of norms of appropriate responses, a tit-for-tat in 
cyberspace could set off a cross-domain escalatory spiral if the response is seen as a gross 
escalation or on the contrary, could be seen as weak if not enough damage is triggered. Indeed, 
there is an incentive to not create mutually agreed thresholds, or to cross what another state may 
consider a red line (such as attacks on identified critical infrastructure), for fear that the strategic 
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ambiguity that currently exists amongst some states actors in this space may become rigidly 
defined.
241
 Unlike cross-domain escalatory responses, escalation solely within the cyber domain 
is self-dampening because a tit-for-tat exchange in cyberspace may only be iterated in an 
increasingly escalatory fashion a limited number of times given access limitations, capability 
constraints, and evolving defenses. Waging an effective long term cyber campaign is difficult 
and extraordinarily costly under a condition of no universal lethality in cyberspace. Over time, 
actors may exhaust their arsenals or have them rendered inert through vulnerability patching the 
longer they are exposed.  
Finally, the anonymizing nature of the cyber domain means that attribution of any cyber 
attack takes time. The temporal requirements of achieving attribution creates breathing space and 
resistance to escalatory behavior across all domains. There is no concept of State A’s nuclear 
armed ICBMs will hit their targets in X minutes, and that therefore the defending state must 
launch theirs in Y minutes to avoid annihilation. This is because knowing who to respond against 
following a cyber attack takes time and, at least for the near future, the independent use of cyber 
power is not capable of creating enough devastation to annihilate, let alone cripple, the 
warfighting ability of another state.
242
 
Overall, this analysis suggests reasons for both optimism and pessimism. On the one 
hand, the cyber domain is inherently self-dampening, which means that we are unlikely to 
observe dangerous cyber escalatory spirals. Additionally, deterrence by denial is feasible under 
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certain conditions, which suggests that escalation could potentially be contained at a given rung 
of the cyber escalation ladder if states have developed denial capabilities to contain the 
ratcheting up of an interaction in the domain. On the other hand, if a state seeks to deliberately 
escalate as part of a bargaining strategy, or feels domestic political pressure to respond to a cyber 
attack, it may turn to kinetic means to do so. The fact that the cyber domain is multipolar means 
that the risk of great power conflict stemming from crises that arises in cyberspace is nontrivial. 
Therefore, it is imperative to consider the extent to which arms control and confidence building 

































Arms Control and Confidence Building Measures for the Cyber Domain 
 




 This paper assesses how, if at all, arms control, which seeks to institutionalize constraints 
on offensive military technology and guard against inadvertent conflict and escalation, can be 
used to produce stability to mitigate the dangers posed by cyber operations. Though arms control 
has direct implications for crisis management, arms control, as addressed in this paper, seeks to 
identify means to shape the incentives that lead to crises and thereby foster stability between 
cyber powers. While this paper argues that cyber arms control is not a realistic endeavor at this 
time, I submit that confidence building measures (CBMs), a step short of arms control, are not 
only necessary, but are also viable vehicles to mitigate some of the contributing factors leading 
to instability posed by cyber operations. In assessing current cyber CBM development efforts, 
this paper creates a novel framework to better understand these efforts and to demonstrate areas 
that are not being addressed and remain as potential flashpoints that could exacerbate tensions 
and spark conflict. 
The first section of this article reviews arms control theory as refined during the Cold 
War and assesses what relevance this scholarship has on the control of cyber arms. My analysis 
finds that arms control in cyberspace is difficult because of the ambiguity surrounding the 
strategic balance of cyber weapons, an inability to monitor for compliance, the dynamic nature of 
the methods and means of cyber operations, and issues of assigning and enforcing culpability. 
However, an incentive exists, at a minimum, to avoid inadvertent conflict and stabilize 
disruptions to international security stemming from cyber operations. Similar issues existed in 




research notes these fears were mitigated over time through the development of confidence 
building measures, mutually agreed-upon notification requirements that signaled the intent 
behind military activities that might otherwise promote fear or indicate a pending attack. The 
paper proceeds by reviewing the general theory of confidence building measures and their 
incorporation into the Helsinki Final Act, the benchmark for all CBM agreements.  My analysis 
concludes by building on the existing scholarship of CBMs in the cyber domain, noting how the 
domain creates new categories of measures that did not apply to nuclear weapons, and proposes 
novel measures that could be implemented in light of this research into Cold War CBMs. Indeed, 
my research suggests that that there are additional steps that can be taken to enhance mutual 
security and guard against inadvertent conflict stemming from cyber operations.  
Toward Cyber Arms Control? 
One tried and tested method to alter the military incentives for the use of offensive 
technologies is to reshape them through arms control. Indeed, states seek arms control regimes 
when doing so can improve mutual security, often this takes the form of increased transparency 
of national security policies between states.
243
 There is a robust canon that normatively addresses 
how arms control should occur in areas that are prone to increase the likelihood of war, with 
some authors, such as Schelling and Halperin, going so far as to suggest that it is irresponsible 
for states to not create measures that avoid false alarms and mistaken intentions.
244
 Indeed, arms 
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control agreements typically follow when the capabilities in question are destabilizing to 
international security.
245
 However, it is puzzling that cyber operations, which both upset 
traditional balances of power and create the conditions for misperceptions that could lead to 
inadvertent conflict, have not prompted states to pursue arms control regimes to secure 
traditional power asymmetries and guard against undesired outcomes stemming from 
uncertainty. As Schelling and Halperin note, arms control can support security policy and occurs 
when it is in each side’s strategic interest.
246
 In an extension of this logic, Jervis notes that the 
fundamental postulate of arms control that “…hostile states almost always have important 
interests of military policy in common,” which he noted often could be crisis stability.
247
 Indeed, 
several countries, such as the United States and Russia, created bilateral agreements to establish 
hotlines to guard against misunderstandings stemming from cyber operations in a crisis. 
However, these efforts have stopped short of the creation of targeting norms, limits on the 
production of cyber weapons, or the development of more robust mechanisms to promote 
transparency of the domain. This hesitance is due not to a lack of an incentive, but to the inability 
to satisfy the basic requirements for arms control. There are three theories of security 
cooperation that identify when arms control agreements are most likely to form in light of 
technological change. Offense-Defense Theory, Technological Opportunism, and Military 
Expectation Theory all make predictions as to when security cooperation is likely to occur and 
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lead to arms control efforts.
248
 The following section outlines each theory and identifies why 
cyber arms control formation may not have been pursued despite an incentive for states to seek 
greater stability. 
Offense-Defense Theory 
 Offense-Defense Theory seeks to explain the propensity of states to go to war.
249
 The 
theory rests under the umbrella of defensive realism and thus assumes that states inherently value 
the status quo and avoiding armed conflict.
250
 The theory focuses on two key variables: 
technology and geography.
251
 When technology and geography favor the offense, the cost of 
mounting an offensive is low. In other words, when offense is dominant the likelihood of states 
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pursuing revisionist aspirations through conquest becomes more likely. Likewise, when 
technology and geography favor the defense conquest is less likely and states are more apt to 
accept the status quo. Yet this leads to one of the basic paradoxes of arms control, when it is 
most needed it is often unsuccessful, but when the need for it is less, it easier to achieve.
252
 
Indeed, under conditions of defense dominance, states feeling secure, are more likely to 
cooperate and lock in the status quo through arms control agreements.
253
  However, Robert Jervis 
notes what he calls the “security dilemma,” a condition where by one state’s efforts to bolster its 
defenses actually may be self-defeating if it is perceived as threatening by another actor, causing 
it to bolster its own capabilities in turn.
254
 This can lead to a state inadvertently undermining the 
status quo and their own security by an action that they intended to do the opposite. According to 
Jervis this could cause states to tragically spiral to war.
255
 When the risk of inadvertent conflict 
exists between actors, arms control measures that create transparency of the intent behind 
national security policies and actions are more likely to form.    
Where geography is a static variable as opposed to technology which is dynamic, 
scholars and decision makers naturally tend to focus on the effect changes in armaments and the 
supporting doctrine has on the balance. However, a danger exists that leaders may misperceive 
the true balance at any given time, resulting in a disastrous outcome. Indeed, Jervis notes that 
during World War I, belligerents thought that the weapons of the day favored the offense, 
                                                     
252
 The author would like to thanks Robert Jervis for this point.  
253
 Andrew Kydd, “Sheep in Sheep’s Clothing: Why Security Seekers Do Not Fight Each 
Other,” Security Studies 7, no.1 (Autumn 1997): 114-155, 119-120. 
254
 Jervis, “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma.” 
255
 Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, NJ: 




however, “If they had known the power of the defense beforehand, they would have rushed for 
their own trenches rather than for the enemy's territory.”
256
 This ambiguity can lead to a false 
sense of military advantage for the offense over defense and may lead to conflict.
257
  
Stemming from this ambiguity, offense-defense proponents have devised two means to 
measure the balance. The first method assesses the force ratios necessary to take and hold 
land.
258
 In other words, how many offensive troops are needed to overwhelm defensive forces. 
By tradition, for every defender, three offenders are necessary to win an engagement. However, 
technological advancements and supporting doctrine can shift the ratio and award an advantage 
to one side. The second method envisions assessing the offense-defense balance through a cost-
exchange comparison.
259
 Jervis, who first proposed the method, argued that offense is dominant 
when $1 spent on offense can defeat $1 spent on defense.  
With cyber warfare, geography remains constant with each state sharing a virtual border. 
However, technology is constantly changing with accesses being gained and lost and new 
capabilities being developed while others expire. This has given rise to a budding debate about 
the offense-defense balance in cyberspace, with most scholars noting challenges of measuring 
the balance in the domain.
260
 The reality is that the balance is exceedingly difficult to measure at 
                                                     
256
 Jervis, “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma,” 191. 
257
 Ibid., 199-214. 
258
 Jack S. Levy, “The Offensive/Defensive Balance of Military Technology: A Theoretical and 
Historical Analysis,” International Studies Quarterly 28, no. 2 (1984): 219-238, 227-228. 
259
 Jervis, “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma,” 188; Levy, “The Offensive/Defensive 
Balance of Military Technology,” 227. 
260
 Concerning the offense-defense balance in cyberspace see Adam P. Liff, “Cyberwar: A New 
‘Absolute Weapon’? The Proliferation of Cyberwarfare Capabilities and Interstate War,” Journal 
of Strategic Studies 35, no. 3 (June 2012): 401-428; Ilai Saltzman, “Cyber Posturing and the 




any given time given the necessary secrecy surrounding cyber arsenals. Furthermore, in a point 
that will be elaborated shortly, even if there was complete transparency it would be challenging 
to assess relative cyber power between actors, since there is no universal lethality of cyber 
weapons. The cost-exchange method is the most viable means to assess the balance, though it is 
not without its challenges. First, most states keep their cyber budgets classified as to not tip off to 
an adversary the technologies that they are investing capabilities against. Second, it is difficult to 
differentiate between offensive and defense expenditures given that, at least from a military 
perspective, the forces that conduct offensive cyber operations may very well be the same as 
those that conduct defensive cyber operations. This suggests that it may not be possible to clearly 
divide expenditures into offensive versus defensive baskets. It may be the case that one is more 
likely to be able to assess the systemic balance in general terms, as opposed to empirically 
measuring the dyadic balance at any moment unless a researcher is willing to develop a 
restrictive proxy measure. Such a measure may be parsimonious, but may carry limited 
explanatory power. Further research is needed on assessing the balance and is beyond the scope 
of this paper.  Yet it is important to note that an implication of this measurement difficulty is that 
the Offense-Defense Theory criterion of defense dominance being necessary for arms control 
formation may not be sufficiently satisfied because of this inability to measure the balance at any 
given time. The theory suggests that this inability by all parties to accurately measure the balance 
will confound security cooperation, thus indicating that until an accepted means to assess the 
balance is devised, cyber arms control formation is unlikely.    
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 In the book War and the Engineers, Keir Lieber argues that Offense-Defense Theory is 
flawed because it views shifts in technology as the cause of war or peace.
261
 Rather, Lieber 
purports in his “Technological Opportunism” theory, changes in technology are filtered through 
the politics of states and are molded to help the state pursue a strategic end. The theory, which is 
nested in the offensive realism tradition, pictures states as security maximizers that use 
technology to improve their relative position in the world. By implication, uncertainty over the 
offense-defense balance has no bearing on security competitions because states seek to escape 
the effects of the security dilemma by maximizing their power. Though Lieber argues that arms 
control efforts to prevent misperceptions are misguided because they do not make war less 
likely, he does not find them as fruitless endeavors.
262
 Lieber conceives arms control as a means 
for states to coordinate to more efficiently allocate material resources. Indeed, coordination can 
be a means to eliminate material requirements, such as having to build a wall against a 
nonexistent threat, which can be a distraction from states’ being able to otherwise pursue their 
strategies. 
Though there are significant shortcomings in Lieber’s theory, of relevance to this analysis 
is that the theory does not provide a robust framework to assess the conditions under which 
security cooperation is likely.
263
 Furthermore, though the theory assesses the role of uncertainty, 
it does not account for the role of secrecy, a deliberate condition, and its effect on cooperation. In 
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its application to cyber warfare, the greatest contribution of the theory is that it may explain, at 
least in some cases, why states have used cyber operations to pursue their strategic ends—often 
to challenge traditional power asymmetries.  
Military Expectation Theory 
 David Kearn puts forth a theory of when states are most likely to pursue arms control 
agreements in his book, Great Power Security Cooperation: Arms Control and The Challenge of 
Technological Change.  Kearn’s “Military Expectation Theory” attempts to bridge the offense-
defense and technological opportunism camps by presenting military technology as both a means 
for states to pursue their strategies and also as a cause of deliberate or inadvertent fear.
264
 Kearn 
submits that there are two variables that shape the likelihood of arms control formation: 1) the 
expectation of the military effect of the technological change; and 2) the perceived effectiveness 
of existing modes of surveillance.  
To Kearn, if a weapon system is perceived as being decisive—that is, “…one[s] that offer 
[to] dramatically improve capabilities over comparable existing systems”—then states that 
possess them may be willing to limit their proliferation. States without are motivated to pursue 
them, thus confounding cooperation.
265
 However, when weapons are not decisive and offer only 
incremental benefits to existing systems, security cooperation is achievable. Furthermore, arms 
control formation is more likely to occur if states have confidence in the abilities of their 
intelligence apparatus to detect cheating.  
In the application of Military Expectation Theory to cyber operations, it is important to 
consider if cyber is, indeed, a decisive weapon. As an independent tool of coercion, cyber 
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weaponry is not decisive, at least until societies become reliant on automation to support their 
essential services (assuming they hold resiliency and redundancy constant).
266
 However, when 
coupled with traditional elements of national power, cyber weapons can drastically improve 
existing systems by making their employment more effective. For example, it is alleged that 
Israel’s 2007 aerial bombing of a Syrian nuclear enrichment faculty was only made possible by a 
cyber attack against Syria’s integrated air defense systems which enabled the uncontested 
bombing run.
267
 In this sense, cyber power can serve as a decisive military shaping operation. 
This incentive for states to hedge the future of cyber capabilities is not unjustified, though 
is perhaps more psychological than rational.
268
 Indeed, state actors live in fear of cyber war and 
thus are hesitant to limit the development, stockpiling, and use of cyber weaponry for fear of 
finding themselves at a strategic disadvantage.  With warnings of “World War 3.0”
269
 and a 
“cyber-Pearl Harbor”
270
 in mainstream media, this fear is not without merit.
271
  States do not 
want to be at a military disadvantage in this domain, particularly given the presumed offensive 
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parity that exists between some states with offensive cyber capabilities.
272
  Indeed, while serving 
as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Martin Dempsey noted that the cyber domain is 
the only domain where the United States has peer competitors.
273
 Historically, when uncertainty 
is created concerning the effect of a technological change, extensive strategic analysis has 
followed. However, Schelling notes that it may be impossible to build a common understanding 
within a single government, let alone between states, as to what the full effect is.
274
 Therefore, 
the perceived potential decisiveness of cyber weaponry, coupled with an uncertain future 
concerning cyber conflict, suggests that a state’s dominant strategy could be to build extensive 
and diverse offensive cyber arms capabilities and direct espionage efforts to identify means to 
thwart a foreign adversary’s cyber warfighting capability under Kearn’s logic.
275
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Kearn’s second variable, monitoring for defection, is not a new criterion of arms control 
agreements. Long before Kearn, scholars discussed the verification problem in the context of 
arms control agreements and noted the importance of verifying what is in a current state’s 
arsenal and also monitoring future develop efforts for compliance with any accord.
276
 This issue 
has also been noted in the literature on cyber conflict with scholars pointing to the obfuscating 
nature of the domain as confounding verification efforts.
277
 In the traditional sense,  
Monitoring entails the gathering of data on treaty-related activities, whether by national 
technical means, on-site inspections, data exchanges, or intelligence. Based on that 
monitoring data, verification entails a judgement concerning parties; compliance (or non-




The requisites for establishing this level of compliance in the cyber domain would require 
affected parties to agree to extremely intrusive access to a government’s networks.  In other 
words, if a state agreed to stop developing a type of cyber weaponry and agreed to allow 
verification, it would essentially have to open its networks to the other state, or a third party, to 
inspect for compliance.  Not only would it be technically impossible to scour every government 
network for evidence of cyber weapons—assuming a state would be foolish enough to construct 
cyber weapons in violation of a treaty and store them on an inspectable network—but it also 
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would be unfathomable for one state to allow another, or any outside actor, to have unfettered 
access to its networks because doing so would increase the risk of cyber exploitation and attack, 
precisely what it was seeking to avoid in the first place.
279
 Indeed, the only way that a state can 
have full confidence that another state is not violating the agreement is if it is monitoring the 
potential belligerent’s every network. Besides being untenable from a resource perspective, this 
type of persistent access could be a violation of the agreement it is attempting to enforce.
280
  
Another means to ensure compliance would be to have monitoring occur through national 
technical means of intelligence. During the Cold War this often took the form of analyzing 
imagery collected from satellites that monitored the nuclear posture of another state. The 
equivalent in cyberspace would be using cyber espionage to collect on internal networks. 
However, where satellite collection is entirely passive, gaining access to and absconding with 
data from sensitive government networks is invasive and, if detected, can be destabilizing. 
Indeed, the critical systems that would likely be intelligence targets also would likely be prized 
targets for attack in a conflict. This inability to perceive the intent behind such access, whether it 
is for compliance monitoring or preparation for an attack, could be a source of conflict.
281 
In sum, Military Expectation Theory predicts that cyber arms control formation is 
unlikely for two reasons. First, the debate over the decisiveness of cyber power will most likely 
leave leaders erroring on the safe side and resisting any efforts to control a capability that they 
                                                     
279
 For further discussion on the logic behind this risk see Ben Buchanan, The Cyber Security 
Dilemma (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016); and Shawn W. Lonergan, “Cooperation 
under the Cybersecurity Dilemma,” in Confronting Inequality: Wealth, Rights, and Power, ed. 
Hugh Liebert, Thomas Sherlock, and Cole Pinheiro (New York: Sloan, 2016). 
280
 The author would like to thank Robert Jervis for this point.  
281
 Indeed, as already noted in the previous discussion of the security dilemma, misperceptions of 




are still understanding the true character of. Second, there are currently no adequate means to 
monitor for compliance without leading to greater vulnerability that would be acceptable to all 
signatories.  
Additional Obstacles Unique to Cyber Arms Control 
In addition to the issues identified by the preceding theories, three additional problems 
confound cyber arms control efforts. First, arms control seeks to achieve mutual security through 
either a preservation or mutual adjustment of the status quo that contributes to greater security of 
all signatories. In other words, arms control either maintains or forms a new strategic balance 
between potential adversaries.
282
 Indeed, Hedley Bull noted that the balance of military power is 
a central tenet of any arms control agreement for these regimes do not abolish military power, 
but seek to stabilize a military situation.
283
 Therefore, the prototypical arms control regime 
places limits on capabilities, be it their numbers or employment. Yet as will be further discussed 
shortly, this view of arms control is overly reductionist for arms control, as forming a strategic 
balance requires stability not only of arms racing behavior but also during a crisis. Underlying 
this balance is some mutual concept of relative strength between potential belligerents. However, 
in cyberspace this has no bearing as there is no measure of relative strength. Unlike traditional 
weaponry, nuclear weapons, or even chemical ordinances, where one can count the number of 
warheads or pounds of a virulent gas that a state possesses, a balance of cyber capabilities 
between states is nonsensical because there is no measure of relative cyber power between states. 
Cyber weapons lack universal lethality, indeed targets of cyber weapons are often are key pieces 
of critical infrastructure, which requires the development of custom exploits not only to gain 
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access, but also to manipulate the system as an actor desires.
284
 These capabilities are often 
cloaked in secrecy so that states cannot tailor defenses against these niche capabilities.
285
 
Therefore, cyber arms control cannot lead to a strategic balance between state actors because the 
balance defies quantification.  
Second, the attack vectors and offensive capabilities at the tactical level of the cyber 
domain are continuously evolving. In the nuclear arena, where innovations that challenged arms 
control agreements such as the introduction of multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles 
(MIRVs) had long development timelines and deliberate and often observable fielding which 
enabled breathing space for arms control agreements to adjust or for states to develop other 
means, such as tailored intelligence or their own complimentary programs, to mitigate the fear 
the advances posed. However, the open-ended promise of innovation coupled with the constant 
changing tradecraft that can emerge with little to no warning in the cyber domain will challenge 
the creation of any agreement. Indeed, new information technology vulnerabilities are discovered 
every day and the median time between the public reporting of the vulnerability and a vendor 
marketing a custom exploit is only 30 days.
286
 With fields that are prone to technological change, 
such as cyber arms, one runs the risk that a formalized agreement could be outdated or restrictive 
in some unanticipated way before the ink has had time to dry. Furthermore, even if interested 
actors could overcome these hurdles, the agreement may decrease security in yet to be realized 
ways. As has been seen in other types of arms control agreements, arms accords have often 
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encouraged innovation in ways that are often against the spirit of preserving the status quo.
287
  
This risk is magnified in the cyber domain as it offers countless opportunities for a would-be 
aggressor. For instance, a cyber agreement that sought to ban a specific attack methodology 
could encourage a state to redirect those resources to pushing the scientific frontier and 
developing a new means of attack for which the other signatories are even more vulnerable. 
Third, even if the preceding obstacles could be overcome, punishing defection would be 
difficult to implement because of the difficulty of attribution and divining a proportionate 
punishment for several reasons. First, in the event of a violation, states would have to attribute 
the source of the defection and develop a metric of confidence in the attribution that they feel 
comfortable with using to pursue reciprocity. In the context of a multilateral treaty, the state that 
detected the violation will need to have compelling evidence that is enough to convince other 
signatories of the defection. These states may use differing metrics for confidence in attribution 
than the party that detected the defection and if the violation was attributed through cyber 
espionage, the state that attributed may have to expose national intelligence collection means and 
methods. Thus, the value of the intelligence loss must be weighed against the necessity to punish. 
Indeed, losing an access into a critical system that is necessary for intelligence collection may 
very well undermine the stability that the arms agreement was seeking to create. Indeed, 
exposing the access will most likely lead to the loss of their ability to monitor for future 
violations and collect other intelligence that the state deems is important to their national 
security. This risk would be compounded if the access is critical to collect information to guard 
against a surprise attack. 
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Second, a state would most likely need to use traditional elements of national power to 
punish the defection in cyberspace because responding with a timely and proportionate cyber 
driven tit-for-tat response may be difficult due to resource and access requirements.
288
 Punishing 
a cyber arms agreement defection can create a dilemma because crafting an effective but also 
proportionate response that relies on physical elements of national power may be difficult to 
formulate if the defection only caused virtual damage. There are no norms quantifying virtual 
damage which means that finding an appropriate non-cyber response to punishing defection, 
such as economic or diplomatic sanctions or a military action, may be difficult to gauge. 
Theoretically, this could encourage any cyber arms control agreement to establish a punishment 
schedule for defection as part of the drafting process.  
 Traditional arms control regimes that mandate bans on capabilities or rely on monitoring 
for compliance are unrealistic constraints for cyber weaponry as they do not enhance the security 
of signatories nor would they adequately address issues within the context of technological 
change. There are three alternative forms of arms control that could be considered to overcome 
the issues of monitoring and compliance. One approach would be to seek complete offensive 
disarmament, as some scholars first argued with nuclear weapons, and was pursued with 
chemical and biological weapons.
289
  However, given the leveling effect that cyber weaponry can 
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bring to a weak state’s warfighting ability, the perceived decisive effect that it may afford to all 
parties, and the widespread proliferation of offensive cyber weaponry that has already occurred, 
this idea seems unlikely to take hold.  Another approach could entail the banning of specific 
means and methods of operating in the domain, but in a rapidly changing technological 
environment this potential solution runs the risk of being quickly outdated and encouraging 
innovation which, as previously noted, may lead to unanticipated sources of vulnerability.  
Another method that could be marginally successful is to ban attacks on certain categories of 
targets and to place limits on the overall damage a cyber attack can legitimately achieve during a 
war, but this approach follows the commencement of hostilities, is voluntary, and does little to 
promote mutual security in peacetime.
290
   
The above analysis demonstrates the hurdles associated with arms control agreements in 
cyberspace. Nevertheless, this does not preclude alternative means to foster stability.  Thus, 
rather than banning specific capabilities, or seeking an agreement that depends on verification, a 
more realistic goal would be to create voluntary mechanisms that promote clarity of the domain 
and enable effective crisis management.  
Confidence Building Measures, Stability, and the European Experience 
 When arms control seems to be a bridge too far between adversaries that hold too many 
points of disagreement and mistrust, yet both acknowledge the potential for inadvertent conflict, 
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decision makers have employed confidence building measures in lieu of establishing robust arms 
control regimes. Like arms control, CBMs may be uni-, bi-, or multilateral agreements. As trust 
is built between parties they may give way to more formalized arms control agreements because 
of the role they have in reassuring a potential adversary—though they often do not. By this logic, 
CBMs are a form of reassurance that seek to demonstrate intentions to a potential adversary, 
therefore (ideally) conveying a desire to maintain the status quo and foster a sense of security in 
an otherwise threatened state.
291
 Indeed, they are designed to ensure crisis situations, routine 
tensions, or localized conflicts between states do not become inadvertent lighting rods that spark 
a general war.
292
 Since CBMs are only intended to signal intent behind military activities, they 
do not change the overall power dynamics between two or more adversaries. Rather, CBMs are 
simply designed to preserve a fragile stability resulting from intense security competitions 
between states. 
Confidence building measures provide reassurance through three mechanisms. First, they 
seek to demonstrate non-aggressive postures by increasing transparency of military actions 
through methods such as inviting designated observers or the public to witness events that 
otherwise could be construed as threatening.
293
 Second, they place self-imposed limits on 
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security activities, such as military exercises, that could cause another state to feel threatened. 
Third, CBMs often operate in a time of crisis by enabling a vital communications link between 
adversaries. In other words, CBMs contribute to stability and détente by helping convey intent 
behind one’s unilateral security policies and actions that would otherwise be cloaked in 
uncertainty.
294
 Furthermore, CBMs also create predictability in a potential adversary’s actions 
and make it easier for another state to detect a deviation from a norm and therefore mitigate the 
vulnerability of a surprise attack by offering an assurance of early warning.
295
 Though CBMs do 
not replace the vital role of national technical means of intelligence in assessing another actor’s 
capabilities and intent, they supplement it by enabling a fuller picture of the meaning behind a 
military policy or action than otherwise would have been available.
296
  However, CBMs do not 
decrease mistrust of an adversary or limit its capabilities; that would require an arms control 
regime that addresses specific security concerns from two or more parties.
297
 Though there has 
been a noted worry amongst scholars and policy makers that CBMs could be used to mask a 
surprise attack, this was a concern that practitioners overcame during the Cold War due to the 
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mutually paramount interest of avoiding inadvertent conflict.
298
 One way that states historically 
have been able to overcome these concerns has been by increasing the degree of confidence that 
a potential adversary might hold of the intent about a military action or policy by voluntarily 
shedding light on such matters. In 1979, the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany 
noted this point before the UN General Assembly,  
A higher degree of confidence can only be achieved when the amount of information 
which governments command enables them to foresee satisfactorily and to calculate 
actions and reactions of other Governments within their political environment. In other 
words, the degree of confidence primarily depends on the degree of openness and 





Though CBMs can be unilaterally implemented, they often take the form of agreements so that 
all parties can understand the level of transparency necessary for one another to develop 
confidence in the intent behind another actor’s security policy or action. 
The Helsinki Final Act 
 As noted, CBMs need not be formalized in international law or codified in another type 
of formal agreement to be effective, however they may become institutionalized over time as 
they evolve from state practice.
300
 The touchstone for all confidence building measures was 
codified in the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe that took 
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place in Helsinki, Finland in 1975.
301
 Broadly speaking, the conference had the goal of creating 
stability, noting,  
…the need to contribute to reducing the dangers of armed conflict and of 
misunderstanding of military activities which could give rise to apprehension, 
particularly in a situation where the participating States lack clear and timely information 




The Helsinki Final Act, initially signed by 35 states, sought to create stability by addressing 
issues that strained East-West relations on topics ranging from sovereignty to freedom of the 
press and cultural exchanges.
303
 Arguably no part of the agreement has been as closely 
scrutinized as the establishment of confidence building measures between all signatories. To wit, 
the original act stipulated voluntary reporting with at least a 21-day prior notification of military 
maneuvers that exceed over 25,000 troops and that occurred within 250 kilometers from a state’s 
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 The provision also enabled the exchange of observers for these maneuvers as well as 
the hosting of military delegations.
305
   
The Helsinki Final Act noted that “…the experience gained from the implementation of 
the provisions…together with further efforts, could lead to developing and enlarging measures 
aimed at strengthening confidence,” and as such created a framework for follow on meetings. 
The first of these occurred in Belgrade in 1977, followed by Madrid in 1980, Stockholm in 1984, 
and Vienna in 1986.
306
 Each of these conferences comprised multi-year efforts that endeavored 
to innovate new and creative means to demonstrate intent and promote transparency in response 
to changing security policies and technology. By the time the 2011 Vienna Document was 
finalized, CBMs had expanded to include the annual exchange of military information such as 
organizational charts, manning and equipment numbers, unit locations, defense budgets, and 
information relating to the employment of new weapon’s systems.
307
 Furthermore, additional 
CBMs included the development of more robust communication regimes that could operate in a 
time of a crisis as well as for routine exchanges of officers and demonstrations of new major 
weapon systems. The original provisions for troop notifications were also refined to require at 
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least a 42-day warning of exercises of at least 9,000 troops or 250 battle tanks. There were also 
controls addressing the number of major exercises that a state could perform per year and 
restrictions on the number of short notice inspections of another signatories’ military maneuvers 
and other troubling sites that a state could annually perform.
308
  
In summary, when formalized arms control agreements that seek to change the incentives 
for military action are not feasible, confidence building measures are an alternative means to 
mitigate the risk of inadvertent conflict by enabling increased transparency and openness 
surrounding a state’s security policies and operations. Over time these measures may evolve to 
become formalized arms control regimes as confidence in each other’s willingness to adhere to 
an agreement is manifested. However, changes in security requirements, polices, and technology 
suggest that for confidence building measures to promote lasting stability they must be 
reassessed and amended on an iterative basis, as was seen throughout the duration of the Cold 
War and in the ensuing years.  
Confidence Building Measures for the Newest Domain 
 The current scholarship on cyber CBMs is in a nascent stage. Though multiple scholars 
have noted their need to avoid inadvertent conflict, few had postulated finite measures that states 
may implement.
309
 Herbert Lin attributes this dearth of measures to the revolutionary nature of 
the domain. In Lin’s words, 
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Meaningful analogs to… [confidence building] measures in cyberspace are difficult to 
find. For example, there is no analog to large-scale troop movements—cyber forces can 
be deployed for attack with few visible indicators. Agreed conventions for behavior, such 
as “rules of the road,” do not cover intent and in cyberspace, intent may be the difference 
between a possibly prohibited act, such as certain kinds of cyberattack, and an allowed 




Tughral Yamin notes this dilemma, but argues that, “A necessary precondition for developing 
cyberspace CBMs is to have good national cyber security policies and practices, particularly for 
the protection of critical infrastructure.”
311
 Though Yamin fails to quantify the requisite level of 
policy creation necessary for the effective formation of CBMs, he does make an important 
contribution by noting that institutional development of cyber security organizations within a 
state are necessary because of their role in information realization and transference in a domain 
that is not necessarily readily conceptualized. Indeed, without institutions that assist in 
information sharing of vulnerabilities, known threats, remediation strategies, and national 
policies and attitudes for approaching the cyber domain then it is unlikely that actors within and 
external to a state will understand the risks posed by cyber operations.   
Despite academia’s lack of extensive research on cyber CBMs, both the United Nations 
and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (which sponsored the original 
Helsinki Final Act), have made efforts towards developing Cyber CBMs. Specifically, the 
United Nations’ Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on Developments in the Field of 
Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security was convened in 
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2004 to discusses potential areas of cooperation.
312
 A year later it failed to reach a consensus and 
no report was submitted. A second GGE was convened in 2009 and after four meetings over two 
years it devised the first set of CBMs.
313
 This list was expanded by a third and fourth round of 
GGE panels that concluded in 2013 and 2015, respectively.
314
 Relatedly, the Permanent Council 
of the OSCE directed efforts in 2012 to begin drafting CBMs specific for cyberspace, noting that 
CBMs were necessary to, “enhance interstate co-operation, transparency, predictability, and 
stability, and to reduce the risks of misperception, escalation, and conflict that may stem from the 
use of ICTs.”
315
 These efforts lead to the drafting of additional CBMs in 2013 and a more 
comprehensive list in 2016.
316
 See Appendix A for a listing of these CBMs. 
It should be noted that both the UN and the OSCE lists avoid using the word “cyber” 
unless in reference to the concept of “cybersecurity.” Indeed, they instead rely on “ICT,” which 
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is a catch all term for “Information and Communications Technology.”
317
 In a thoughtful legal 
review of the measures, Katharina Ziolkowski notes that adopting the ICT label, as opposed to 
“cyberspace” or “information space” (as some states use in their doctrine), avoids potential 
political hurdles.
318
 Indeed, many states have competing definitions and terminology for the 
same concepts and by employing the much more neutral ICT moniker the measures were able to 
avoid opposition at the onset. As noted in Appendix A, OSCE Measure 9 speaks to this point and 
voluntarily encourages all states to publish their national ICT terminology and calls for all states 
to build a consensus behind a common lexicon.  
Johan Holst argued in 1983 that CBMs come in four varieties: information, notification, 
observation, and stabilization and noted that some measures may encompass several of the 
categories.
319
 Information measures involved the sharing of defense related information such as 
budgets and organizational structures between interested parties. Notification pertained to the 
advanced warning of major military activities within a geographic concentration, such as a 
military exercise or a major change in force distribution. Observation measures included 
activities such as inviting potential adversaries to physically observe military exercises, the 
fielding of new weapon systems, or other related military activities first-hand. However, as Holst 
notes, stabilization measures were multifaceted and encompass three dimensions, 
…crisis stability (relative absence of pressures to take early military action to forestall 
moves by the adversary); arms-race stability (relative absence of inducement to expand 
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However, ICT CBMs are more diverse.
321
 Indeed, whereas Holst justly envisioned his 
information categorization as an exchange of defense related data, given the diversity of threat 
actors in the cyber domain and difficulty of defense, ICT information CBMs have three 
components. First, the sharing of threat information that identifies emerging methods and means 
for exploitation and attack. This can include the sharing of threat information that relates to 
specific online personas, country profiles, as well as law enforcement information about non-
state actors. Second, security information which pertains to the dissemination of system 
vulnerability reports as well as instructions for remediation. Third, use information which 
includes Holst’s conceptualization of the sharing of state-level defense related materials, such as 
doctrine and national policies, but for ICT is broadened to incorporate private sector use given 
that they are significant stakeholders in cyberspace. The recognized influence and role of the 
private sector is evident in both the UNGA and OSCE CBMs that address the sharing of ICT 
information relating to “national attitudes” and views from both public and private sources.
322
 
Indeed, there is a recognition in these CBMs that the actors in this space are not solely states and 
the information about the uses of the cyberspace must extend beyond traditional state actors. 
Furthermore, several of the measures are designed to explain what norms the state is attempting 
to establish within its borders, such as desires for a free and open Internet and what ICT 
infrastructure it considers to be critical. These ICT CBMs are not only designed to avoid 
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inadvertent conflict, as was the case with CBMs during the Cold War; several of these CBMs are 
designed to track norm emergence and evolution. Indeed, the strategic culture with which a state 
operates in the domain is vital to interpreting intent behind actions relating to and in the cyber 
domain. This culture affects not only conflict avoidance as states try to create a framework to 
interpret another actor’s intent and actions, but also how to interpret and respond to coercion and 
conflict escalation emanating from the operational employment of cyber power.
323
  
  Unlike what was addressed in Holst’s framework, several modern-day measures pertain 
to the maintenance of the CBMs. These administrative measures are designed to enable the 
preservation and continued relevance of the measures as well as the conservation of the 
respective organization that facilitated its creation. These measures demonstrate advances in the 
creation of CBMs in the last 30 years since Holst’s article. One common element to both the UN 
and the OSCE list of measures is a reliance on Computer Emergency Readiness Teams (CERTs) 
for the dissemination of threat and security information. Since the first team was created at 
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Carnegie Mellon University in 1989, the concept has expanded to include over 360 teams 
operating in over 80 countries who mutually promote security cooperation by sharing technical 
vulnerability and remediation information.
324
 
 Holst’s measures that are not observed in either the UNGA or OSCE ICT measures 
include: the notification, observation, and political categories. This is not surprising given the 
prior discussion on obstacles confronting cyber arms control agreements. Indeed, notification of 
a cyber event or an exercise does not readily make logical sense. However, Paul Meyer, one of 
the few scholars that attempted to postulate cyber CBMs, called for exchanges of personnel to 
observe “cyber-security exercises” between potential adversaries.
325
 Though Meyer does not 
clarify what a “cyber-security exercise” is, it could be beneficial to all parties if there was 
coordination of a cyber defensive exercise if the intent was to build capacity. Indeed, if the 
exercise demonstrates how an actor intends to respond to and remediate a cyber-attack, inviting 
allies to observe can help them grow their cyber defensive infrastructure, to include national 
authorities necessary to respond to a crisis, and help identify points of inject where they could 
augment efforts and enable a unified cyber defense. However, inviting an adversary to take part 
may have a different effect. When discussing a “cyber security” exercise the assumption is that 
this is an entirely defensive mission with all cyber effects being delivered solely on that state’s 
internal network. Indeed, most of these exercises are used to identify both technical and 
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procedural vulnerabilities on internal networks.
326
 These exercises do not showcase the units or 
the capabilities that would conduct offensive operations. Such an exchange is not in keeping with 
the spirit of the interchange of observers of military exercises as envisioned in the Helsinki Final 
Act. In other words, the effect that this would have on establishing confidence in both the 
command and control of and the efficacy of another state’s offensive cyber forces is highly 
dubious. Noting this concern, states could try to build offensive operations into the exercise. It is 
plausible to imagine building a counterstrike that targets an infected server that is commanding 
the attack into such a scenario, however, any capability for access and attack that is used will 
most likely be limited to an already publically available open source tool or will be fictionalized 
as to not give away to the adversary the specific vulnerability in the target system they are 
exploiting. For if a state used real cyber weapons from their arsenal, it is plausible that any 
observing state would develop hardware and software upgrades to render the demonstrated 
capability inert. Yet, exercising the planning process and the command and control of such 
capabilities increases the organization’s efficiency and control of such operations. However, 
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public notification of the successful execution of such exercises could increase the adversaries’ 
confidence in the actor’s ability to command and control cyber capabilities. Notification of such 
security related exercises is a possible avenue for future ICT CBMs, however, any reporting 
mandate that accounts for both public and private cyber security events could become 
administratively difficult to manage if the government is not a directly involved party to the 
exercise.  
 Furthermore, the lack of measures that seek political stability in cyberspace is not 
surprising. Though assurances to avoid interfering in the internal affairs of another state occurred 
during the Cold War, the Internet creates an avenue to undermine regimes that some states have 
a moral or strategic incentive to take advantage of. Indeed, both authoritarian and democratic 
regimes view the Internet as a medium to influence not only their own, but each other’s citizenry. 
However, there are sharp divisions between states on their view of both the Internet within their 
borders which directly informs the Internet norms and policy they press for external to the 
state.
327
 Figure 1 highlights the differences of views of the Internet by regime type which may 
confound the development of political CBMs across dyads of unlike regime types. 
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Most Western actors view access to a free and open Internet as in keeping with their 
democratic principles, with some actors going so far as to view such access as a human right, and 
therefore a moral requirement for states to safeguard, as was suggested in a 2011 UN Special 
Rapporteur report, and reaffirmed in a 2016 UN Resolution that condemned intentional 
disruption of Internet access by governments.
328
 However, despite these reports, many 
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authoritarian states feel that an open Internet encroaches on their sovereignty and is threatening 
to regime survival.
329
 An implication of this is that political CBMs, in line with the definition 
that Holst put forward, seems unrealistic between dyads of differing state type. Given the 
potential far-ranging effect online posts can have, a political CBM would most likely attempt to 
require states to censor their citizen’s online posts if the material can be perceived as 
undermining the ideology or government of another state; an unfathomable obstacle for many 
Western democracies. Furthermore, many Western states may be reluctant to create political 
stability CBMs because of a perceived strategic benefit the current ambiguity affords. For 
democracies this includes the spread of democratic principles and globalization that the Internet 
enables.
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 This would explain why the United States government invests heavily in the 
development of anonymity technology through the US State Department’s Bureau of 
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 Though beyond the scope of this paper, this view is in line with the literature on the 
Democratic Peace Theory that holds that democracies are more likely to be peaceful with one 
another because of shared culture, norms, and structural mechanisms that promote peaceful 
conflict resolution. Additionally, scholarship has shown that common ideologies encourage 
alliance formation whereas divergent ideologies can have a positive effect on threat perception 
and domestic stability.  Indeed, authoritarian regimes view access to the unfettered Internet as a 
venue that can encourages civil unrest because it exposes their citizenry to differing ideological 
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view is rational given the role social media played during Arab Spring which resulted in multiple 
regime changes. Some Western policy makers and strategists may hold that by keeping a free 
and open Internet, democracies can spread democratic values in hopes that it will encourage 
democratic revolutions in authoritarian regimes. Thus, resulting in a strategic victory and an 




Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, which seeks annual grants for the development of 
software that contributes to Internet freedom.
331
 Furthermore, it would explain why the US 
government has spent “approximately $2 million annually during the past decade to help enable 
Internet users in China and other Internet restricting countries to access its websites, such as 
Voice of America and Radio Free Asia.”
332
 
 Many authoritarian regimes, however, which have pushed for the development of a 
concept of cyber sovereignty might be hesitant to see them realized. The 2016 US presidential 
election exposed the effect Russian meddling in a campaign could have. With the public release 
of hacked emails, to include the falsification of some of the leaked materials, trolling, and the 
fake news, the US election may have very well been influenced.
333
 This same type of activity has 
occurred and in ongoing in Europe though the full extent of these operations is still being 
realized.
334
 That said, the point is that the Internet affords a means to directly reach the citizenry 
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of another state in a way that has not been possible before. Many authoritarian regimes have 
moved to block this access through censorship and many Western states are struggling with 
finding a way to block this interference without sacrificing their democratic ideals. Though a 
political CBM that amounts to a promise to avoid interfering in the internal governance of 
another state seems like all parties have an incentive to pursue, it is unlikely, particularly the 
wake of Russian interference in the 2016 US presidential election. Indeed, this influence 
operation exposed the decisive effect cyber operations can create, and just as arms control 
agreements are unlikely to take hold when a new technology is perceived to offer decisive 
effects, a CBM that seeks to block such activities is also unlikely to take hold. 
One other notable absence from both the UNGA and OSCE ICT CBM lists is any 
measure dealing directly with cooperation on cybercrime. Though both lists include sharing of 
threat information, to include technical signatures and threat actor data, there is no provision that 
encourages cooperation on the prosecution of cyber criminals or the syncing of domestic cyber-
criminal statutes. The framework in Figure 1 provides some insights into why such a provision is 
conspicuously absent. Most Western states only restrict online activity for illicit activities. 
Keeping with this view, much of the West has agreed to cooperate on the prevention of 
cybercrime by becoming signatories to the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime.
335
 Where this 
type of cooperation may be possible between dyads of similar regime type, it is unlikely across 
non-like dyads. Indeed, the Russian Federation is the only member of the Council of Europe that 




 Council of Europe, “European Treaty Series no. 185- Convention on Cybercrime,” (Budapest: 




has not signed the treaty.
336
  This resistance to cooperation on cybercrime exists for several 
reasons. First, some authoritarian regimes benefit from being directly or indirectly complicit in 
online illicit activity as they receive the monetary proceeds or intellectual property gained from 
cybercrime. Indeed, North Korea has been said to net millions of dollars from cybercrime to get 
around the crippling effects of economic sanctions.
337
 Second, the sheltering of cyber criminals 
enables the state to have a future cyber proxy actor that can conduct plausibly deniable cyber 
operations at the behest of the state.
338
 Though Western actors could receive the same benefits 
from cybercrime, most of these states have domestic statutes that limit their citizenry and the 
government from engaging directly in this type of activity.  
ICT CBMs Beyond Europe 
In practice, the most notable ICT CBMs outside Europe take the form of bilateral 
agreements. Specifically, the bilateral CBMs between the United States, China, and Russia. With 
respect to China and the US, some progress has been made in developing mechanisms that 
promote transparency and cooperation both during peacetime as well as during a crisis. In 2015 
Presidents Obama and Xi signed an agreement to abstain from cyber-enabled intellectual 
property theft that enabled a commercial competitive advantage, to exchange vulnerability and 
law enforcement information, and to create a working group to further discuss the UN Group of 
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Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in 
the Context of International Security 2015 Report.
339
 Though this agreement did not specifically 
create mechanisms to avoid inadvertent conflict or contribute to crisis stability, it did clarify how 
each state intends to use the domain. Furthermore, it made it apparent when the other state was 
defecting from a pattern of compliance and potentially engaging in revisionist behavior.  
In a separate landmark agreement, in 2014 the US DoD and the Chinese PLA allowed the 
exchange of observers for major military activities created a military crisis notification system 
utilizing the Defense Telephone Link between the two countries that was first established in 
2008.
340
 Though neither document mentioned the word “cyber” or “ICT,” it was understood at 
the signing that the driving catalyst was uncertainty stemming from the potential for inadvertent 
cyber conflict and escalation during a crisis.
341
  
 In June 2013, the United States and Russia created a working group within the context of 
the Bilateral Presidential Commission that sought to “promote transparency and reduce the 
possibility that an incident related to the use of ICTs could unintentionally cause instability or 
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 Though the United States suspended its participation in the Bilateral Commission 
following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the agreement mentioned three measures of note.
343
 
First, the continuous sharing of ICT threat information between the US CERT located at the 
Department of Homeland Security and its Russian equivalent. Second, an agreement to utilize 
the Nuclear Risk Reduction Center (NRRC), first established in 1987, to facilitate inquiries 
about cybersecurity incidents. In the closing days of the 2016 presidential election, it was 
reported that the United States used the NRRC to compel Russia to avoid interfering with US 
voting systems.
344
 What is unique about this case is not that the hotline was used, but that it was 
used for deterrence rather than for détente. Finally, the commission also created a direct line 
between the White House’s Cybersecurity Coordinator and the Kremlin’s Deputy Secretary of 
the Security Council integrated into the Direct Secure Communications System which, like the 
NRRC, was first developed to manage nuclear crises during the Cold War. Though these 
bilateral agreements are examples between major state powers, there are other agreements 
between regional powers, particularly on cyber security coordination efforts, that are beyond 
the scope of this paper. That said, these examples highlight confidence building measures that 
have been taken to avoid escalation and prevent inadvertent conflict between countries that are 
potential adversaries, thus promoting both peacetime and crisis stability.  
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Cyber operations can be destabilizing to interstate relations and lead to increased tensions 
and inadvertent conflict because their secretive nature promotes uncertainty between actors. 
However, states have an incentive to avoid unwanted tensions, particularly when it runs the risk 
of escalating into a general war. Therefore, confidence building measures that facilitate a 
dialogue between states is a first step toward mitigating the destabilizing effects posed by the 
cyber domain.  The existing Computer Emergency Response Team infrastructure, which enables 
a common threat picture for state and non-state actors alike, reduces some of the uncertainty and 
vulnerability that exists between actors in this volatile space.  However, the CERTs do not help 
manage crisis escalation nor do they promote transparency beyond the technical threat and 
security information that they freely share. To those ends, states have utilized, to differing 
degrees, both bilateral and multilateral agreements to create mechanisms to share information 
about their intended uses of cyberspace, law enforcement information concerning nefarious 
actors, as well as to share information in a crisis.  
Though it is impossible to eliminate the incentives for actors to misrepresent or disguise 
their aggressive cyber actions, an incentive exists to avoid misunderstandings that can escalate to 
inadvertent conflict. Considering this research, a CBM that seeks a voluntary commitment 
between two or more states that they will avoid developing new accesses and enduring 
backdoors on systems within the sovereign territory of the other state or any allies it is obligated 
to defend during a time of crisis may be warranted. In other words, during a crisis, states should 
avoid hacking another state’s critical systems, because gaining access to them for intelligence 
collection runs the risk of being misinterpreted as gaining a foothold through which a cyber 




pose for inadvertent conflict creation and escalation. As previously discussed, an intelligence 
gathering cyber operation may be seen by the recipient as a precursor to a cyber attack, 
particularly during a period of increased hostilities. 
A second step would be a commitment to limit the number of non-state offensive cyber 
actors in the domain.  The traditional move would be a CBM that amounts to a commitment for 
states to keep the operational capabilities in the hands of the military, but oversight and launch 
authority in the hands of policymakers, as many states have done with nuclear arms.  However, 
the lack of complete military control of offensive cyber capabilities is already commonplace as 
many states must rely on civilian industry for expertise and development, thus rendering the 
consolidation of offensive cyber power by the military a costly and often unrealistic proposition. 
This occurs for several reasons. First, the line between governmental and non-governmental 
actors is often blurred, with some states operating parastatals that depend heavily on cyber 
espionage for economic growth. Therefore, limiting non-state actors that engage in cyber 
espionage and offensive operations may not be acceptable to some states due to economic 
concerns. Second, some states lack robust indigenous cyber capabilities, personnel, and the 
resources to produce them and are thus forced to employ cyber proxies to fulfill national security 
objectives.
345
 Further adoption of international institutions that seek to standardize laws between 
states for prosecution of cyber-crime and other types of nefarious cyber related activity, as has 
been seen in the Budapest Convention, are a good first step, but as already noted, have had 
limited traction amongst states outside the West. 
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 In a related logic, limiting not only actors, but also the proliferation of technology is an 
admirable goal. However, many of these tools are publically available via online forums or for 
sale via the Dark Web, a section of the Internet that is accessible via most web browsers and is 
known to facilitate illicit transactions.
346
 For instance, the source code for Stuxnet as well as 
NSA capabilities for surpassing firewalls have been compromised and a tech savvy actor can 
learn to morph them into something more advanced.
347
 Second, efforts have been made to 
control the export of ICT technology that can support offensive operations using The Wassenaar 
Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies. 
However, the 2013 amendments which tried to apply this to cyber quickly met industry 
opposition because the technology that supports offensive operations is also necessary to 
discover vulnerabilities that are in need of being patched, thus highlighting the offensive and 
defensive dual use nature of many cyber security tools.
348
 Indeed, this provision triggered 
significant resistance from private industry which felt it would inevitably lead to greater 
insecurity by placing restrictions on cyber security-related technology and activities, such as 
penetration testing technology, the sharing of threat information, and the use of multinational 
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computer bug bounty programs.
349
 To date, the provisions of ICT technology on cyber security 
capabilities of the Wassenaar Arrangement are still being refined both collectively by the 
Wassenaar Plenary and by member countries as they nest domestic regulation with their 
obligations under the Arrangement. For instance, in response to the public feedback, the specific 
2013 Wassenaar amendments that covered the training and employment of vulnerability 
detection systems were never implemented in the United States.
350
 
 Finally, care should be given to craft a measure that speaks not only to how states intend 
to employ cyber power to achieve objectives, but also the delegation of authorities that each state 
mandates for the approval of various types of cyber operations. This would assist in 
understanding what organizations and individuals are behind specific operations, thus adding 
clarity to attribution efforts. Furthermore, such a measure would assist in building confidence 
between states that these operations are maintained through a rigid command and control 
structure.  
The further creation of ICT confidence building measures and the continued maintenance 
of those already in existence is a necessary step towards mitigating the security dilemmas and 
                                                     
349
 Russell Brandom, “Google says controversial exports proposal would make the world ‘less 
secure,’” The Verge, July 20, 2015, http://www.theverge.com/2015/7/20/9005351/google-
wassenaar-arrangement-proposal-comments; and Chris Bream, “Wassenaar rules are not the 
right direction,” Facebook U.S. Public Policy, July 28, 2015, 
https://www.facebook.com/uspublicpolicy/posts/1047027321981746. For a more comprehensive 
list of the public feedback the US Department of Commerce received regarding this regulation 
see the nearly 1000-page report titled- “Public comments for Wassenaar Arrangement 2013 
Plenary Agreements Implementation: Intrusion and Surveillance Items proposed rule (published 
May 20, 2015),” https://efoia.bis.doc.gov/index.php/documents/public-comments/public-
comments-2015/1027-bis-2015-0011-comment-report/file. 
350
 Discussion with a senior official in the US Department of Commerce- Bureau of Industry and 
Security- November 28, 2016. Specifically, Wassenaar Arrangement Category 4 rules: 4.A.5, 
4.D.4, and 4.E.1.C, were never added to the Commerce Control List as elucidated in the 
Department’s Export Administration Regulations (EAR) in either 2014 or 2015 following the 




inadvertent risks that states confront in cyberspace. Despite traditional arms control regimes 
being unrealistic and ill-suited for controlling cyber operations, an incentive exists for states to 
press for the further adoption of ICT confidence building measures that mitigate uncertainty and 







THE UNGA RECOMMENDED THE FOLLOWING CBMS 
                                    ON JULY 22, 2015 
CLASSIFICATION   
OF CBM 
1. The identification of appropriate points of contact at the policy and 
technical levels to address serious ICT incidents and the creation of a 
directory of such contacts; 
 
Stability- Crisis 
2. The development of and support for mechanisms and processes for 
bilateral, regional, subregional and multilateral consultations, as 
appropriate, to enhance inter-state confidence-building and to reduce the 




3. Encouraging, on a voluntary basis, transparency at the bilateral, 
subregional, regional and multilateral levels, as appropriate, to increase 
confidence and inform future work. This could include the voluntary 
sharing of national views and information on various aspects of national 
and transnational threats to and in the use of ICTs; vulnerabilities and 
identified harmful hidden functions in ICT products; best practices for 
ICT security; confidence-building measures developed in regional and 
multilateral forums; and national organizations, strategies, policies and 









4. The voluntary provision by states of their national views of categories 
of infrastructure that they consider critical and national efforts to protect 
them, including information on national laws and policies for the 
protection of data and ICT-enabled infrastructure. States should seek to 
facilitate cross-border cooperation to address critical infrastructure 






– A repository of national laws and policies for the protection of 
data and ICT-enabled infrastructure and the publication of 
materials deemed appropriate for distribution on these national 
laws and policies; 
 
–The development of mechanisms and processes for bilateral, 
subregional, regional and multilateral consultations on the 
protection of ICT-enabled critical infrastructure; 
 
– The development on a bilateral, subregional, regional and 
multilateral basis of technical, legal and diplomatic mechanisms 
to address ICT-related requests; 
 
– The adoption of voluntary national arrangements to classify ICT 
incidents in terms of the scale and seriousness of the incident, for 








THE UNGA RECOMMENDED THE ADDITIONAL CBMS 
 ON BILATERAL, SUBREGIONAL, REGIONAL AND  
                          MULTILATERAL BASIS 
CLASSIFICATION   
OF CBM 
A. Strengthen cooperative mechanisms between relevant agencies 
to address ICT security incidents and develop additional 
technical, legal and diplomatic mechanisms to address ICT 
infrastructure-related requests, including the consideration of 
exchanges of personnel in areas such as incident response and 
law enforcement, as appropriate, and encouraging exchanges 






B. Enhance cooperation, including the development of focal 
points for the exchange of information on malicious ICT use and 
the provision of assistance in investigations; 
Information- 
Security 
C. Establish a national computer emergency response team and/or 
cybersecurity incident response team or officially designate an 
organization to fulfil this role. States may wish to consider such 
bodies within their definition of critical infrastructure. States 
should support and facilitate the functioning of and cooperation 







D. Expand and support practices in computer emergency response 
team and cybersecurity incident response team cooperation, as 
appropriate, such as information exchange about vulnerabilities, 
attack patterns and best practices for mitigating attacks, including 
coordinating responses, organizing exercises, supporting the 








E. Cooperate, in a manner consistent with national and 
international law, with requests from other States in investigating 
ICT-related crime or the use of ICTs for terrorist purposes or to 

















THE FOLLOWING CBMS WERE ADOPTED THROUGH  
OSCE PERMANENT COUNCIL DECISION NO. 1106  
                              ON DECEMBER 3, 2013 
CLASSIFICATION   
OF CBM 
1. Participating States will voluntarily provide their national 
views on various aspects of national and transnational threats to 
and in the use of ICTs. The extent of such information will be 




2. Participating States will voluntarily facilitate co-operation 
among the competent national bodies and exchange of 
information in relation with security of and in the use of ICTs. 
 
Information- Threat 
3. Participating States will on a voluntary basis and at the 
appropriate level hold consultations in order to reduce the risks of 
misperception, and of possible emergence of political or military 
tension or conflict that may stem from the use of ICTs, and to 
protect critical national and international ICT infrastructures 






4. Participating States will voluntarily share information on 
measures that they have taken to ensure an open, interoperable, 
secure, and reliable Internet. 
 
Information- Use 
5. The participating States will use the OSCE as a platform for 
dialogue, exchange of best practices, awareness-raising and 
information on capacity-building regarding security of and in the 
use of ICTs, including effective responses to related threats. The 
participating States will explore further developing the OSCE 





6. Participating States are encouraged to have in place modern 
and effective national legislation to facilitate on a voluntary basis 
bilateral co-operation and effective, time-sensitive information 
exchange between competent authorities, including law 
enforcement agencies, of the participating States in order to 
counter terrorist or criminal use of ICTs. The OSCE participating 
States agree that the OSCE shall not duplicate the efforts of 






7. Participating States will voluntarily share information on their 
national organization; strategies; policies and programmes – 
including on co-operation between the public and the private 
sector; relevant to the security of and in the use of ICTs; the 




8. Participating States will nominate a contact point to facilitate 
pertinent communications and dialogue on security of and in the 
use of ICTs. Participating States will voluntarily provide contact 
data of existing official national structures that manage ICT-
related incidents and co-ordinate responses to enable a direct 
dialogue and to facilitate interaction among responsible national 
bodies and experts. Participating States will update contact 










after a change has occurred. Participating States will voluntarily 
establish measures to ensure rapid communication at policy levels 
of authority, to permit concerns to be raised at the national 
security level. 
9. In order to reduce the risk of misunderstandings in the absence 
of agreed terminology and to further a continuing dialogue, 
participating states will, as a first step, voluntarily provide a list 
of national terminology related to security of and in the use of 
ICTs accompanied by an explanation or definition of each term. 
Each participating state will voluntarily select those terms it 
deems most relevant for sharing. In the longer term, participating 





10. Participating states will voluntarily exchange views using 
OSCE platforms and mechanisms inter alia, the OSCE 
communications network, maintained by the OSCE Secretariat’s 
conflict prevention centre, subject to the relevant OSCE decision, 




11. Participating states will, at the level of designated national 
experts, meet at least three times each year, within the framework 
of the security committee and its informal working group 
established by Permanent Council Decision No. 1039 to discuss 
information exchanged and explore appropriate development of 
CBMs. Candidates for future consideration by the IWG may 
include inter alia proposals from the consolidated list circulated 
by the chairmanship of the IWG under PC.DEL/682/12 on 9 July 




















THE FOLLOWING CBMS WERE ADOPTED THROUGH  
OSCE PERMANENT COUNCIL DECISION NO. 1202  
                              ON MARCH 10, 2016 
CLASSIFICATION   
OF CBM 
12. Participating States will, on a voluntary basis, share 
information and facilitate inter-State exchanges in different 
formats, including workshops, seminars, and roundtables, 
including on the regional and/or subregional level; this is to 
investigate the spectrum of co-operative measures as well as other 
processes and mechanisms that could enable participating States 
to reduce the risk of conflict stemming from the use of ICTs. 
Such activities should be aimed at preventing conflicts stemming 






With respect to such activities participating States are 
encouraged, inter alia, to: 
 
 
– Conduct such activities in the spirit of enhancing 




– Complement, through such activities, UN efforts and 
avoid duplicating work done by other fora; and 
 
 
– Take into account the needs and requirements of 
participating States taking part in such activities. 
 
 
Participating States are encouraged to invite and engage 
representatives of the private sector, academia, centres of 
excellence and civil society in such activities. 
 
 
13. Participating States will, on a voluntary basis, conduct 
activities for officials and experts to support the facilitation of 
authorized and protected communication channels to prevent and 
reduce the risks of misperception, escalation, and conflict; and to 
clarify technical, legal and diplomatic mechanisms to address 
ICT-related requests. This does not exclude the use of the 
channels of communication mentioned in Permanent Council 






14. Participating states will, on a voluntary basis and consistent 
with national legislation, promote public-private partnerships and 
develop mechanisms to exchange best practices of responses to 




15. Participating states, on a voluntary basis, will encourage, 
facilitate and/or participate in regional and subregional 
collaboration between legally-authorized authorities responsible 
for securing critical infrastructures to discuss opportunities and 
address challenges to national as well as trans-border ICT 






Collaboration may, inter alia, include:  
– Sharing information on ICT threats;  
– Exchanging best practices;  




challenges including crisis management procedures in case of 
widespread or transnational disruption of ICT-enabled critical 
infrastructure; 
– Adopting voluntary national arrangements to classify ICT 
incidents in terms of the scale and seriousness of the incident; 
 
– Sharing national views of categories of ICT-enabled 
infrastructure states consider critical; 
 
– Improving the security of national and transnational ICT-
enabled critical infrastructure including their integrity at the 
regional and subregional levels; and 
 
– Raising awareness about the importance of protecting industrial 
control systems and about issues related to their ICT-related 
security, and the necessity of developing processes and 
mechanisms to respond to those issues. 
 
16. Participating states will, on a voluntary basis, encourage 
responsible reporting of vulnerabilities affecting the security of 
and in the use of ICTs and share associated information on 
available remedies to such vulnerabilities, including with relevant 
segments of the ICT business and industry, with the goal of 
increasing co-operation and transparency within the OSCE 
region. OSCE participating states agree that such information 
exchange, when occurring between states, should use 
appropriately authorized and protected communication channels, 
including the contact points designated in line with CBM 8 of 
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ABSTRACT
What are the dynamics of coercion in cyberspace? Can states
use cyber means as independent tools of coercion to
influence the behavior of adversaries? This article critically
assesses traditional coercion theory in light of cyberspace’s
emergence as a domain in which states use force, or its
threat, to achieve political objectives. First, we review the
core tenets of coercion theory and identify the requisites of
successful coercion: clearly communicated threats; a cost–
benefit calculus; credibility; and reassurance. We subsequently
explore the extent to which each of these is feasible for or
applicable to the cyber domain, highlighting how the
dynamics of coercion in cyberspace mimic versus diverge
from traditional domains of warfare. We demonstrate that
cyber power alone has limited effectiveness as a tool of
coercion, although it has significant utility when coupled with
other elements of national power. Second, this article
assesses the viability and effectiveness of six prominent
warfighting strategies in the traditional coercion literature as
applied to the cyber domain: attrition, denial, decapitation,
intimidation, punishment, and risk. We conclude that, based
on the current technological state of the field, states are only
likely to achieve desired objectives employing attrition,
denial, or decapitation strategies. Our analysis also has unique
implications for the conduct of warfare in cyberspace.
Perhaps counterintuitively, the obstacles to coercion that our
analysis identifies may prompt states to reevaluate norms
against targeting civilian infrastructure.
Cyberspace has definitively emerged as the latest frontier of militarized interactions
between nation-states. Governments, as they are wont to do in an anarchic inter-
national system, have already invested considerable resources to develop offensive
and defensive military capabilities in cyberspace. It remains to be seen, however,
how and to what extent these tools can be employed to achieve desired political
objectives. Put simply, what is the logic of coercion in cyberspace? Can govern-
ments use cyber power to deter state adversaries from taking undesirable actions
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or compel them to bend to their wills and, if so, how and under what conditions?1
This analysis draws on the large corpus of coercion theory to assess the extent to
which existing frameworks can shed light on the dynamics of coercion in cyber-
space. The article proceeds as follows. First, we outline the theoretical logic of coer-
cion theory and identify the factors necessary for successful coercion. Each element
of coercion is immediately followed by a discussion of how it applies to the cyber
domain and an assessment of how the particularities of the domain reflect on the
requirements of successful coercion. We demonstrate that, based on current capa-
bilities, cyber power has limited effectiveness as an independent tool of coercion.
Second, we explore the extent to which cyber power could be used as part of a war-
fighting strategy to target an adversary’s ability or willingness to resist and suggest
which strategies are likely to be more versus less effective.2 We assert that, based
on current capabilities, attrition, denial, and decapitation strategies are most likely
to be effective in cyberspace. Finally, we conclude with recommendations for
policymaking and further research.
Coercion Theory
As Thomas C. Schelling so eloquently articulated, coercion is fundamentally
about affecting an adversary’s behavior using the threat or limited application of
military force; “[i]t is the threat of damage, or of more damage to come, that can
make someone yield or comply.”3 Coercion involves producing a desired behav-
ior or outcome on the part of an adversary by forcing her to confront a cost–ben-
efit calculus, such that the adversary believes it is less costly to concede to the
threatener’s preferred course of (in)action than to defy the latter’s demands.4
Coercion is distinct from brute force. In the latter case, one state defeats another
militarily and then imposes a political settlement on the defeated power; in the
former case, the target of coercion retains the military capacity to resist or con-
cede, and the coercer seeks to achieve a political settlement short of full-scale
1Thomas C. Schelling makes the important distinction between compellence and deterrence. The former involves the
threat or limited application of force to change an adversary’s behavior, while the latter involves the threat of force
(or pain, in Schelling’s parlance), to preserve the status quo. See Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cam-
bridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960) and idem., Arms and Influence (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press,
2008), 69–86. Robert J. Art elaborates on this concept. See Robert J. Art, “To What Ends Military Power?” Interna-
tional Security 4, no. 4 (Spring 1980): 3–35.
2The authors are grateful to Jack Snyder for pointing out the distinction between coercion and warfighting
strategies.
3Schelling, Arms and Influence, 3. Emphasis in the original. Alexander L. George et. al. also emphasize that coercion
can involve both the threat or limited application of military power. See Alexander L. George, David K. Hall, and Wil-
liam R. Simons, eds., The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy: Laos, Cuba, Vietnam (Boston: Little, Brown and Company,
1971), 2, 18. Lawrence Freedman distinguishes between coercion, as defined by Schelling, and “strategic coercion,”
which is “the deliberate and purposive use of overt threats to influence another’s strategic choices.” See Lawrence
Freedman, “Strategic Coercion,” in Strategic Coercion: Concepts and Cases, ed. Lawrence Freedman (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1998), 15.
4Robert A. Pape, Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996), 4. It is
important to note, however, that Pape’s reference to coercion in this context is distinct from deterrence; Schelling
uses the umbrella term “coercion” to refer to both compellence and deterrence. See also Daniel L. Byman and Mat-
thew Waxman, The Dynamics of Coercion: American Foreign Policy and the Limits of Military Might (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 2002), 3.
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war by manipulating the cost–benefit calculus of the target state.5 While coercion
has always been a fundamental element of the exercise of state power, the advent
of nuclear weapons and mutual assured destruction has made coercion even
more critical. As Schelling explains, the prospect of civilization-ending nuclear
warfare, coupled with advances in technology making it possible to target an ene-
my’s population centers and hold its society at risk without first defeating its
armed forces, has turned statecraft into the diplomacy of violence.6 The signifi-
cance of coercion for interstate relations has not decreased with the advent of
cyber warfare; if anything, it has increased. Indeed, like nuclear weapons, cyber
weapons enable governments to target adversary populations while bypassing
the latter’s military forces. For example, cyber weapons could be employed to tar-
get a state’s critical infrastructure to render key pieces of a state’s military sys-
tems inoperable at decisive times, as was allegedly the case when Syrian air
defense systems failed to respond to an Israeli bombing operation against a pur-
ported Syrian nuclear enrichment facility in 2007.7
Notwithstanding the central role coercion plays in states’ strategies, successful
coercion—both its deterrent and compellent varieties—is difficult to achieve.8
There is a large body of empirical literature that assesses the reasons for failed
coercion, particularly focusing on examples of failed coercion in American foreign
policy during the Vietnam War and through the use of air power in the post-Cold
War international system.9 In general, using the threat or limited application of
military force to affect an adversary’s behavior is difficult to accomplish because
there are many factors that are necessary conditions for successful coercion, some
of which are in tension with others. Moreover, if coercion is difficult to achieve
through the threat or use of conventional military power, we argue that it is even
more challenging in cyberspace. The literature on coercion suggests that four fun-
damental conditions must be met for coercion to succeed: the coercive threat must
be clearly communicated; it must be linked to a cost–benefit calculus such that the
5Schelling, Arms and Influence, 2–6. Pape, Bombing to Win, 13.
6Schelling, Arms and Influence, 18–34. Schelling links technological advances in the power to hurt with the increased
“importance of war and threats of war as techniques of influence, not of destruction; of coercion and deterrence,
not of conquest and defense; of bargaining and intimidation,” 33.
7Richard A. Clarke and Robert K. Knake, Cyber War: The Next Threat to National Security and What to Do About It (New
York: Ecco, 2012), 1–8.
8It is widely accepted that deterrence may be easier to achieve, but harder for social scientists to observe due its
negative object (for example, we only observe deterrence failures). Conversely, compellence is easy to observe but
more difficult to achieve for precisely the same reason—there are reputational costs associated with being seen to
back down and concede to an adversary’s demands. Leaders who are successfully deterred could point to a variety
of reasons they chose to not alter the status quo without losing face. See the discussion in Schelling, Arms and Influ-
ence, 74–75; Robert J. Art, “Coercive Diplomacy: What Do We Know?” in The United States and Coercive Diplomacy,
eds. Robert J. Art and Patrick M. Cronin (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2003), 361–62.
9See, for example, Pape, Bombing to Win; Todd S. Sechser, “Goliath’s Curse: Coercive Threats and Asymmetric Power,
International Organization 64, no. 4 (October 2010): 627–60; Wallace J. Thies, When Governments Collide: Coercion
and Diplomacy in the Vietnam Conflict, 1964–1968 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980); Alexander L.
George, Forceful Persuasion: Coercive Diplomacy as an Alternative to War (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute
of Peace Press, 1991); Art, “Coercive Diplomacy;” Alexander L. George and William E. Simons, eds., The Limits of Coer-
cive Diplomacy, 2nd ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990); Byman and Waxman, Dynamics of Coercion; Thomas J.
Christensen, Worse Than a Monolith: Alliance Politics and Problems of Coercive Diplomacy in Asia (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 2011).
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target’s costs of conceding are less than the costs of not complying; it must be
credible; and there must be an element of reassurance.10
Communication
The essence of successful coercion is clear communication.11 The target of a coercive
threat has to know precisely the behavior in which the coercing state wants the tar-
get state to engage (or refrain from engaging), the timeframe in which the coercing
state expects the target to comply, and the costs associated with cooperation versus
defection. The target state must understand “what behavior of his will cause the vio-
lence to be inflicted and what will cause it to be withheld.”12 Ideally, coercion takes
the form of an ultimatum: if State B does not do action X within timeframe Y, State
A will take specified action Z. However, in the vast majority of international crises,
political leaders default to ambiguity, rather than clarity, of threats; leaders often pre-
fer to retain flexibility to escape from costly or imprudent commitments or be adap-
tive in their responses to an adversary’s behavior, especially if they lack domestic
political support.13 The fundamental fact of anarchy complicates clear communica-
tion because it leads to poor, fragmentary information and creates incentives to
misrepresent private information—indeed, this is a cause of war.14 Beyond incentives
for strategic ambiguity, clear signaling is complicated by misperceptions stemming
from both cultural differences and cognitive limitations.15 Insights from cognitive
psychology have demonstrated that recipients of a signal tend to fit incoming
information into preexisting beliefs, interpret signals based on implicit theories
about their meaning, prefer simplicity over complexity, and are influenced by moti-
vated biases.16 Put simply, signaling often fails “because the perceiver does not
understand what message the actor is trying to communicate.”17 Communication is
10Of course, this is not an exhaustive list of all of the factors that contribute to successful coercion. For example,
George and Simons identify nine conditions that favor coercive diplomacy: clarity of objective, strong motivation,
asymmetry of motivation, sense of urgency, strong leadership, domestic support, international support, fear of
unacceptable escalation, and clarity of terms. See George and Simons, eds., Limits of Coercive Diplomacy, 279–91.
However, we propose that these various lists and factors could be grouped into the four main conditions identified
above.
11However, it is important to note a caveat that, in some instances, sending ambiguous signals can be advantageous
for the purposes of coercion. Particularly in the context of nuclear bargaining, the threat that leaves something to
chance—precisely because the risk of nuclear war generates extraordinary costs—may help a coercing state. See
Schelling, Strategy of Conflict, chap. 8.
12Idem., Arms and Influence, 3–4.
13Jack Snyder and Erica D. Borghard, “The Cost of Empty Threats: A Penny, Not a Pound,” American Political Science
Review 105, no. 3 (August 2011): 429; Robert Jervis, “Deterrence Theory Revisited,” World Politics 31, no. 2 (January
1979): 303; Richard Ned Lebow, Between Peace and War: The Nature of International Crises (Baltimore, MD: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1981), 29–27; Glen H. Synder and Paul Diesing, Conflict Among Nations: Bargaining, Deci-
sion Making, and System Structure in International Crises (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1977), 213–15,
220. Even Schelling acknowledges that “most commitments are ultimately ambiguous in detail,” Arms and Influence,
67.
14Freedman, “Strategic Coercion,” 18; James D. Fearon, “Rationalist Explanations for War,” International Organization
49, no. 3 (Summer 1995): 379–414.
15Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976).
16Ibid., 117–202. Robert Jervis, “Signaling and Perception: Drawing Inferences and Projecting Images,” in Political Psy-
chology, ed. Kristen Renwick Monroe (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2002), 306–8. See also Robert Jer-
vis, The Logic of Images in International Relations (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970).
17Jervis, “Signaling and Perception,” 304.
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facilitated when actors can agree on a shared meaning of a particular type or vehicle
of signaling (such as diplomatic language). In the case of diplomatic language, for
example, clarity is easier to achieve because “both the signaler and the perceiver
agree as to the message that the former is trying to convey.”18
Communication in Cyberspace
Understanding intent is exceptionally difficult in the cyber domain. Many scholars and
US government-sponsored studies have noted that cyber operations create a high
probability of misunderstanding the coercing state’s intentions.19 Unlike diplomatic
channels, in cyberspace there is no agreed-upon language that guides policymakers to
a common understanding that helps divine the meaning behind a cyber signal. More-
over, in cyberspace, most operations are interactions between humans and machines
facilitated by code for which there are few, if any, norms governing the exchange.20
That many high-level decision makers lack even a basic understanding of the cyber
domain and, therefore, are likely to be intellectually unprepared during a time of crisis,
compounds this uncertainty. Furthermore, the signaler may be uncertain about what
kind of cyber tool she should select to communicate in cyberspace because the actual
effects of a cyber attack may be unpredictable ex ante—even to the signaler.21
Signaling in cyberspace is the most problematic of all the domains (land, sea, air,
space, and cyber) because the signal may go unrealized. In other words, in cyberspace
only the initiator may perceive the engagement.22 Moreover, even if a target state real-
izes it has been attacked, it is difficult to infer the intent behind a cyber signal based
solely on an observed incursion. This ambiguity has the potential to trigger unintended
escalation because it is difficult to distinguish between hostile and benign intentions
when an outside actor is perceived to have accessed a critical system.23 In a
18Ibid., 300.
19For further reference, see Andru E. Wall, “Demystifying the Title 10-Title 50 Debate: Distinguishing Military Opera-
tions, Intelligence Activities & Covert Action,” Harvard National Security Journal 3 (December 2011): 85–142; Robert
Chesney, “Military-Intelligence Convergence and the Law of the Title 10/Title 50 Debate,” Journal of National Secu-
rity Law and Policy 5 (October 2011): 539–629; William A. Owens, Kenneth W. Dam, and Herbert S. Lin, eds., Technol-
ogy, Policy, Law, and Ethics Regarding U.S. Acquisition and Use of Cyberattack Capabilities (Washington, DC: National
Academies Press, 2009).
20For more on norms and international law as they pertain to the cyber domain, see Catherine Lotrionte, “A Better
Defense: Examining the United States’ New Norms-Based Approach to Cyber Deterrence,” Georgetown Journal of
International Affairs 8, no. 10 (April 2014): 75–88; Martha Finnemore, “Cultivating International Cyber Norms,” in
America’s Cyber Future: Security and Prosperity in the Information Age, ed. Kristin M. Lord and Travis Sharp (Washing-
ton, DC: Center for a New American Security, 2011); Tim Maurer, “Cyber Norm Emergence at the United Nations—
An Analysis of the UN’s Activities Regarding Cyber-Security,” Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs (Sep-
tember 2011); Oona A. Hathaway, et al., “The Law of Cyber-Attack,” California Law Review 100, no. 4 (August 2012):
817–85; David E. Graham, “Cyber Threats and the Law of War,” Journal of National Security Law and Policy 4 (2010):
87–102; Jack Goldsmith, “How Cyber Changes the Laws of War,” European Journal of International Law 24, no. 1
(2013): 129–38.
21The authors are grateful to Robert Jervis for illustrating this.
22For instance, it is easy to imagine how a single signal could get lost in the over eighty-eight thousand petabytes of
IP traffic that are estimated to transverse the Internet per month.
23For further discussion of risks surrounding the ambiguity of intent in cyberspace, see Shawn W. Lonergan, “Coopera-
tion under the Cybersecurity Dilemma,” in Confronting Inequality: Wealth, Rights, and Power, ed. Hugh Liebert,
Thomas Sherlock, and Cole Pinheiro (New York: Sloan, 2016). Also see Robert Jervis, “Some Thoughts on Deterrence
in the Cyber Era,” Journal of Information Warfare (forthcoming): 8–9.
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hypothetical example, Japan may have an intelligence requirement to monitor the ura-
nium enrichment efforts of North Korea. However, Japan’s access to a network at a
North Korean enrichment facility does not necessarily suggest that it intends to
destroy North Korea’s nuclear ambitions through cyber means; Japan could simply be
monitoring the program to meet its own defensive requirements, which is widely
accepted by international convention to be a necessary state practice.24 Actors could
exploit this uncertainty to their advantage, but it may also lead to unintended con-
flict.25 Herbert Lin notes this ambiguity in cyberspace and concludes that the cyber
domain presents an increased risk of accidental escalation: “In the absence of direct
contact with those conducting such operations—sometimes even in the presence of
such contact—determining intent is likely to be difficult and may rest heavily on infer-
ences made on the basis of whatever attribution is possible. Thus, attempts to send sig-
nals to an adversary through limited and constrained military actions—problematic
even in kinetic warfare—are likely to be even more problematic when cyber attacks
are involved.”26
Attribution problems complicate effective communication in cyberspace
because they create problems for both target and initiator. From the perspective of
the target state, a fundamental impediment to deciphering the intent behind a
cyber signal is the difficulty of identifying the actor who sent it. This presents a
challenge to policymakers because, if a cyber action is uncovered, the true meaning
of the signal may not be ascertained without attribution. While some actions in
themselves may send a clear signal without attribution, typically the identity of the
signaling state is critical for coercion to succeed. For instance, in the prior scenario
we assumed North Korea attributed the cyber incursion to Japan. However, what if
North Korea were unable to attribute the access to Japan and had to surmise the
intent of the incursion devoid of attribution? The spectrum of possible motivations
of such an incursion ranges from a preparation for a preemptive attack from a rival
such as Japan or the United States on one end of the spectrum, to a benign case of
espionage from an ally such as China on the other. In this hypothetical case, not
only is the signal obfuscated because intent cannot be deduced without attribution,
but North Korea also does not know what is an appropriate response and against
whom to respond. If these conditions are not met, coercion is by definition not
possible.
There are, however, several methods to assign attribution following a cyber
incursion.27 The easiest ascription approach is when the perpetrator publically
accepts responsibility for the action and the target state believes that the self-
identified attacker possessed both the capability and motivation to carry it out.
24Geoffrey B. Demarest, “Espionage in International Law,” Denver Journal of International Law and Policy 24 (1995):
321–48.
25Jervis, Logic of Images in International Relations, 86–87.
26Herbert Lin, “Escalation Dynamics and Conflict Termination in Cyberspace,” Strategic Studies Quarterly 47 (2012): 57.
27For further reference on attribution, see Thomas Rid and Ben Buchanan, “Attributing Cyber Attacks,” Journal of Stra-
tegic Studies 38, no. 1–2 (2015): 4–37; Jon R. Lindsay, “Tipping the Scales: The Attribution Problem and the Feasibil-
ity of Deterrence against Cyberattack,” Journal of Cybersecurity 1, no. 1 (2015): 1–15.
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Another attribution technique mandates that the target state had access to the
attacker’s network from which the incursion originated and either witnessed
the operation in real time or recorded it. This second method is difficult
because it requires that the target state had access to the specific network from
which the aggressor initiated an attack; that they observed the onslaught devel-
oping in real time and intentionally refrained from establishing tailored
defenses or engaging in a preemptive attack to block the assault; or that that
they had complete intelligence collection of all cyber operations from the adver-
sary’s network, which is typically technically difficult to consistently collect.
However, in some instances governments may decide that the intelligence value
of maintaining access outweighs the likely damage from the attack. Another
attribution method is when sensors placed either at Internet service providers
or key nodes in the Internet run algorithms that analyze raw data flows and
scan for anomalies and variants of known attack signatures. However, the real-
time use of such technology is still in a nascent stage and there is currently no
guarantee that, once detected, the source of the malware could be traced back
to the true originator.28 The final method of assigning attribution occurs when
the signature of the attack (the coding) is so unique that it could be traced to a
specific actor or threat network. Yet, this method heightens the risk of falling
victim to deceptive techniques, such as embedding remarks in a foreign lan-
guage of a noninvolved party, which may confound forensic experts seeking to
assign attribution. Recently, however, there have been advances in signature
recognition software designed to scour millions of lines of code to compile
unique profiles of the developers.29 Moreover, from the target’s perspective,
even if she is able to successfully attribute an attack to a particular actor, she
may be hesitant to reveal her ability to do so because it would likely require
going public with valuable information that could compromise her own capa-
bilities and accesses. For instance, the United States’ decision to quickly attri-
bute the Sony hack in late 2014 to North Korea likely revealed and
compromised American accesses to other governments’ cyber infrastructure.30
28Gerhard Munz and Georg Carle, “Real-Time Analysis of Flow Data for Network Attack Detection” (paper presented at
the 10th IFIP/IEEE International Symposium on Integrated Network Management, Munich, Germany, 21 May 2007).
29Developing unique signatures of attackers and code developers is becoming more common as exploits become
increasingly sophisticated and threat data is shared among cyber security practitioners. Stuxnet, for instance, was
nearly fifteen thousand lines of code that comprised over five hundred thousand bytes. That is the equivalent
amount of digital data as a large textbook. Governments have been keen to invest in digital forensic technology, as
evident in then Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta’s 11 October 2012 address from the deck of USS Intrepid, where
he noted: “The department has made significant advances in solving a problem that makes deterring cyber adver-
saries more complex: the difficulty of identifying the origins of that attack. Over the last two years, [the] DoD has
made significant investments in forensics to address this problem of attribution and we’re seeing the returns on
that investment. Potential aggressors should be aware that the United States has the capacity to locate them and
to hold them accountable for their actions that may try to harm America,” see Leon Panetta, “Remarks by Secretary
Panetta on Cybersecurity to the Business Executives for National Security, New York City,” 11 October 2012, http://
archive.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptidD5136. For a review of Panetta’s speech, see Jack
Goldsmith, “The Significance of Panetta’s Cyber Speech and the Persistent Difficulty of Deterring Cyberattacks,”
Lawfare, 15 October 2012.
30The authors thank Robert Jervis for this comment.
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Attribution issues create problems not only for the target state attempting to infer
the intent behind a signal, but also for the coercing state seeking to send a clear sig-
nal. The conventional wisdom on cyber operations posits that states typically seek to
avoid attribution when conducting cyber exploitation and espionage operations.
However, coercion in cyberspace requires attribution to be effective. A coercing state
may employ several methods to ensure attribution. First, a state could couple the
action in cyberspace with a formal diplomatic message, elucidating the meaning the
signal (the cyber attack) was intended to convey.31 Coupling a cyber operation with
a diplomatic message may be the least costly method to ensure ascription for the
coercer, but it must also be credible. This technique was observed in March 2016
when Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter, in a formal public statement, acknowl-
edged that the United States conducted a cyber attack against the Islamic State of
Iraq and Syria’s command and control systems in Mosul, Iraq.32 However, a coerc-
ing state must ensure that the target believes its self-declared attribution. This could
present a problem for the coercing state if, in order to demonstrate that it was the
one sending a signal, it had to reveal capabilities and accesses that it may prefer to
keep private. Second, if coupling is not an available avenue, some have postulated
several technical methods to ensure attribution, such as embedding unique signa-
tures in code.33 This type of ascription technique demands that some trace of the
cyber operation remain on the target’s machines.
This suggests that simply gaining access to a network and conducting cyber
espionage is not sufficient to send a coercive signal in cyberspace—even if such
accesses may be necessary to support a coercive signal.34 While much of the discus-
sion in the public domain conflates cyber espionage and cyber military operations,
these are in fact distinct, just as they are in conventional domains. All forms of
espionage, whether conducted in cyberspace or elsewhere, are fundamentally about
collecting private information against another actor. Conversely, to be coercive, a
cyber signal must be attributable and aim to disrupt, deny, degrade, and/or destroy
data resident on computers and computer networks, or the systems themselves.
31Jervis, The Logic of Images in International Relations, 139–44.
32Damian Paletta and Felicia Schwartz, “Pentagon Deploys Cyberweapons against Islamic State,” Wall Street Journal,
29 February 2016.
33Goldsmith, “Panetta’s Cyber Speech.”
34This, of course, creates something of a paradox for a coercing state because it may need to gain prior access to a
system or network (which requires obfuscation and avoiding attribution) to send a subsequently attributable coer-
cive signal. The one caveat to this is that cyber espionage could be used to conduct a data breach of sensitive infor-
mation that can later be released to embarrass or otherwise intimidate some actor. Though cyber espionage may
be a complex operation, depending on how well defended the network or computer the targeted information was
resident on is, it is not a costly coercive cyber signal. Rather, cyber is being used as a vehicle to acquire information.
It is not being employed as a signaling mechanism in itself. Due to this, the 2015 Sony hack is not a coercive cyber
operation because it did not seek to destroy or disrupt and systems, but rather was used to steal embarrassing
insider information. In this instance, if North Korea were to use the information gleaned from its alleged cyber
attack on Sony’s systems to coerce the company into refraining from releasing a movie, its cyber espionage would
constitute a tool that was the component of a broader coercion strategy, but the fact that North Korea breached
Sony’s networks to steal information was not in itself sending a costly signal to the company. Cyber espionage is a
routine aspect of interstate interactions in cyberspace and, in itself, does not meet the threshold of a costly signal.
It is possible that cyber espionage activities could be coupled with other costly signals but, independently, it is not
one.
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Cost–Benefit Calculus
Coercion theory assumes that states are rational actors who make cost–benefit calcula-
tions when determining how to respond to threats and inducements posed by other
actors in the international system. The benefit side of the calculus involves how much
the adversary values a particular course of action, while the cost side entails the price
she anticipates paying in order to carry it out.35 Coercion, put simply, forces the target
state to choose between “making concessions or suffering the consequences.”36 There-
fore, to be effective, a coercing state must issue a threat such that the target perceives it
to be more costly to suffer those consequences than to concede.37 To succeed, the
coercer must know what the target state values and, therefore, what it can hold at risk
to get the target to comply; or, in Schelling’s parlance, “[c]oercion requires finding a
bargain, arranging for him to be better off doing what we want—worse off not doing
what we want—when he takes the threatened penalty into account.”38 More important
than an objective measure of costs versus benefits, however, is how the adversary per-
ceives them, which stems from “the magnitude of the dangers and profits the adver-
sary sees ahead for a given path and the probability of their occurrence.”39 At its core,
therefore, coercion is the manipulation of the target’s perceptions of the cost–benefit
balance of a particular course of action.40
Affecting an adversary’s cost–benefit calculus may seem deceptively simple; in prac-
tice, it could fail across multiple dimensions. Coercion could fail because the target
does not understand what the adversary values and, therefore, does not know how to
appropriately tilt the cost–benefit calculus. This could stem from poor intelligence or,
more fundamentally, from the fact that leaders are not always rational, utility-maxi-
mizing economic individuals. It may be difficult to quantify what a target state values
if it involves something intangible (such as prestige) and, therefore, hard to assign a
numerical value to the cost a coercer must threaten to impose to achieve a desired
behavior. Relatedly, coercion could fail because states are not unitary actors and, there-
fore, there may be domestic political or bureaucratic organizational considerations that
factor into what a target state values, how it perceives costs versus benefits, and accept-
able levels of risk that the coercing state does not take into account. Moreover, even if
the coercer knew what the adversary values, it could be politically difficult to make a
sufficiently costly threat. Finally, coercion could fail due to cognitive limitations on the
part of the target. Insights gleaned from prospect theory, for instance, have illustrated
that individuals often fail to make rational, cost–benefit calculations when assessing
risk (such as being more averse to losses than gains) and misunderstand sunk costs.41
35Byman and Waxman, Dynamics of Coercion, 11.
36Pape, Bombing to Win, 12.
37Byman and Waxman, Dynamics of Coercion, 10. Pape, Bombing to Win, 15–16.
38Schelling, Arms and Influence, 4.
39Byman and Waxman, Dynamics of Coercion, 11.
40George, Forceful Persuasion, 11–14. George also points out that the more expansive or extreme the demands of the
coercing state are, the costlier the threat must be to secure compliance.
41Byman and Waxman, Dynamics of Coercion, 10–14. Schelling, Arms and Influence, 86. Jack S. Levy, “Prospect Theory,
Rational Choice, and International Relations,” International Studies Quarterly 41, no. 1 (March 1997): 87–112.
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Cost–Benefit Calculus in Cyberspace
In cyberspace, the state issuing a coercive threat must calculate what target to go
after and the effect it seeks to deliver against it. Similarly, the target must also cal-
culate whether it can absorb the cost and, if so, whether the coercer can ratchet up
the cost to the target while avoiding too much cost itself. There are several catego-
ries of targets a state may consider attacking in cyberspace to coerce another state.
Generally speaking, the class of target that inflicts the highest level of cost, a state’s
critical infrastructure, is typically the hardest to gain access to due to the technical
complexities stemming from custom, tailored uses and advanced physical and vir-
tual defensive measures commonly emplaced around these vital capabilities. The
United States Department of Homeland Security has defined these crucial nodes
as” … systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital that the incapacity
or destruction of such may have a debilitating impact on the security, economy,
public health or safety, environment, or any combination of these matters.“42 This
category includes critical infrastructure that is essential for everything from
the safeguarding of nuclear regulatory systems to gas pipelines, and control sys-
tems that enable communication systems to work.43 In the United States, many of
these critical systems are ran by private industry, but in states with parastatal enter-
prises (such as China), they remain centrally controlled by the government. Not all
pieces of critical infrastructure, however, are universally valued across states. For
instance, diverging state opinions over the ideal relationship between the citizen
and the Internet has changed what states may consider critical infrastructure.
Indeed, one accomplished Chinese academic with senior-level party connections
noted to the authors that their ”Great Fire Wall,” which restricts citizen access to
Western media sources, is considered part of China’s critical infrastructure.44 In
this case, attacking a vital node that the state links to regime stability would be sig-
nificantly costlier for China than the destruction of other types of critical infra-
structure. Similarly, the recent hack of the US Democratic National Committee,
allegedly committed by Russia or Russian-sponsored groups, is an example of how
a state could target a critical component of a democratic regime—its electoral sys-
tem.45 This creates the potential for unintended escalation dynamics if the coercing
state did not accurately calculate the extent to which the target values its electoral
process.
Military capabilities may also be targeted by cyber attacks. These targets include
everything from software running on advanced avionic platforms, to air defense
42“National Infrastructure Protection Plan: Partnering to Enhance Protection and Resiliency,” Department of Homeland
Security, 2009, https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/NIPP_Plan.pdf.
43Control Systems are defined as, “Computer-based systems used within many infrastructure and industries to moni-
tor and control sensitive processes and physical functions. These systems typically collect measurement and opera-
tional data from the field, process and display the information, and relay control commands to local or remote
equipment or human-machine interfaces (operators),” ibid., 109.
44Professor at Peking University, Beijing, China, in discussion with the authors, 17 June 2015.
45David E. Sanger and Eric Schmitt, “Spy Agency Consensus Grows That Russia Hacked D.N.C.,” New York Times, 26 July
2016.
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assets, communication systems, and satellites tied into the Global Positioning
System (GPS). Setting one’s cyber sights on these military systems is similar in
terms of costliness to targeting civilian critical infrastructure in that both are cus-
tom engineered and are typically difficult to gain access to and, therefore, mandate
a highly tailored capability to exploit. Additionally, given that military systems are
designed to be used during times of conflict, they tend to be more secure than civil-
ian infrastructure because they are created with the expectation that they may be
attacked via cyber means and, therefore, there is a greater emphasis placed on
survivability and resilience early on in the development cycle.
From the target’s perspective, attacks against critical national infrastructure and
military capabilities are the most costly types of attacks, precisely because govern-
ments rely on these to survive in the international system and perform their basic
functions. Coercing states may also choose to target the corporate sector of another
state, depending on permissibility allowed by its own domestic legal regimes. Tar-
gets could include the online banking ability of a particular bank, the network of a
leading defense contractor, or consumer information held by retailers. There is
variation in terms of the cost to a coercer of targeting a particular company or sec-
tor of the economy, and this variation is largely a function of the resiliency and
defenses that private actors choose to incorporate into their networks and systems.
However, in terms of the perceived cost to the target state, generally speaking,
cyber attacks against a private company are of a lower magnitude than attacks
against critical national infrastructure and military capability, including command
and control capabilities. Therefore, these kinds of attacks would only be useful to
coerce a target state into conceding on relatively minor issues, if at all. This is anal-
ogous to conventional domains—dropping ordnance on a Walmart is fundamen-
tally different from dropping ordnance on a communications node. However,
there are two important caveats to this analysis. First, there may be some reputa-
tional costs a target may incur if attacks against certain private sectors actors are
perceived to undermine the legitimacy of the regime. Second, there is likely to be
important variation stemming from regime type, because some kleptocratic states
may rely on the support of key industries or even companies to maintain regime
stability. In these cases, attacks against business or industry may be comparable in
terms of perceived cost to attacks against critical national infrastructure.
Regardless of the nature of the target, when sending a coercive signal in cyberspace,
a policymaker must decide if she wants to produce a disruptive or destructive effect,
the most salient distinction in the domain. Thus, a policymaker employing cyber
attacks as a coercive instrument of state power must make a calculation of what effect
is necessary to achieve the desired outcome. Destructive cyber attacks take two forms:
the rare cyber attacks that generate an effect felt in the physical world, and the more
common destruction of digital information, which can be almost as dire as a physical
attack for many pieces of infrastructure. Disruptive attacks, conversely, seek to opera-
tionally diminish a system to the point that a user lacks confidence in its ability to per-
form some function. The latter may be more appealing to a coercing government
462 E. D. BORGHARD AND S. W. LONERGAN
176
because disruptive attacks enable functionality of the affected system to be restored
once the attack is ceased and, thus, may aid in reassuring the target state, as will be dis-
cussed in a later section. Notwithstanding the above discussion, states may be unable
to perfectly tailor a cyber signal to affect a target’s cost–benefit calculus. In other words,
the technical complexities of certain types of costly operations may force less capable
states into sending less costly signals that don’t sufficiently alter the target’s calcula-
tions. Governments may find cheap, fast, and easy cyber operations appealing even
when they are less effective for the purposes of coercion. Put simply, governments
may hit what they can get, rather than the optimal target to coerce another state.
Credibility
Beyond being costly, a coercer’s threat must be credible—the target must believe
that the coercer will actually carry it out. A threat is credible if it is in a state’s inter-
ests to carry it out and if that state has both the capability and the resolve, or politi-
cal will, to do so.46 Credibility is arguably one of the most difficult aspects of
coercion, which is why Schelling devotes an entire chapter of Arms and Influence
to “the threats that are hard to make, the ones that are not so inherently credi-
ble.”47 While it is challenging to assess a coercing state’s ability to carry out a
threat, it is even more difficult to discern and demonstrate resolve.48 Furthermore,
in games of chicken, testing resolve through the limited application of force only
tends to harden resolve even more, because the very act of probing resolve engages
a state’s political legitimacy and reputation, making leaders more likely to dig in
before they give in.49 A target may doubt a coercer’s resolve because it doesn’t
believe that it is in the latter’s interests to carry out the threat (this was particularly
important in the context of nuclear deterrence); or because it doubts that the leader
has sufficient domestic political support to carry out the threat;50 or because the
coercer has not established a reputation for carrying out past threats.51 How indi-
viduals actually assess credibility, however, is poorly understood.52
Because credibility is difficult to convey but essential for coercion, states attempt to
enhance the credibility of their threats by making them costly—through sending costly
46Schelling, Arms and Influence, 36.
47Ibid. Of course, one of the reasons Schelling found credibility so confounding was the problem of coercion in the
nuclear age, where carrying out a threat would mean immeasurable costs to oneself as well as one’s adversary.
48Stephen Biddle, for example, discusses how assessing the raw, quantifiable capabilities of states’ militaries is a poor
predictor of battlefield outcomes because it does not take into account force employment. See Stephen Biddle, Mili-
tary Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006). For diffi-
culties ascertaining resolve, see Art, “Coercive Diplomacy,” 365.
49Ibid., 365–66. See also Snyder and Diesing, Conflict Among Nations, 118–22.
50Randall L. Schweller, Unanswered Threats: Political Constraints on the Balance of Power (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Uni-
versity Press, 2008).
51Schelling asserts that a country’s image—others’ expectations about how it is likely to behave—is “one of the few
things worth fighting for.” This is due to what Schelling describes as the interdependence of threats. See Schelling,
Arms and Influence, 124, 55–59. Also see Herman Kahn, On Thermonuclear War (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 1960), 566. For a critique of the importance of having a reputation for resolve, see Jonathan Mercer, Reputa-
tion and International Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996).
52Robert Jervis, “Deterrence and Perception,” International Security 7, no. 3 (Winter 1982–1983): 9.
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signals. James D. Fearon asserts that, “to be credible, a threat must have some cost or
risk attached to it that might discourage an unresolved state from making it.”53 That’s
because talk is cheap: “words are cheap, not inherently credible when they emanate
from an adversary, and sometimes too intimate a mode of expression.”54 There are
two mechanisms states can employ to generate costly and, therefore, credible signals.
First, states can tie their hands, limiting their choices and increasing the costs of back-
ing down in the event the target of coercion does not comply with the terms of the
threat. Second, states can sink costs, taking actions that are costly up front, such as
mobilizing troops.55 Using a similar framework, Robert Jervis describes how states can
use indices to generate costly signals. Indices are “behaviors (either verbal or nonver-
bal) that the perceiver believes are inextricably linked to a characteristic that helps pre-
dict what the actor will do in the future.”56 Democracies, it has been argued, may have
an advantage in costly signaling because they can more easily tie their hands through
incurring audience costs.57 Generating costly signals does not come without risks—
indeed, costly signaling, paradoxically, is designed to increase the risk of war through
locking in coercers to the use of force in order to (hopefully) avoid it.58 Furthermore,
there are myriad reasons states may seek to avoid a perfectly committing threat
through sending an unambiguous costly signal, as previously noted.
Credibility in Cyberspace
As the coercion literature has elucidated, making a credible threat requires both the
capability to impose the threatened cost and the will to employ it if the party to be
influenced does not comply with the issuer’s demands. Credibility in cyberspace
could be established via two mechanisms. First, establishing indices could create a
venue for states to better communicate and demonstrate capability. However, indi-
ces of cyber power do not yet exist and are likely to be difficult to form. Therefore,
at present, credibility is most likely to be inferred through costly signaling.
Cyber Power Indices
Establishing indices of cyber power contributes to the credibility of threats in
cyberspace because it helps ascertain a state’s capability.59 Perfect information of
another state’s cyber capabilities does not exist; therefore, indices facilitate a state’s
53James D. Fearon, “Signaling Foreign Policy Interests: Tying Hands Versus Sinking Costs,” Journal of Conflict Resolution
41, no. 1 (February 1997): 69.
54Schelling, Arms and Influence, 150.
55Fearon, “Signaling Foreign Policy Interests,” 70. Schelling also refers to these dynamics in his discussion of commit-
ment through the use of bridge burning, trip wire forces, plate glass windows, and engaging a nation’s honor and
prestige through public commitments. Schelling, Arms and Influence, 44–49.
56Jervis, “Signaling and Perception,” 300.
57The idea that democracies have an advantage in costly signaling has been the conventional wisdom in the litera-
ture, although Jessica L. Weeks argues that autocratic regimes are also capable of generating audience costs. Jessica
L. Weeks, “Autocratic Audience Costs: Regime Type and Signaling Resolve,” International Organization 62, no. 1
(Winter 2008): 35–64. For a different critique of audience costs logic, see Snyder and Borghard, “The Cost of Empty
Threats.”
58Fearon, “Signaling Foreign Policy Interests,” 82–83.
59Robert Jervis, The Logic of Images in International Relations, 26–28.
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assessment of another state’s ability to carry out threats. In cyberspace, these indi-
ces include budgets, growing and training cyber forces, establishing commands,
and advertising participation in major cyber exercises.60 When assessing capabili-
ties in cyberspace, it is also critical to analyze how the latter would be employed. In
particular, states in this domain may feel less constrained by international laws
and norms (or even the threat of assured retaliation because, as this analysis dem-
onstrates, these threats are difficult to credibly convey). This is because actors in
the cyber domain tend to prefer to obfuscate their identities, leading some state
actors to be more willing to act in ways that they would not otherwise be willing to
on a battlefield or via formal diplomatic channels.
Estimating the capability of a cyberspace actor is a conundrum that has chal-
lenged scholars because the opaque nature of the domain confounds measurement
efforts.61 In the nuclear and chemical warfare arenas, there are methods to estimate
the stockpiles of arms a nation holds and for which there exist treaties, accords,
and international oversight institutions that monitor and limit the quantities of
these weapons. However, in the cyber world there is no measure of relative
strength; one cannot simply count the number of cyber tools the way one can
count the number of warheads or the pounds of poison gas a country possesses.
This is because offensive cyber capabilities are not universally lethal. A shroud of
secrecy surrounds a nation-state’s cyber capability and, therefore, creates a situa-
tion of imperfect information from which a policymaker must judge another state’s
actions and intent. Unlike in the conventional or nuclear realms, where states can
reveal their capabilities to bolster credibility (or where the technology necessitates
public tests to assess their effectiveness, such as nuclear tests), in the cyber realm
states typically prefer to—and can—keep capabilities secret because revealing them
would enable adversaries to defend against them and render the capabilities impo-
tent. In other words, it is harder for states to reveal private information in cyber-
space to enhance the credibility of their threats.62 Moreover, governments face
unique difficulties deriving intent based on observed capabilities because many
states in the cyber domain find themselves coercing with the weapons they have,
rather than the ones they may want or need. In other words, there may be a large
gap between capabilities and intent. A distinction should be made here between
what a state can measure about its own cyber capabilities and what its adversaries
can assess. Measuring a rival’s military strength has always been more difficult
than introspective assessment due to military secrecy. However, the difference in
cyberspace is that self-assessments of cyber capabilities (at least currently) also
happen to be much harder to conduct because effective metrics have yet to be
60It general sense, it may be easier for democracies to showcase their level of cyber power due to greater institution-
alized transparency over military organizations and budgets compared to authoritarian regimes.
61For example, see H. J. Seo, Yoon-Cheol Choy, and SoonJa Hong, “A Study on the Methodology to Evaluate the Level
of Nation’s Capability for Cyber War” (paper presented at the 12th Annual International Workshop on Information
Security Applications, Korea, August 2011).
62The authors are grateful to Robert Jervis for clarifying this point.
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devised. This, in turn, makes assessing another state’s cyber-military might even
more difficult than for other domains and types of weapons.
Furthermore, measures of cyber power include factors beyond raw estimates of
the size of cyber forces. While human capital and skill levels are important contrib-
utors to capability in the conventional domain, they are arguably even more vital in
the cyber domain. Simply counting the number of cyber forces that a country may
openly report as an assessment of cyber power does not take into account the dif-
ferences in skill levels and a state’s relative depth of cyber operations. A lack of
homogeneity of material resources and technically proficient human capital across
states means that one cannot precisely compare cyber capabilities between states.
Comparing quantities of cyber forces is akin to comparing quantities of ships in a
navy without distinguishing between tugboats and aircraft carriers. Regime type
also factors into capabilities. Some states, such as Russia and China, place a greater
emphasis on developing cyber forces to monitor their citizenry to detect unrest
and preserve regime stability. From a technical standpoint, these operations are
markedly different from conducting a destructive cyber attack against a state
adversary. Democratic states have the advantage of devoting fewer cyber resources
to population monitoring and, therefore, are freer to invest in adversary-centric
capabilities.63 Finally, what matters for capability in cyberspace is having the right
operator, armed with the right capability, with access to a vulnerable target, rather
than a numerical advantage. Capability and access imply that, regardless of how
skilled an individual operator is, she will always be constrained by the cyber tools
with which she has been equipped.
Cyber Operations as Costly Signals
In order to bolster the credibility of a threat, states often engage in costly signaling
that ranges from national leaders’ threats and troop mobilizations, to onshore trip
wires, to the movement of aircraft carriers during times of crises.64 All of these serve
63Authoritarian states have gone to extensive efforts to institute hierarchies in their Internet infrastructure so that
they can keep their citizens from accessing material that they deem may threaten regime stability. However, the
West has pursued a free and open Internet that is largely devoid of state censorship. These conflicting visions for
the Internet was evident in the 2012 breakdown of the United Nation’s International Telecommunications Union’s
World Conference on International Communication (WCIT) when, in the wake of Arab Spring, many Middle Eastern
states joined a voting bloc led by China and Russia to press for a treaty that limited the openness of the Internet
and removed protections on free speech and human rights. In response, Canada, the United States, and many Euro-
pean states refused to ratify the treaty. This divide has given rise to extensive debates about Internet governance,
state sovereignty in cyberspace, and the “Balkanization” of the Internet. See James D. Fielder, “The Internet and Dis-
sent in Authoritarian State,” in Conflict and Cooperation in Cyberspace: The Challenge to National Security, ed. Panayo-
tis A. Yannakogeorgos and Adam B. Lowther (Boca Raton, FL: Taylor and Francis, 2014); Daniel W. Drezner, “The
Global Governance of the Internet: Bringing the State Back In,” Political Science Quarterly 119, no. 3 (Fall 2004): 477–
498; Stephen K. Gourley, “Cyber Sovereignty,” in Conflict and Cooperation in Cyberspace; Michael N. Schmitt, ed., Tal-
linn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013);
Dana Polatin-Reuben, and Joss Wright, “An Internet with Brics Characteristics: Data Sovereignty and the Balkanisa-
tion of the Internet” (paper presented at the 4th USENIX Workshop on Free and Open Communications on the Inter-
net, San Diego, CA, 18 August 2014).
64Fearon, “Signaling Foreign Policy Interests.” Schelling, Arms and Influence. Christian Le Miere, “The Return of Gun-
boat Diplomacy,” Survival 53, no. 5 (October–November 2011): 53–68. Dr. Strangelove’s Doomsday machine is per-
haps the ideal embodiment of Schelling’s perfect coercive capacity. We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for
making this analogy.
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to demonstrate a state’s capability and willingness to follow through with the terms
of a threat. The greater the cost to the initiating state of producing a given signal,
ceteris paribus, the more effective the signal is as an indication of the initiating state’s
resolve. Therefore, leaders could use cyber operations to convey their commitment
to a particular course of action if they are sufficiently costly to produce.66 Not all
cyber operations are equally costly for the coercing state, however. Some operations
are resource intensive, whereas other types of operations, such as a Distributed
Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks and website defacements, can be conducted using
minimal resources. In this regard, it is helpful to conceptualize interstate cyber signal-
ing as existing along a spectrum where the greater the resource requirements, the
costlier the signal is to produce, and the more resolve it demonstrates.
As Figure 1 demonstrates, states could send signals via five broad categories of cyber
attacks that are increasingly costly. The cheapest way to attack another entity is to con-
duct a DDoS attack. This is an operation where multiple compromised systems are
Figure 1. Spectrum of coercive cyber operations.65
65Several of the examples provided in this graphic include cyber operations conducted by nonstate actors that were
not necessarily coercive cyber operations. Though this study addresses state-initiated cyber operations, the listed
examples are used to provide the reader with highly publicized cyber operations to assist with conceptualization.
Furthermore, note the gap between the attacks against the Sands Casino and Saudi Aramco on the one hand, and
Stuxnet on the other. There is a dramatic capability difference between the former examples and Stuxnet, which is
assessed to have taken the work of thousands of individuals and millions of dollars over a several year time span.
For further reference to the complexity of Stuxnet and the resources necessary to develop such a capability, see
Ralph Langner, “Stuxnet’s Secret Twin,” Foreign Policy, 19 November 2013. Furthermore, it is important to note that
there can be exceptions to the linear increase in costs depicted in this graphic. In other words, some types of attacks
may be relatively more costly than how they are categorized in this graphic under unique conditions. For example, a
DDoS attack against an extremely hardened target may be more costly to carry out than gaining access to a social
media account.
66Though nonstate actors may engage in these activities, the scope of this article is limited to state-to-state
exchanges. Furthermore, while Fearon discusses both tying hands and sinking costs as mechanisms for generating
costly signals, we focus on cyber operations as sunk costs because the tying hands logic is a poor fit for the cyber
domain. The only likely allegory to tying hands in cyberspace is the ability, in some instances, to create automaticity
by initiating an autonomous offensive cyber response.
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directed by a central computer to flood another computer with information requests.
When enough compromised computers are connected together they act as one botnet
(a network of enslaved information technology devices that can be centrally controlled)
and, if the network is large enough, it may overwhelm the processing capabilities of the
intended target and force it to shut down. Examples of this include the alleged Iranian-
based DDoS attacks against the US financial sector in 2013, which took down the retail
pages of over twenty-six corporations over a four-month time span.67 These operations
are on the far left of the spectrum because they are not inherently expensive to conduct
(even though theymay force the target to absorb high costs). The current going rate for
a 24-hour DDoS attack is approximately $400–800 USD on the black market, depend-
ing on the size of the botnet being employed.68 Furthermore, these operations are access
agnostic in that, in order to conduct the operation, the attacker does not have to be pre-
positioned with a back door into the target’s network to facilitate the attack.
To send a costlier signal, a state could engage in operations designed to hack
user accounts, including email and social media accounts. These are slightly cost-
lier than DDoS attacks because they involve acquiring the credentials of an individ-
ual with access to the specific target (unless, in the unlikely scenario, the
perpetrator can guess the target account’s password). A well-known example of
this is the 2013 hack of the Associated Press’s Twitter feed, where hackers tweeted
that there were two explosions in the White House and that the president was
injured, prompting volatility in the stock market.69
Website defacement represents an additional level of cost for several reasons.
First, it requires a minimal level of knowledge of webpage design coding. Second,
website defacements involve delivering an effect to produce the observed deface-
ment or redirection. Third, it is dependent on gaining access to the website admin-
istrator’s account. Notable examples include the defacement of the United States
Army’s official website in 2015 and the Syrian Electronic Army’s hack of a Wash-
ington Post website in 2015.70
Even more costly is gaining privileged access to internal networks for the purposes
of data theft. This is more difficult than gaining access to a typical end user’s account
because it often relies on gaining access to internal systems and data repositories to
which end users typically lack access. Most companies limit privileged accesses of
this nature and compartmentalize this kind of information due to the potential con-
sequences of a breach perpetrated against even a single actor with such extraordinary
accesses (or by the actor herself). There is also an element of scale in these types of
cases because attackers can acquire large amounts of private information, such as the
contents of corporate email servers, billing records, personally identifiable
67Deloitte CIO Journal, “DDoS Attacks on U.S. Banks: Worst Yet to Come?” Wall Street Journal, 19 February 2013.
68Data comes from black markets accessed on the Dark Net on 17 March 2016. We are grateful to “BillyBear” for his
assistance with this.
69David Jackson, “AP Twitter Feed Hacked; No Attack at White House,” USA Today, 23 April 2013.
70Polly Mosendz, “Syrian Electronic Army Claims to Have Hacked US Army Website,” Newsweek, 8 June 2015. Brian
Fung, “The Syrian Electronic Army Just Hacked the Washington Post, Again,” Washington Post, 14 May 2015.
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information, and confidential information and documents pertaining to corporate
strategy and development efforts. Two well-publicized examples of this kind of attack
include the hack of the Department of Defense’s Office of Personnel Management in
2015, allegedly committed by China, which compromised the personal information
of nearly twenty-two million federal employees and their friends and family; and the
2014 attack against Sony Picture Entertainment, attributed by the US government to
North Korea, which released embarrassing corporate communications, policies, and
personally identifiable information of employees.71
The costliest type of signaling is a cyber attack that requires gaining access to
well-defended or closed networks and seeks to disrupt or destroy key systems.
Within this category, there is wide variation in the resources required to conduct
these operations. The cost depends on the complexity of the attack and the relative
difficulty of gaining access to the targeted systems. Since these types of operations
disrupt or destroy data, they require customized tools that will produce the desired
effect once inside the network. Furthermore, transacting in what is often a well-
defended, restricted area is difficult not only because of the code-based language of
exchange, but also because gaining access to closed and defended networks
requires a significant investment of materiel resources and human capital. This
investment includes not only the development of cyber tools to gain access to spe-
cific systems, but also the development of capabilities to exfiltrate information resi-
dent on the system and/or, more invasively, to completely subjugate the targeted
machine. This investment extends beyond the development of cyber arms; it also
requires extensive testing against a mockup of the intended target for both the
developer and eventual cyber operator. The combination of technical knowhow
with financial resources severely limits the number of states that can be called gen-
uine cyber powers—particularly since such investments may be long-term com-
mitments without guaranteed successful outcomes. Indeed, some cyber operations
may take years from the time the concept is conceived until the operation is imple-
mented. Operations that involve gaining access to hardened systems that use
closed networks not connected to the open Internet, such as the Stuxnet attack
against Iran to delay its uranium enrichment program, are significantly costly. In
the case of Stuxnet, custom-engineered cyber capabilities containing over fifteen
thousand lines of code were required to manipulate Iran’s customized Supervisory
Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems; this would certainly be costlier
than a cyber attack that simply deleted information from servers to which an actor
had gained access.72 In this example, the Stuxnet attack would be significantly
more costly to conduct than the 2012 Saudi Aramco breach, which destroyed data
71Julie Hirschfeld Davis, “Hacking of Government Computers Exposed 21.5 Million People,” New York Times, 9 July
2015. David E. Sanger and Nicole Perlroth, “U.S. Said to Find North Korea Ordered Cyberattack on Sony” New York
Times, 17 December 2014.
72Langner, “Stuxnet’s Secret Twin.” Eric Oliver, “Stuxnet: A Case Study in Cyberwarfare,” in Conflict and Cooperation in
Cyberspace. Jon R. Lindsay, “Stuxnet and the Limits of Cyber Warfare,” Security Studies 22, no. 3 (July–September
2013): 365–404.
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resident on over thirty thousand corporate computers, due to the time, material,
and personnel requirements that would be mandated by the former compared to
the later. Finally, this category of cyber attacks could require incurring the addi-
tional cost of gaining physical access to a network, particularly if it is closed,
through using human operators.73
Operating militarily in cyberspace requires a skill set that is not uniformly
distributed across all states and takes years to develop. Moreover, unlike tradi-
tional means of signaling, sending a signal via cyberspace is uniquely costly
because, once an attack capability is used, it often cannot be used again. While
it may be possible to replicate a capability, as already noted, there is little uni-
versality of cyber capabilities. Most critical targets are unique, and potential
victims can prevent exploitation once the threat signature has been identified
and incorporated into their defenses, which also compounds the difficulty of a
sustained assault. Furthermore, once these tools are deployed they have a lim-
ited lifespan as routine defensive techniques and vulnerability patching may
render a tool that took years to develop obsolete within seconds of
employment.
Governments can also generate costly signals through manipulating the
shared risk of war. This concept was championed by Schelling, who submits
that credibility can be enhanced by exhibiting risky behavior, particularly dur-
ing times of crisis.74 States can demonstrate resolve through acting in a man-
ner that increases the risk of war and/or increases political costs to the party
issuing the threat, but falls short of initiating an attack. For instance, a state
can raise the alert status of its forces or move naval fleets into close proximity
of an area of hostiles. Neither of these signals is inherently costly; however,
during a time of increased tension, such maneuvers increase the likelihood of
war due to the potential misperception of intent and miscalculation. Further-
more, leaders can generate political costs through tying hands. In other words,
politicians that are subjected to electoral sanctioning may generate self-
imposed reputational costs by committing themselves to a course of action,
which could put their political future in jeopardy if they waiver from it.75
In cyberspace, risk generation occurs by acting in overt ways that ensure the
receiver perceives the signal, but falls short of a cyber attack. These types of actions
include actively scanning networks, pinging pieces of key infrastructure, and per-
haps even deploying beacons on compromised infrastructure. These operations
can increase the risk of war because their intent cannot be surmised and could be
interpreted as a precursory step to offensive cyber operations. However, these
operations generate tradeoffs between intelligence collection and coercion strate-
gies that policymakers should take into account.
73Owens, Dam, and Lin, eds., Cyberattack Capabilities, 83–89.
74Schelling, Arms and Influence, chap. 3.
75Fearon, “Signaling Foreign Policy Interests.” For an alternative point of view, see Snyder and Borghard, “The Cost of
Empty Threats.”
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Reassurance
Finally, to succeed, a coercive threat must have an element of reassurance, such
that the target is made to believe that compliance with the terms of the threat will
ensure the coercer does not mete out the threatened punishment regardless.76 In
other words, “the pain and suffering have to appear contingent on his behavior; it
is not alone the threat that is effective—the threat of pain or loss if he fails to com-
ply—but the corresponding assurance, possibly an implicit one, that he can avoid
the pain or loss if he does comply.”77 Related to reassurance, Schelling also
describes the importance of saving face—leaving a backdoor that enables that
adversary to back down without paying too high a price in its own reputation and
integrity. Coercers should therefore deliver the threat in a way that “decouple[s] an
adversary’s prestige and reputation from a dispute.”78
Reassurance is also a difficult aspect of coercion. Todd S. Sechser argues that great
powers encounter problems reassuring weaker states that are the targets of compel-
lent threats because the very military capability that enhances the credibility of the
stronger state’s coercive threat makes it more difficult for the target to believe that
the stronger state won’t simply make more demands following the former’s compli-
ance with the initial threat.79 This sheds light on the inherent tension between the
actions that enhance credibility versus those that buttress reassurance; the more a
target believes the coercer will actually carry out a threat (credibility), the less likely
the target believes the coercer will refrain from doing so in the event she complies
(reassurance). Credibility is enhanced when the coercer is forced to inflict some pun-
ishment on a target in a way that makes it difficult for the coercer to back down or
renege—but the more likely it is that the target believes the coercer will use force,
the more insurmountable the task of simultaneously reassuring the target that the
threat will be walked back, especially if the coercer’s prestige and reputation are
engaged in the process of enhancing credibility. In a similar vein, reassurance can be
difficult for domestic political reasons; the leader of the coercing state may worry
that sending a reassuring signal to an adversary in the context of a crisis situation
makes her look weak and irresolute to her domestic public.80
Reassurance in Cyberspace
Assuring a target state that, once it capitulates to the aggressor’s demands, the pun-
ishment will cease is perhaps the greatest obstacle to successful coercion in cyber-
space. Effective command and control of a cyber attack are essential for
reassurance. However, this is often exceedingly difficult in cyberspace depending
76For a broader discussion of assurance strategies, see Jeffrey W. Knopf, “Varieties of Assurance,” Journal of Strategic
Studies 35, no. 3 (April 2002): 375–399.
77Schelling, Arms and Influence, 4.
78Ibid., 125.
79Sechser, “Goliath’s Curse.
80If this is the case, it would imply that democracies may encounter greater difficulties than autocracies when it
comes to reassurance.
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on how and by whom an attack is carried out. For instance, 128 distinct cyber
attacks were recorded against Estonian websites during May 2007 in response to
the Estonian government’s decision to relocate a Soviet-era war monument.81
Since these assaults lacked a centralized controller, it would have been difficult for
a unitary actor to provide the Estonian government with a credible assurance that
the attacks would cease if the statue were returned to its original location (if we
can assume this was the objective of the attacks). Furthermore, many states choose
to employ cyber proxies to conduct cyber operations because they may not have
the means to conduct the operation themselves or desire plausible deniability.
Proxies may not act in the way a government desires depending on the proxy’s
incentives for participating in the attack and a government’s ability to incentivize
good behavior.82 Furthermore, once the attack tool is released, it may be exceed-
ingly difficult to stop. For instance, the Stuxnet computer virus was presumably
never intended to propagate beyond Iranian nuclear centrifuges, but it infected
over 100,000 computers worldwide before it could be stopped.83 Due to the techni-
cal complexities of cyber capabilities and the collective action issues that may sur-
round command and control of a cyber attack, a rational actor would be wise to
second guess a reassurance that an assault will stop in exchange for submission.
A unique paradox occurs as an implication of this analysis. The ideal means to
reassure a target is to engage in a disruptive cyber attack. Disruptive attacks are
easily reversible and can, therefore, be credibly revoked if a target complies with a
coercer’s demands. However, disruptive attacks are not particularly costly and,
therefore, are less credible than a destructive attack. A destructive attack can
deliver an immediate effect, and it also generates irreversible costs to the target
that can increase over time. Together, this implies that a coercive cyber attack that
both reassures and maximizes costs for the target may be unachievable.
Assessing Warfighting Strategies in Cyberspace84
As the above discussion illustrates, cyber power is not an ideal independent tool of
coercion. Nevertheless, governments may still choose to use cyber power to pursue
warfighting strategies aimed at eroding a target’s ability or willingness to resist due
to the perceived ease or cost effectiveness of conducting cyber operations as
opposed to conventional ones, particularly under conditions of conventional asym-
metry—as well as their destructive nature in many cases.85 In this section, we
81Andreas Schmidt, “The Estonian Cyberattacks,” in A Fierce Domain: Conflict in Cyberspace, 1986 to 2012, ed. Jason
Healey (Vienna, VA: Cyber Conflict Studies Association, 2013), 182.
82For further reference, see Erica D. Borghard and Shawn W. Lonergan, “Can States Calculate the Risks of Using Cyber
Proxies?” Orbis 60, no. 3 (Summer 2016): 395–416.
83Kim Zetter, “Report: Obama Ordered Stuxnet to Continue After Bug Caused It to Spread Wildly,” Wired, 1 June 2012.
84For further discussion of the likely impact of cyber on strategy in general, see Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “Nuclear Lessons for
Cyber Security?” Strategic Studies Quarterly (Winter 2011): 18–36.
85Anti-Access/Area-Denial strategies currently pursed by states to thwart the movement and maneuver of conven-
tionally superior militaries in a theater of operations typically contain a strong element of cyber power. See, for
example, Erica D. Borghard and Shawn W. Lonergan, “Will Air-Sea Battle Be ‘Sunk’ by Cyberwarriors?” National Inter-
est, 8 December 2014.
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analyze the viability and effectiveness of the six most prominent warfighting strate-
gies that have been explored in the coercion literature and apply them to the cyber
domain: attrition, denial, decapitation, intimidation, punishment, and risk. In par-
ticular, we discuss the extent to which these strategies are viable based on the cur-
rent state of the field, as well as the extent to which they can generate sufficient
costs to be theoretically effective.87 We define viability in terms of whether the
strategy is technically feasible based on known, existing capabilities.88 We define
effectiveness in terms of whether the strategy can generate sufficient costs to
change state behavior. This is conditional on several things: on the target side,
whether a target’s systems are vulnerable, whether the systems themselves have
resiliency, and whether the target as a whole has resiliency beyond the affected sys-
tem(s) (that is, how dependent the target is on a particular set of cyber-enabled
services or capabilities); and on the coercer’s side, how costly the attack is to con-
duct in material, personnel, and political terms. Together, two dimensions of via-
bility and effectiveness form a 2 £ 2 matrix according to which the six strategies
can be assessed, as depicted in Table 1.
Viable and Effective Strategies
Currently, we argue that there are three warfighting strategies that are likely to suc-
ceed using cyber power: attrition, denial, and decapitation. We claim that govern-
ments are most likely to achieve desired objectives using these strategies because
the technical requirements and capabilities for carrying out these operations in
cyberspace exist and because they can generate sufficient costs (in theory) to force
a target government to concede. However, it is imperative to note that this discus-
sion remains theoretical and its efficacy in practice is highly context dependent—
whether a given government will concede to the demands of a coercing state will
depend on the particular cost–benefit calculus it makes for a specific situation.
While attrition, denial, and decapitation have different logics, what unites them is
their discrete military application—these strategies are generally employed against
military targets—and they are most likely to be successful when coupled with







86As is the case with conventional coercion, these capabilities may vary tremendously across states. In fact, this is
especially likely in an emergent domain.
87Given the relative newness of these strategies, much of this discussion remains theoretical rather than applied.
88Of course, this is liable to change as the state of technology changes.
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conventional military operations and/or diplomacy. In other words, the use of
cyber power to undermine a government’s ability or willingness to resist is not as
effective in isolation from other instruments of state power.
Attrition
Attrition strategies seek to erode the adversary’s military capability such that the
target can no longer resist. Within the cyber domain, this strategy could include
attacks that both degrade and destroy government or private networks and sys-
tems, depending on the latter’s military utility. In cyberspace, the successful appli-
cation of an attrition strategy would force a target to abandon a network or system
through destroying it or building up a user’s mistrust in it such that the target is
forced to abandon its operation. A notable attribute of attrition strategies is that
they seek to exhaust a target state’s resources as it is forced to dedicate assets to
protect or replicate capabilities in different and more secure manners. In particu-
lar, cyber raiding—targeting an enemy in its weakest areas—is a common tactic of
attrition, where data is the equivalent of an enemy’s provisions. Conventionally,
raiding refers to stealing or destroying an enemy’s provisions or equipment. These
forays are commonly conducted behind an adversary’s lines and are directed
against their supply convoys and depots. In cyberspace, destroying or corrupting
servers that handle military plans, air or ship tasking orders, or even defense devel-
opmental efforts, can prevent certain actions from occurring at the time they are
urgently needed. More importantly, if they persist they will eventually erode a
state’s confidence in its networks and the data resident on them. It is difficult, if
not impossible, to destroy a state’s militarily capabilities through the exercise of
cyber power alone. However, it is theoretically possible to force a state to suffer the
gradual erosion of its capabilities—especially of its confidence in them—as vulner-
able targets are attacked and as governments are forced to divert considerable
resources to investigating and repairing them until the cost of continued resistance
becomes unbearable.
Denial
A denial strategy involves increasing the costs to an adversary such that achieving a
military objective—such as taking a piece of territory—becomes prohibitive or
impossible.89 As such, it could involve both a defensive component (increasing
one’s own defenses such that an adversary cannot go on the offense without incur-
ring significant costs), as well as an offensive one (actively taking out enemy capa-
bilities to deny the adversary the ability to achieve an objective).90 In cyberspace,
the targets of denial strategies mirror those of traditional domains of warfare,
except that the effect achieved is delivered via a cyber operation. An adversary’s
89Robert Pape defines coercion by denial as “using military means to prevent the target from attaining its political
objectives or territorial goals.” Bombing to Win, 13.
90Byman and Waxman, Dynamics of Coercion, 78–82.
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Integrated Air Defense Systems (IADS), command and control apparatuses, and
air traffic control systems are all examples of legitimate targets for a state pursuing
a denial strategy. An example of using cyber means (coupled, in this case, with
conventional military power) to target an adversary’s air defense systems is the
alleged 2007 Israeli air attack against Syria’s nuclear facilities.91 Unlike conven-
tional approaches to denial, in cyberspace, due to the increasing reliance of embed-
ded technology in many modern battlefield systems, the surface from which these
systems can be attacked has significantly increased. For instance, in conventional
warfare the only way to remove tanks from a battlefield is to destroy them piece-
meal from the air or ground. However, theoretically, it may be possible in the not
too distant future (if not already) to use a cyber attack to render entire fleets of
weapon systems inert at a critical moment. This concern has already been realized
by many policymakers and is evident in the discussion over Chinese cyber espio-
nage of the research and development of the Joint Strike Fighter.92 On the other
hand, the length of the timeframe under consideration could affect assessments of
the potential costliness of denial strategies in cyberspace. For instance, cyber
instruments could be used to disable, rather than destroy, an adversary’s weapons
systems or command and control, rendering an attack costly in the short term but
less costly than the ostensibly permanent destruction of those systems through
conventional means.93
Decapitation
Decapitation strategies seek to achieve strategic paralysis by targeting command
and control centers, leadership, critical economic nodes, and key weapons sys-
tems.94 Currently, it is technically possible to use cyber attacks to shut down a
command and control node. However, given that most states employ secondary
and tertiary redundant systems (for example, analogue or even courier-based com-
munication), as well as separate communication networks (for example, multiple
classified and unclassified networks), the impact of this type of operation could be
short lived. Nevertheless, successfully targeting a critical command and control
node, such as the US government’s Secure Internet Protocol Router Network
(SIPRNET) or Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (JWICS),
would have immediate and significant material and psychological effects. There-
fore, governments should either take into account temporal limitations when tar-
geting command and control networks, or ensure that they also target all
additional means of adversary communication. Conventional military operations
that target command and control facilities can wipe out entire communications
networks, for example, through dropping ordnance on a facility. In contrast, cyber
91Clarke and Knake, Cyber War, 1–8.
92David E. Sanger, “With Spy Charges, U.S. Draws a Line That Few Others Recognize,” New York Times, 19 May 2014.
93The authors are grateful to Robert Jervis for pointing this out.
94Pape, Bombing to Win, 79.
THE LOGIC OF COERCION IN CYBERSPACE 475
189
operations can typically target a single or limited number of communications
nodes or networks due to the compartmentalized nature of each network. This
would therefore require multiple distinct cyber operations to achieve near-com-
plete command and control paralysis. Furthermore, even if cyber attacks could be
used to successfully target a government’s primary communications networks,
backup systems would likely need to be defeated through traditional forms of elec-
tronic warfare or conventional operations (for example, jamming transmissions,
capturing curriers, or cutting telephone lines or undersea cables). Altogether, this
analysis implies that one is more likely to observe decapitation strategies employed
at lower echelons of command, such as troops in the field, where there are typically
fewer redundant systems, or against less-capable state adversaries.
Viable and Ineffective Strategies
Warfighting strategies in cyberspace can be technically viable but ineffective because
they cannot force the adversary to incur sufficiently high costs to prompt a change in
her behavior. Much of the activity that currently occurs in cyberspace falls into this cat-
egory—actors can harass, annoy, or otherwise inconvenience each other. Indeed, those
who claim that the threat of a cyber Armageddon is exaggerated focus on these kinds of
cyber attacks.95
Intimidation
An intimidation strategy is designed to directly address a state’s domestic audiences
and sometimes, national policymakers. Actions as part of an intimidation strategy
do not cause significant damage and are typically tailored to undermine a govern-
ment’s legitimacy or convince domestic audiences that the government is powerless,
prompting a loss of confidence by the public.96 In cyberspace, intimidation typically
takes the form of website defacement and email spamming campaigns. While these
operations are technically easy to conduct because they involve fewer resources and
a lower skill set compared to other types of operations, they cause minimal cost to
the recipient. The effect these attacks produce is typically perceived as an annoyance,
rather than a strategic message, because these types of attacks are fairly common
and easy from which to recover. Therefore, they are unlikely to be sufficiently costly
to force targeted governments to change their behavior. Indeed, observed intimida-
tion strategies, such as the 2008 defacements of Georgian government websites
portraying President Mikheil Saakashvili as Adolf Hitler, have had no real effect.97
95Thomas Rid, Cyber War Will Not Take Place (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), xiv–xv.
96Andrew H. Kydd, and Barbara F. Walter, “The Strategies of Terrorism,” International Security 31, no. 1 (Summer 2006):
66.
97Jeffrey Carr, Inside Cyber Warfare, 2nd ed. (Sebastopol, CA: O’Reilly, 2012), 183–84. Andreas Hagen, “The Russo-Geor-
gian War 2008,” A Fierce Domain, ed. Healy. Ronald J. Deibert, Rafal Rohozinski, and Masashi Crete–Nishihata,
“Cyclones in Cyberspace: Information Shaping and Denial in the 2008 Russia–Georgia War,” Security Dialogue 43,
no. 1 (February 2012): 3–24.
476 E. D. BORGHARD AND S. W. LONERGAN
190
Nonviable and Ineffective Strategies
The two paradigmatic strategies of traditional coercion that currently have the least
utility in cyberspace are punishment and risk. While there has been considerable brou-
haha in public and even government spheres regarding the potentially dire consequen-
ces of a “World War 3.0” or a “cyber Pearl Harbor,” these are largely unrealistic given
the current state of the domain.98 However, as we will describe below, changes in mod-
ern societies’ interconnectivity and reliance on automated systems, as well as advances
in military cyber technologies, could change the value of these strategies.99
Punishment
Originally stemming from the work of Giulio Douhet, an Italian general and early
proponent of the strategic use of air power, punishment strategies are designed to
inflict sudden, large-sale pain and devastation on an adversary’s civilian population
until the panic-stricken citizenry demands an end to the war.100 Indeed, Douhet
envisioned that a single successful air raid on an enemy’s population center could”
… spread terror through the nation and quickly break down [a state’s] material
and moral resistance.”101 This concept was further refined by Schelling and mod-
ern coercion theorists, who applied it to the strategic use of nuclear weapons; hold-
ing an adversary’s population at risk of extreme destruction is the foundation of
modern deterrence theory.102
In theory, inflicting punishment in cyberspace would involve the use of cyber
power to cause virtual and physical damage to civilian infrastructure and population
centers. This could entail attacks against essential services, such as water treatment
facilities, transportation, air traffic control systems, nuclear power plants, electrical
grids, food safety systems, waste management systems, etc. However, in practice,
there are two critical elements of punishment that cannot be sustained given the
current nature of the cyber domain: first, the immediate and sudden nature of an
attack; and second, the scale and scope of the pain. Put simply, governments cannot
kill a lot of people in a very short period of time using cyber weapons; the magni-
tude of the pain states are currently capable of inflicting via the cyber domain alone
is hardly comparable to the devastation wrought by conventional or nuclear attacks
against cities. Access requirements and the customized nature of cyber capabilities
render it nearly impossible to launch a time-dependent, highly coordinated cyber
campaign of the scale required to inflict severe costs on enemy populations. The
scope is also nearly impossible to achieve because it would require an extraordinarily
98See Michael Joseph Gross, “World War 3.0,” Vanity Fair, 30 March 2012; Erik Gartzke, “The Myth of Cyberwar: Bring-
ing War in Cyberspace Back Down to Earth,” International Security 38, no. 2 (Fall 2013): 41–73.
99The utility of punishment or risk strategies in general is beyond the scope of this discussion.
100Giulio Douhet, The Command of the Air, trans. Dino Ferrari (New York: Coward-McCann, 1942), 57–58.
101Ibid., 57.
102Beyond Schelling, see, for instance, Patrick M. Morgan, Deterrence: A Conceptual Analysis (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage
Publications, 1977); Robert Powell, Nuclear Deterrence Theory: The Search for Credibility (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 1990); Kahn, On Thermonuclear War.
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large number of discrete and distinct cyber attacks. As discussed in prior sections,
there is limited universal lethality of cyber weapons, which means that governments
would have to develop unique accesses and distinct tools for each targeted system.
Moreover, there is no guarantee that an effect can be delivered as planned. Addi-
tionally, it is difficult to envision a government entity being able to sustain a cyber
assault against multiple key pieces of infrastructure in order to push a society to a
breaking point before the target moves to mitigate the onslaught through preestab-
lished redundant mechanisms and/or cyber or kinetic military operations.
Manipulation of Risk
Punishment and risk are fundamentally related—both involve targeting an adver-
sary’s population centers to force the government to concede to the coercer’s
demands. However, unlike punishment strategies that call for immediate and deci-
sive destruction, risk strategies entail gradually escalating the intensity and scope
of attacks against civilian targets.103 There is a critical psychological element to the
manipulation of risk in that what drives concessions is the threat and prospect of
future pain. This requires that the coercing state can sustain and ratchet up an
assault over time.
Like punishment, the manipulation of risk does not translate well into cyber-
space. Carrying out a comprehensive, tiered cyber campaign plan to create the
ratcheting effect of punishment that Schelling proscribes is exceedingly difficult for
reasons already articulated. To wit, this would require a significant planning effort
and mandate a costly access and capability development program. Furthermore,
risk strategies do not rely upon the sudden and intense destruction that are envi-
sioned by punishment strategies, but instead are designed to be employed over
time. In order to be effective, the attack would have to be maintained against an
adversary that would likely be active in trying to stop or mitigate the effects of the
onslaught. Presumably, if a state is at the technical level where it is susceptible to
large-scale cyber attacks, it also has the wherewithal to defend against them over
time. Finally, the effective employment of a risk strategy in cyberspace would
require an impossibly high level of control by the coercing government over the
cyber tools it would employ against an adversary. According to Schelling, risk is
most likely to succeed when an action, “once initiated, causes minimal harm if
compliance is forthcoming and great harm if compliance is not forthcoming, is
consistent with the time schedule of feasible compliance, is beyond recall once ini-
tiated, and cannot be stopped by the party that started it but automatically stops
upon compliance, with all this fully understood by the adversary.”104 Indeed, the
risks of using cyber power—effects getting beyond the control of the initiating state
in unanticipated and potentially undesirable ways—are precisely the opposite of
the calibrated manipulation of risk Schelling envisions.
103Schelling, Arms and Influence, 3. Also see Pape’s discussion of manipulation of risk in Bombing to Win, 66–69.
104Schelling, Arms and Influence, 89. Italics in the original.
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Future Trends in Viability and Effectiveness
The negligible utility of punishment and risk strategies rests on the current state of
technology and the dependence (and, therefore, vulnerability) of modern societies
on cyber-enabled essential services. Changes along either of these dimensions—
technical viability and/or the costs that can be imposed on civilian populations—
would alter the feasibility and effectiveness of these strategies. For instance, the
dawn of the “Internet of Things” (a concept that depicts a not-too-distant future
where everything from an individual’s toaster and refrigerator to a city’s garbage
collection and other essential services are automated and connected to the Inter-
net) could make it possible for governments to impose high and devastating costs
on society through cyber means.105 Moreover, it is conceivable that, as societies
remove human redundancy through increased automation and become more
dependent on interconnected networks of services, punishment and risk strategies
could become more effective as the attack surface expands and more targets
become vulnerable to a cyber attack.
Additionally, punishment and risk strategies could become more viable due to
better investment in human capital, decreasing costs of planning and conducting
large-scale cyber campaigns, increased government spending on developing cyber
capabilities, and gaining and maintaining accesses to potential target sets, and the
unknown unknowns of potentially disruptive technological innovations that make
these attacks easier.
Strategic Implications of the Coercive Use of Cyber Power
This analysis explores the applicability of traditional theories of coercion to the cyber
domain. We identify four key elements of coercion—communication, cost–benefit cal-
culus, credibility, and reassurance—and assess how each manifests itself in cyberspace.
We then analyze the utility of various warfighting strategies that seek to undermine an
adversary’s ability and/or willingness to resist and find that, based on the current state
of the field, only three—attrition, denial, and decapitation—are likely to be useful for
aspiring coercers in cyberspace. However, even these strategies are most useful in con-
junction with conventional instruments of power and/or diplomacy; cyber power is
rarely, if ever, independently decisive. For policymakers, this suggests that, especially if
a coercing state has an asymmetrical advantage in other elements of national power,
using cyber power to enable espionage, sabotage, and other shaping operations to sup-
port a cross-domain coercive strategy may be a more effective use of cyber capabilities
than employing it as an independent instrument of state power.
This framework also highlights the importance of indices and developing an
understanding of another state’s intentions in cyberspace due to the high risk of
misperception, which can lead to unintended outcomes and inadvertent escalation.
105Jayavardhana Gubbi et al., “Internet of Things (IoT): A Vision, Architectural Elements, and Future Directions,” Future
Generation Computer Systems 29, no. 4 (September 2013): 1645–60.
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A policy implication of this is that states should focus intelligence-collection efforts
on developing an advanced understanding of the cyber capabilities and aspirations
of potential adversaries. In addition to indices, states may also send signals through
the use of cyber attacks. However, since neither of these signaling mechanisms is
inherently clear, the most likely way to convey the intent behind an action in
cyberspace is to ensure attribution and couple the event with a diplomatic message
or place it within the context of a conventional military operation. Furthermore,
for cyber power to be an effective coercive tool, the target needs to believe that an
attack will cease once she complies with the coercer’s demands. This would require
assurances that would have to come via established means that often do not yet
exist. Providing a credible reassurance is difficult because many types of cyber
attacks, such as DDoS attacks, can come from numerous users and make it difficult
for the threatening state to credibly demonstrate it exerts control over a decentral-
ized network of attackers. This leads to a paradox in which the type of cyber attack
that is most likely to aid in reassuring a victim may also not be able to generate the
punishment that would be necessary for capitulation.
Cyber power can be used as a coercive instrument of state power but, once the
theory of coercion meets the reality of cyber operations, many attractive targets
may become too costly and out of reach for a state to attack in a timely manner.
Therefore, governments are more likely to pursue coercive strategies that allow for
a wide variety of targets that are more easily accessible than hardened critical infra-
structure. In other words, long development timelines and access constraints often
mean that policymakers cannot attack their ideal target(s) in a timely manner and,
therefore, are more likely to pursue warfighting strategies that do not necessitate
sudden and intense devastation but, rather, inflict costs against vulnerable public
and private interests. Given current levels of dependency on technology, this type
of attack would provide damaging, but limited, effects. This has unique and poten-
tially troubling implications. Since the end of the Second World War, many states
have sought to limit their coercive attacks to key pieces of government and military
infrastructure out of ethical and legal concerns surrounding targeting civilian
infrastructure (and due to the domestic and international political costs of doing
so). However, given that in cyberspace much of the vulnerable infrastructure is
owned by private industry, policymakers may reevaluate norms against targeting
these systems as they pursue attrition, denial, or decapitation strategies. Cyber war-
fighting strategies that intentionally target civilian infrastructure, such as punish-
ment and risk, are currently nonviable and ineffective. However, as technology
evolves and the Internet of Things makes societies both more interconnected and
vulnerable, states may find strategies that explicitly aim to wreak havoc on civilian
populations more effective. Together, this suggests that, at the domestic level, gov-
ernments should strive to continue to build resiliency into civilian networks and,
at the international level, norms governing appropriate targeting in the cyber
domain are urgently needed.
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